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FREEDOM'S ASSOCIATIONS
Jason Mazzone*
This Article offers a new approach to the protection of associations under the Constitution.
Although the modem Supreme Court's doctrine of freedom of association is based on expression,
in the early Republic associations were understood not in terms of free speech, but in terms of
freedom of assembly and popular sovereignty. On this account, associations are constitutionally
significant because they allow for self-government. Popular sovereignty also offers a more useful
basis for understanding freedom of association today. This Article therefore provides tools for
assessing the proper scope of constitutional protections for associations once they are understood in
terms of popular sovereignty, and for evaluating governmental regulations of associational life.
This Article shows that associations merit constitutional protection if they directly engage in
political activities, or if they equip their members with politically relevant skills. This Article sorts
out different kinds of associations and evaluates the proper scope of their associational
freedom.With respect to the contentious issue of whether associations should be exempt from anti-
discrimination laws, the popular sovereignty approach suggests that only small, member-intensive
associations should be free to select their members without governmental interference. While
mass-membership organizations like the Boy Scouts or even political parties may merit some
constitutional protection, their significance to popular sovereignty does not depend on their
exemption from laws prohibiting discrimination.
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PROLOGUE
Traveling to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635, Anne Hutchinson
gathered together other women passengers to discuss the weekly sermons
they heard aboard their ship.' Once arrived in Boston, Hutchinson continued
the tradition by opening her home twice a week to women friends for
discussion.' She was promptly criticized by the Puritan establishment for
"maintaining a meeting and an assembly in [her] house that hath been
condemned by the general assembly as a thing not tolerable nor comely in
the sight of God nor fitting for [her] sex."'3 During the next two hundred
years or so, the Puritan church oversaw women's groups, organizing them as
sewing circles with readings and discussion of religious texts.4 By the 1800s
the sewing had become secondary to study and discussion; still, these
women's groups were careful to avoid any hint that they were engaged in
education or politics. 5 Margaret Fuller, for instance, in the late 1840s, held
"Conversations on Literature and Culture" in Elizabeth Peabody's bookstore
in Boston.6 Addressing an audience of mostly women, Fuller remained
seated during her talks so as not to be considered a public lecturer.7
In the late 1860s, women's study groups spread across the United States,
increasing in number through the 1890s and into the early part of the
twentieth century! Historians explain that during the social and economic
upheaval in the period immediately following the Civil War, women turned
to each other for community and stability.9 Excluded from public life,
women used clubs as a way to explore their role in society and to examine
that role against the egalitarian promise of the War." By 1906, the General
Federation of Women's Clubs reported five thousand organizational
members; all told, there were probably ten to twenty times that number of
1. See THEODORA PENNY MARTIN, THE SOUND OF OUR OWN VOICES: WOMEN'S STUDY CLUBS,
1860-1910, at 6 (1987).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 8.
5. See id. at 8-9.
6. See id. at 9.
7. See id.
8. See KARENJ. BLAIR, THE CLUBWOMAN AS FEMINIST: TRUEWOMANHOODREDEFINED, 1868-1914,
at63 (1980); MARTIN, supra note 1, at 14.
9. See MARTIN, supra note 1, at 14-30.
10. See id. at 15-30.
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clubs in existence at the time.11 These small, local groups of middle-aged
women met in each other's homes to study art, music, geography and
literature.12 Typically, the clubs had written constitutions and followed
parliamentary procedure in organizing discussion; many clubs had club
songs, pledges at the start of meetings, and club mottoes.13 The clubs had a
tremendous influence on their participants. Clubwomen were intensely loyal,
remaining members year after year. 4 The clubs taught women confidence
and solidarity."5 In clubs women learned, often for the first time, to evaluate
and criticize ideas; they also learned that despite differences of opinion there
could still be lasting friendship and connection.' 6 A common theme at the
time was that "one joins a club not so much to acquire information, because
that can be done at home, but rather to learn to express oneself readily and
intelligently."
17
Some of the early study groups continue to exist today. The Claremont
Book Club, for instance, whose original purpose was "to keep abreast of
current literature and to aid the war effort by knitting for the Red Cross," has
been meeting in California since 1917.18 In 1991, the group provided
comfort and support to members who lost their homes in the Oakland fires. 9
Beginning in the 1890s many women's study clubs changed their focus,
becoming less engaged in study, and more socially and politically active.'
The club members began to see their study as too insular and, equipped with
skills and confidence through their club experience, they looked to make
reforms in broader society.2 One club president's comments summed up the
mood: "Ladies, you have chosen me as your leader. Well, I have an
important piece of news for you. Dante is dead. He has been dead for several
centuries, and I think it is time we dropped the study of his inferno and
11. See id. at3.
12. See id. at 66-69.
13. See id.
14. See BLAIR, supra note 8, at 60-63.
15. See id. at 130-31.
16. See id.
17. See MARTIN, supra note 1, at 94.
18. See ELLEN SLEZAK, THE BOOK GROUP BOOK 46-49 (1993).
19. See id. at 47-49.
20. See BLAIR, supra note 8, at 93-98.
21. See id. at 93.
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turned our attention to our own. 22 Of particular focus were promoting
libraries and advocating increased educational opportunities for women. 3
By the first decades of the twentieth century, many clubwomen turned
their energies away from study altogether, taking what they had learned in
the clubs to aid political causes such as the suffrage movement. 24 Although
the study clubs declined in number as a result, the participation of these
women in political life was born out of their early association with other
members on the basis of shared interests and a search for solidarity.
25
This Article is about that kind of association.
I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of association is not among the specific protections of the
Constitution, but the United States Supreme Court has recognized such a
right under the First Amendment.26 In early cases involving freedom of
association, the Court found that government interference with membership
in associations undermined the ability of individuals to engage in political
advocacy.27 In recent years, groups have asserted freedom of association as a
defense to the application of state laws prohibiting them from discriminating
in their selection of members.28 In considering those claims, the Court has
characterized the right at issue as the "freedom of expressive association"
and therefore focused on whether the inclusion of a particular individual
would impair the message the organization seeks to impart.29 In its most
recent decision in this line of cases, the Court upheld the right of the Boy
Scouts of America to discharge James Dale, a gay Eagle Scout.30 The Court
held that the Boy Scouts enjoy freedom of association because they engage
in expressive activity.31 Since the presence of a gay scout would significantly
impair the Scouts' ability to impart their views-which, the Court found,
include disapproval of homosexuality-the Court held the First Amendment
22. Id. at 172.
23. See id. at 93-100.
24. See id. at 111-12.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
27. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
28. See infra Part I.E & F.
29. See id.
30. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
31. See id. at 649-50.
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exempts the Scouts from New Jersey's law against sexual orientation
discrimination."
The analysis of freedom of association in the Supreme Court's recent
opinions and in the discussion by commentators33 is deficient in many
respects. It is at once insufficiently protective of the associational interests at
stake and insensitive to the government's interest in regulating certain types
of associational activity. Much legal writing on freedom of association lacks
any firm theoretical understanding of why the Constitution protects freedom
of association and what exactly is at stake in safeguarding this right. Little
effort has so far been made to understand in a detailed and serious manner
what it is about associating that warrants constitutional protection. As a
result, existing approaches prove unsatisfactory for identifying legitimate
claims to freedom of association and the proper scope of such claims, as well
as for determining the permissible reach of governmental regulations of
associational life.
Forreasons I discuss further below, the modem notion of "expression" is
a dubious peg on which to hang a constitutional right of free association.34
Despite a series of judicial decisions (and much academic writing), the
concept of "expressive association"--which is of course not mentioned in
the Constitution-remains quite vague. Some associations, for example
commercial entities, receive little or no protection on this basis even though
they might be highly expressive. Therefore, expression cannot be the only
criterion motivating the present analysis. But few attempts have been made
to articulate the full range of relevant considerations in analyzing claims to
associational freedom.
32. See id. at 656.
33. There is a large amount of literature on freedom of association. See generally Victor Brudney,
Association, Advocacy and the FirstAmendment, 4WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995); Dale Carpenter,
Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1515 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest ofAssociations, 9 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 595 (2001); David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists,
and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. Cr. REV. 203; Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person
Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L REv. 1483 (2001); Richard W.
Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Association, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1841 (2001); Katherine A. Moerke & David W. Selden, Associations Are People Too, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1475 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, The Hollywood Ten, and the
First Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MiNN. L. REV. 1669 (2001); William P. Marshall,
Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nwv. U. L. REV. 68 (1986); Deborah L Rhode,
Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U. L REv. 106 (1986).
34. See infra Part Ill.
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The proper scope of freedom of expressive association also remains hard
to discern. It requires judges to engage in the uncertain enterprise of
determining, on an ad hoc basis, whether a particular organization's specific
message is undermined by a particular governmental regulation. This
approach, as widespread surprise with the Court's Dale decision
demonstrates, gives us few tools to determine or predict what types of
governmental regulations of what kinds of associations unduly infringe
constitutional interests. More generally, expressive association has shifted
the focus away from associating and to the more familiar First Amendment
territory of speech, messages, and the like. The end result is a discussion of
associational expression rather than a careful constitutional analysis of
association itself.
Perhaps most strikingly, contemporary analysis of freedom of association
proceeds in a piece-meal fashion that is oddly removed from broader issues
and implications. The doctrine of freedom of association has emerged from a
very narrow discussion of a few specific types of organizations, in particular
advocacy groups (such as the NAACP) and so-called voluntary associations
like Rotary, the Jaycees, and the Scouts. There are, of course, many other
instances of citizens "associating" together: in commercial organizations,
churches, schools, parades, and theaters to name a few. But these
associations (and others) are routinely excluded from modem accounts of
freedom of association. They are either defined away as unconnected to the
analysis at hand or else they are just ignored (and discussed under different
doctrines entirely). The failure to explain adequately what associational
freedom is, why it matters, and how we can identify where it exists leaves
aside a host of seemingly relevant forms of associating.
This Article seeks to enrich the legal understanding of freedom of
association by offering an account that is more attentive to the purposes for
protecting freedom of association under the Constitution and more
sociological in considering the nature of associational life. Rather than
relying on general notions of "expressive association" and the like (which
seem to me more like slogans than tools for constitutional analysis), I take a
fresh look at association and its proper scope of constitutional protection.
Why, in other words, does the Constitution safeguard the ability of citizens
to come together? In answering this question, one that has so far received
very little attention, I argue that instead of developing a new doctrine of
"expressive association," there is a much firmer constitutional basis for
protecting the rights of citizens to come together in collective activities: the
First Amendment right of freedom of assembly and petition. While the
assembly and petition clause is today largely ignored in First Amendment
Vol. 77:639, 2002
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analysis, the rights to assemble and petition were historically core political
values (to which freedom of speech was often quite secondary).35
In analyzing claims of freedom of association, rather than working
backwards from expression, we should begin instead with the reasons for
and the proper scope of constitutional protections for free assembly and
petition. This approach is preferable because in the early Republic it was
against the right of assembly and petition that associations were
understood. 6 On that score, consistent with the assembly and petition clause,
freedom of association is protected under the First Amendment because
associations represent instances of popular sovereignty.
Freedom of association at its core is a political right, a right of self-
governance. Associations empower citizens to exert political influence and
to keep government in check. It is in this sense that citizen groups are-as I
call them in my title-freedom's associations. They are a form of popular
sovereignty in democratic government. This understanding is sounder as a
matter of constitutional interpretation and historical experience than is
today's prevailing account of freedom of association as a right of expression.
The remainder of this Article identifies the circumstances under which
courts should recognize and protect a claim of freedom of association once it
is conceived as protecting popular sovereignty.37 In taking up this issue, I
argue that freedom of association is properly understood to apply to
organizations that seek to influence political outcomes. The popular
sovereignty account therefore provides a firm rationale for distinguishing
political associations from associations involved in economic or social
activity. At the same time, many non-political associations teach their
members to develop shared programs, to coordinate their actions, and to
undertake collective projects. They provide their members with political
opportunities by connecting them with other citizens, raising their awareness
and knowledge of political issues, and alerting them to political events and
organizations. These features make many kinds of non-political associations
important to popular sovereignty. In the early years of the twentieth century,
women's sewing and study circles taught their members skills and values
they could later bring to political and social causes. 38 Similarly, many
associations are significant training grounds for political engagement, even if
35. See infra Part V.D.
36. See id.
37. See itfra Part VI.
38. See supra Prologue.
647
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politics is not their stated purpose. We should, therefore, understand freedom
of association to protect both politically active associations as well as
associations that politicize their members.39
In protecting both of these varieties of associations we need also to be
attentive to the proper scope of the constitutional right in each instance."0
Political associations do not require the same kinds of protections as the non-
political associations significant to popular sovereignty because they provide
their members with skills and experiences useful for participating in politics.
In particular, I show that freedom of association should not be construed to
exempt an association from anti-discrimination law just because the
association itself is involved in political activities. Only politicizing
associations, those that are protected because they prepare their members for
politics, need relief from anti-discrimination law and similar forms of
governmental interference with the selection of members.
Accordingly, while organizations like the women's clubs of the
nineteenth century should be exempt from anti-discrimination law, freedom
of association does not require granting the same exemption to mass-
membership organizations like political parties or the Boy Scouts. The
reason the Court's decision in Dale was incorrect, therefore, is not that the
Boy Scouts merit no constitutional protection. Rather, recognizing that the
organization may contribute to political life in a manner contemplated by the
assembly and petition clause, those contributions do not depend on the
Scouts' ability to discriminate against gay members.41
Part II provides an overview of the Supreme Court's freedom of
association jurisprudence. Part III identifies the shortcomings in the Court's
analysis and related academic commentary. Part IV draws on theoretical and
empirical work in the social sciences to identify the features of associations
that are relevant to their protection under the First Amendment. Part V
develops an account of freedom of association as protecting popular
sovereignty. Part VI offers a methodology for distinguishing among different
kinds of associations and for evaluating the proper scope of their
constitutional protection and applies this methodology to revisit recent cases.
Part VII offers concluding thoughts.
39. See infra Part VI.B.
40 See infra Part VI.C.
41. See infra Part VI.D.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION CASE
LAW
A. Speech: Patterson
Freedom of association is not among the Constitution's explicit
protections.4 2 The United States Supreme Court first recognized a right of
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas"
in 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.43 In Patterson, the Court
held that a state court order requiring the NAACP to divulge its membership
lists constituted "a substantial restraint upon the exercise by [the NAACP' s]
members of their right to freedom of association"'  and that the order was
therefore unconstitutional. s The freedom of association recognized in
Patterson fell squarely within the First Amendment. The Court explained:
42. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("The association of people is not
mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights").
43. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). In earlier cases, the Court bad hinted at a right of free association. See
Sweezy v. New Hampshire byWyman, 354 U.S. 234,245,250-51 (1957); Watkdns v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 197-99 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957); Am.
Communications Ass'n, C.LO. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,392-93,402-04 (1950).
44. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
45. Id. The Court in Patterson did not discuss an earlier case, N.Y. ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63 (1928), which upheld a statute requiring associations with twenty or more members to file a copy
of their constitution and rules along with a membership list and made it a misdemeanor to become a
member of an association which failed to comply with these requirements. See id. at 72. In Zimmerman, a
Ku Klux Klan member challenged the statute as "depriv[ing] him of liberty in thatitprevent[ed] him from
exercising his right of membership in the association." Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
"[t]here can be no doubt that under that [police] power the state may prescribe and apply to associations
having an oath-bound membership any reasonable regulation calculated to confine their purposes and
activities within limits which are consistent with the rights of others and the public welfare." Id.
Describing the Klan's activities as entailing "a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and negroes, and
stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices," id. at 76, and observing that the Klan "was striving for
political power, and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state, and national
affairs," id., the Zimmerman Court justified the disclosure statute "as an effective ... deterrent from the
violations of public and private right to which the association might be tempted." Id. at 72.
The Court in Zimmerman did not make clear whether it viewed freedom of association as a First
Amendment right. However, it is difficult to see Patterson as representing an evolution in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence. Shortly after Patterson, the Court upheld a federal order requiring the
Communist Party to disclose its membership list as justified by the government's interest in protecting the
nation against the "world Communist movement ... whose purposes it is by whatever means necessary to
establish Communist totalitarian dictatorship." Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 93 (1961).
Washington Law Review Vol. 77:639, 2002
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It
is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state
action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny.
4 6
On this view, freedom of association is a necessary precondition to free
speech. It is therefore protected in order to safeguard First Amendment
speech interests.47
One way to understand Zimmerman and Communist Party of the United States, especially in light of
Patterson, is that while the Court protected associations with political viewpoints, it was unwilling to
protect associations engaged in violence. On this understanding, little justification is required to regulate
an association organized to overthrow the existing government. See Communist Party of the United States,
367 U.S. at 96-97 ("When existing government is menaced by a... movement which employs every
combination of possible means, peaceful and violent ... to destroy the government itself.. . the
legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met consistently with the safeguarding of personal
freedom is not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods.").
46. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61 (citations omitted).
47. Since Patterson, the Court has suggested that the Constitution may protect associational freedom
independently of its role in furthering speech. In Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), the Court held that a city ordinance limiting to $250
contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures was unconstitutional. See id. at
292. Citing Patterson and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (which struck down provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act limiting expenditures by individuals, see 424 U.S. at 44-45), the Berkeley
Court invoked the "freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard
on public issues." 454 U.S. at 295. The Court's particular concern was that the ordinance worked an
inequity between associations and individuals: it allowed individuals on their own to spend unlimited
amounts to advocate a view on a ballot measure, but it imposed restrictions on spending by people
working together. See id. at 296. The decision also contains language suggesting that associational
interests may be protected not just for the ends that they serve but as an independent right. See id. at 300.
("The restraint ... plainly contravenes both the right of association and the speech guarantees of the First
Amendment."). It is nonetheless difficult to treat Berkeley as standing for a firm proposition that
associational rights may be infringed independently of any additional constitutional interest which such
rights further. The Berkeley Court specified that association is "virtually inseparable" from speech; given
that the Court made clear that the spending limits imposed by the ordinance would be unconstitutional
even if they also applied to individuals, see id. at 297-99, it is not certain that the Court would reach the
same result if associations were merely treated differently than individuals.
650
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B. Burdens on Speech
In a series of cases applying the speech rationale of Patterson, the Court
has identified various ways in which government action may infringe
freedom of association. The first is by imposing burdens on certain
associations. A case in point is Healey v. James,48 in which the Court ruled
that the Central Connecticut State College could not deny recognition and
the use of campus facilities to a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS).49 The Court found that withholding these privileges without
sufficient justification abridged the students' First Amendment rights to
freedom of association."
A second way government action may infringe associational freedom is
by burdening individuals or denying them benefits because of their
associational ties, thereby increasing the costs associated with membership.5'
In Shelton v. Tucker,52 for example, the Court held unconstitutional an
Arkansas statute that required teachers employed in a state-supported school
Other cases also contain language suggesting that associational freedom may be an independent right,
notjust an accessory to First Amendment expression. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,298-99
(1966) (describing "the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express his preferences
and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses," and noting
that "[a] private golf club ... restricted to either Negro or white membership is one expression of freedom
of association:'); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Prejudice and
bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close his home or
club to any person or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the basis of personal
prejudices including race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are
themselves constitutionally protected liberties.").
48. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
49. See id. at 194.
50. See id. at 181-82. The Court observed: "Among the rights protected by the First Amendmentis the
right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not
explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech,
assembly, and petition." Id. at 181.
51. See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. at 185-86 ("[Ihe Court has consistently disapproved governmental
action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization .... [Gluilt by association alone, without establishing that an
individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government is an impermissible basis upon which
to deny First Amendment rights. The government has the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with
an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims.")
(quotation, citations, and alteration omitted) (collecting cases); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
460-62 (1965) (holding that a federal statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to
serve as officer or employee of labor union is an unconstitutional bill of attainder); Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (holding that the state may not refuse bar admission
solely on the basis of past membership in the Communist Party).
52. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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or college to file an annual affidavit listing every organization to which the
teacher belonged or contributed during the preceding five years.53 The Court
distinguished the disclosure statute from the statute at issue in Patterson on
the ground that a school has a legitimate interest in screening teachers. 54
Nonetheless, the Court found that the disclosure requirement in Shelton
unduly impaired the teachers' freedom of association because it required
revealing membership in associations that did not bear on a teacher's fitness
to teach. In so holding, the Court stated that the "right of free association
[is] a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free
speech, lies at the foundation of a free society. '56 Echoing Patterson, the
Shelton Court placed particular emphasis on the risk that a disclosure
requirement undermines participation. Observing that the statute did not
specify that information disclosed would remain confidential,57 the Court
noted that "[e]ven if there were no disclosure to the general public, the
pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who
control his professional destiny would be constant and heavy.
' 58
A third way the government may infringe associational freedom is by
requiring membership in an association in order to receive a governmental
benefit. Not all such schemes are impermissible. The Court has, for instance,
upheld against freedom of association challenges integrated bars in which a
license to practice law is conditioned on bar association membership and
payment of membership fees. 59 The Court has been less willing to sanction
compelled membership that implicates political interests. In Elrod v. Burns,
60
the Court held unconstitutional the actions of a sheriff who discharged
public employees such as security officers because they were not
Democrats. 6 The Elrod Court held that the discharges violated the
employees' rights of "political belief and association [which] constitute the
core of those activities protected by the First Amendment."6' The Court
found that the state's asserted interest in political loyalty only extended to
employees in policy-making positions and did not reach the lower-level
53. See id. at 480.
54. See id. at 485.
55. See id. at 488.
56. Id. at 486.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 842-43 (1961).
60. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
61. See id. at351.
62. Id. at 357.
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employees the sheriff had fired.63 Similarly in Branti v. Finkel' the Court
reiterated the holding of Elrod and found unconstitutional the actions of a
county public defender in discharging assistant public defenders because
they were Republicans. 65 The Court explained how "party affiliation may be
an acceptable requirement for some types of government employment. Thus,
if an employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge
of his public duties, his First Amendment rights may be required to yield to
the State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and
efficiency. 66 Nevertheless, the Court found that the work of assistant public
defenders has "no bearing whatsoever on partisan political concerns," 67 and
concluded that, under the First Amendment, they could not be discharged on
the basis of their political affiliation.
6
C. Unions and Bar Associations
Freedom of association has also arisen in cases involving unions. 69 In
early cases, courts viewed associations among co-workers as unlawful
conspiracies. ° In addition to criminal penalties, labor organizers risked
63. See id. at 367.
64. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
65. See id. at 517-19.
66. Id. at 517.
67. Id. at 519.
68. See id at 519-20.
69. Early labor organizers "detached themselves from economic theories that explicitlyjustified the use
of collective action to control or govern the marketplace. Instead, they placed their faith in a looser
tradition of individual 'rights' that linked their interests and freedom of maneuver to those of the citizenry
at large." Leon Fink, Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American
Constitutional Order, 74 J. AM. HIST. 904, 908 (1987). By the end of the nineteenth century, unions
invoked the First Amendment assembly clause to justify their collective activities. See id. at 915.
70. The earliest case on point is the 1806 Philadelphia-Cordwainers Case (Commonwealth v. Pullis), in
which ajury found a group of several cordwainers in the shoe industry guilty of combining to raise their
wages. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 113 (John R. Commons &
Eugene A. Gilmore eds., 1910). See generally I JOHN R. COLLINS ET AL, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES 138-52 (1918); CHRISTOPHER L TOmt.INs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENTIN AMEIuCA, 1880-1960,at 101-219 (1985);
MARJORIE S. TURNER, THE EARLY AMERICAN LABOR CONSPIRACY CASES: THEIR PLACEIN LABOR LAW,
A REINTERPRETATION (1967); Morris D. Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy andIts Modern
Application to Labor, 40 TEX. L REV. 303 (1962); HerbertHovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American
Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L REV. 919, 922-24 (1988); Wythe Holt, Labor Conspiracy Cases in the
United States, 1805-1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication, 22 OSGOODEHALLI-J.
591 (1984); Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE LJ. 165 (1931); Edwin E. Witte,
Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE LJ. 825 (1926).
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liability to employers in tort.71 In 1898, Congress passed the Erdman Act72 to
prohibit so-called "yellow-dog" contracts (in which employers conditioned
employment on the employee's agreement not to join a union) but ten years
later the Supreme Court held that the Act was an improper exercise of
Congress' commerce power.73 The Court also invalidated similar state efforts
to protect union activities as violating individual rights of contract under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 74
Since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 193575 federal
statutory law has safeguarded the rights of employees to associate in unions
and to engage in collective bargaining with their employers.76 Employees can
be required, pursuant to union-shop provisions, to join a union as a condition
of employment, to finance activities of the union, and to be bound by
agreements the union reaches with an employer.77 The Court has upheld
these aspects of federal law while recognizing they implicate First
Amendment interests.7 s
Employees cannot, however, be forced to support a union's political
speech.79 In the case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,0 the Supreme
court held that non-union teachers in a public school could not be required,
under an agency-shop provision of a collective bargain agreement between
the union and the employer school board, to finance the expressive activities
71. See, e.g., Vegelan v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896)
[W]hen a plaintiff proves that several persons have combined and conspired to injure his
business, and have done acts producing that effect, he shows temporal damage and a cause of
action, unless the facts disclose, or the defendants prove, some ground of excuse or
justification. And I take it to be settled, and rightly settled, that doing that damage by
combined persuasion is actionable, as well as doing it by falsehood or by force.
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
72. 30 Stat 424 (1898).
73. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908). In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 187 (1941), the Court recognized that Adair and similar holdings had been "sapped of their
authority" by subsequent cases.
74. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)
76. See id. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 36-43 (1937), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act.
77. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (the "Railway Labor Act' or "RLA").
78. See Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,448 (1984); Ry. Employees v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 236-38 (1956).
79. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455-56 (recognizing First Amendment limits on the uses to which unions can
put funds obtained from dissenting employees); Int'l Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,749-71
(1961) (construing the RLA not to authorize expenditure for political causes).
80. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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of the union.8' Writing that "[o]ur decisions establish with unmistakable
clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 82 and that "[tihe fact that the appellants are compelled to
make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights,"83 the
Abood Court held that "the Constitution requires ... that [the] expenditures
be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by those employees who
do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so
against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment."'
A similar principle applies to bar associations. In Keller v. State Bar of
California,85 the Court held that although abar association may use collected
dues to fund activities "germane" to "regulating the legal profession and
improving the quality of legal services,"" where bar membership is required
to practice law, the association may not use dues to fund more ideological
activities.37 Bar members cannot, for example, be required to finance
literature on the bar association's position on gun control laws. 8
A fourth way, then, that the government may infringe associational
freedom is by co-opting association: by using an association of citizens to
advance the government's own expression. In Abood and Keller, the
government could not use existing associational ties to further its own
expressive ends. 9
81. See id. at 235-36.
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Id. at 235-36.
85. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
86. Id. at 13.
87. See id. at 14.
88. See id. at 16.
89. See Abood, 431 U.S. at235-36; Keller, 496 U.S. at 14-16. But see Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217,233-34 (2000) (upholding mandatory student fee program under which collected fees were




Freedom of association has also arisen in cases involving political
parties.90 In a series of cases addressing the procedures for selecting party
delegates, the Court has underscored the associational rights of political
parties and their members. In Kusper v. Pontikes,91 the Court explained that
the "freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments"92 and that "[t]he right to associate
with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic
constitutional freedom." 93 Consequently, the Court struck down an Illinois
statute prohibiting a voter from voting in the primary of one party within
twenty-three months of voting in another party's primary.94 Similarly, in
Cousins v. Wigoda,95 the Court held that a state court injunction prohibiting
a rival set of delegates from attending the 1972 Democratic National
Convention violated the associational freedom of the enjoined delegates and
of the National Democratic Party.96 In several subsequent cases, the Court
also invalidated, on freedom of association grounds, legislative interference
with the selection of convention delegates. 97 In one typical case, the Court
explained the problem in the following terms:
Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter has the
right to associate with the political party of her choice, but also that a
political party has a right to identify the people who constitute the
90. For useful commentary on these cases, see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of
Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L REV. 191 (1982); and
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L
REV. 1741 (1993).
91. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
92. Id. at 56-57.
93. Id. at 57.
94. See id. at 61.
95. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
96. See id. at 487.
97. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,586(2000) (invalidating "blankef'primary
election system in which all registered voters, regardless of party membership, could vote for any
candidate, regardless of party); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,229
(1989) (invalidating state law prohibiting parties from endorsing candidates in a primary election);
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,225 (1986) (affirming right of party to hold open
primary against state rules requiring closed primary); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 120-26 (1981) (similar).
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association, and to select a standard bearer who best represents the
party's ideologies and preferences."
The Court has also invoked associational freedom in the context of state
impediments to the formation of new political parties. In Norman v. Reed,99
the Court limited the ability of states to require a candidate from a new party
to demonstrate public support before being placed on election ballots."'
Under Illinois law, a new party was required to collect nominating signatures
from twenty-five thousand voters before fielding candidates for statewide
office."0' Candidates running for office solely within a large political
subdivision also needed the signatures of twenty-five thousand voters. 0 2 But
if the subdivision comprised separate districts from which officials were
elected, a candidate had to collect twenty-five thousand signatures from each
individual district. 03 The Court held that this scheme violated the
associational freedom of new party candidates because it was not sufficiently
tailored to the state's interest in ensuring new parties had sufficient public
support." 4 In so holding, the Court explained the constitutional right at issue
as the right of "citizens to create and develop new political parties," a right
that "derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments and advances the
constitutional interest of like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of common
political ends, thus enlarging the opportunities of all voters to express their
own political preferences."' 0 5
Political parties have at times excluded individuals seeking to join, raising
the issue of the extent of a party's freedom to choose its members. In a series
of cases beginning in 1927, the Court invalidated efforts by the Texas
Democratic Party to exclude African-Americans from voting in the state
Democratic primary elections. 0 6 However, in these so-called White Primary
98. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (quotations and citations omitted).
99. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
100. See id. at 292-94.
101. See id. at 282-83.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 292-94.
105. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted).
106. The sequence of the holdings is as follows: In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Court
invalidated a Texas statute prohibiting African-Americans from voting in the primary elections. See id. at
540-41. In Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), the Court invalidated as unconstitutional state action a
resolution excluding African-Americans from voting in the primary passed by the Democratic Executive
Committee pursuant to a state statute. See id. at 88. In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), the Court
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Cases, the Court characterized a party's regulation of a primary election that
is "integral" to the general election process as a state action.'0 7 The Court
therefore avoided determining whether the associational freedom of political
parties extends to race-based discrimination in membership.
0 8
E. Membership and Expression: Roberts and its Progeny
An association's freedom to select its members was central to two cases in
the 1980s involving the ability of the Jaycees'09 and Rotary"0 to deny
membership to women, and to a third case involving discrimination by a
contingency of New York social clubs."'
1. The Jaycees
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,' 2 the all-male Jaycees sued
Minnesota officials claiming that the application of the state's Human Rights
Act, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in "places of public
accommodation," violated the organization's freedom of association."' The
Supreme Court disagreed and held that Minnesota could require the Jaycees
to admit women as full members of the organization."
14
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court described two distinct types
of associational freedoms protected by the Constitution: "freedom of
intimate association" and "freedom of expressive association."" s Intimate
association, according to Roberts, is itself a"fundamental... liberty," and is
protected as such. 16 Expressive association, on the other hand, is protected
upheld against a state action challenge a similar resolution adopted at the state party convention. See id. at
55. In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court overruled Grovey and held that the regulation of
a primary election integral to the general election is state action. See id. at 664. In Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953), the Court also invalidated a scheme by which white party members gathered to select a
candidate before the actual primary. See id. at 463.
107. See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664.
108. See id.
109. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
110. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
111. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
112. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
113. See id. at 615.
114. See id. at 624-27.
115. Id. at618.
116. Id. at 617.
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because it is "indispensable... [to] preserving""1 7 freedom of speech. Thus,
whereas intimate association is intrinsically protected, expressive association
is protected for its instrumental value."'
2. Intimate Association
In describing "freedom of intimate association," the Roberts Court
invoked case law protecting a constitutional "zone of privacy."11 9 The Court
explained that "the Bill of Rights... afford[s] the formation and
preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State."'12 The
Roberts Court identifies two considerations underlying this freedom of
intimate association. First, "certain kinds of personal bonds have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.''
Second, protection of intimate association "reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with
others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty."' 2
117. Id. at 618.
118. See id. The Court in Roberts recognized that these two forms of associational freedom may
overlap: "The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally protected association may, of course,
coincide. In particular, when the State interferes with individuals' selection of those with whom they wish
to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association in both of its forms may be implicated." Id.
119. See id. at 618-19 (citing inter alia Zablocki v. Redhair, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)).
120" Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
121. Id. at 618-19.
122. Id. The Courts description suggests that intimate association is also, in some sense, instrumental:
intimate association facilitates ideals and beliefs, which are also First Amendment values. Intimate
association might, then, be viewed as promoting personal beliefs; expressive association as promoting
more publicly formed and expressed ideas. But the Court suggests that more is at stake in intimate
association than the possible ways in which such association may serve First Amendment interests. See id.
The Court attaches importance to the notion that there is something inherently valuable about personal
ties. See Ed. They create a space, a "critical buffero] between the individual and the powerof the State," id.
at 619, providing individuals with "emotional enrichment," d., and "the ability to independently define
one's identity," id. By contrast, expressive associations are formed specifically for purposes that are
protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 622. The distinction therefore seems to be that whereas
individuals may often develop and share ideas through intimate associations, they are not necessarily
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The freedom of intimate association recognized in Roberts is quite
limited. The Court observed that "the relationships that might be entitled to
this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and
sustenance of a family-marriage; the raising and education of children; and
cohabitation with one's relatives."'123 These "[flamily relationships, by their
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life."'124 Each of these types of relationships, according to the Court,
"are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion
from others in critical aspects of the relationship. ' ' "as The Court contrasted
associations exhibiting these features with "a large business enterprise,"'
26
which could not make a supportable claim to freedom of intimate
association. 27 "Between these poles," the Court observed, "of course lies a
broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to
constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State.' '128 The
Court explained that "determining the limits of state authority over an
individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore
unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments." 129 However, the Roberts Court
declined to "mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any
precision,' 130 and instead simply noted that, in determining whether an
association is sufficiently intimate, "factors that may be relevant include size,
formed for that purpose. Indeed, an intimate association (such as a family) is protected without regard to
its value in promoting and transmitting ideas as such. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at486 ("We deal with
a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to a degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."). Expressive association, on the other hand, requires a
closer nexus between association and protected expression.
123. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 619-20.








purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a
particular case may be pertinent."' 3' The Roberts Court saw any further
explanation unnecessary because, applying these characteristics, it had no
doubt that the Jaycees-a large national organization with fairly unselective
(except for gender) membership policies-fell outside the reach of intimate
association.' 32 Therefore, while Roberts left open the possibility of intimate
association extending beyond the family, the Court gave no indication of any
association it viewed as sufficiently intimate to have a valid claim to
constitutional protection on this basis.
3. Expressive Association
Turning to expressive association, the Roberts Court found this right
"plainly implicated"' 33 in light of the Jaycees' expressive activities:
[A] not insubstantial part of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected
expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. Over the
years, the national and local levels of the organization have taken
public positions on a number of diverse issues and members of the
Jaycees regularly engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying,
fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection
under the First Amendment. 1
34
The Court observed that the government may infringe rights of expressive
association by "impos[ing] penalties or withhold[ing] benefits from
individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group,"'35 or by
"requir[ing] disclosure of the fact of membership in a group seeking
anonymity,' '136 or by, as here, "interfer[ing] with the internal organization or
affairs of the group.' 37 In that regard, the Court stated that
[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the
131. Id.
132. Id. at 620-21.
133. Id. at 622.
134. Id. at 626-27 (quotations and citations omitted).
135. Id. at 622.
136. Id. at 622-23.
137. Id. at 623.
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group to accept members it does not desire. Such a regulation may
impair the ability of the original members to express only those views
that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.
1 38
Applying strict scrutiny analysis, 139 the Court concluded that Minnesota's
statute could, nonetheless, be constitutionally applied to the Jaycees because
the statute served the compelling state interest of eliminating gender
discrimination, 140 the statute did not aim to suppress speech, 4' and the
statute advanced the state's interest by the least restrictive means.
142
That the anti-discrimination statute did not unduly burden the Jaycees'
right of expressive association turned on the Court's conclusion that the
presence of women would not alter the message the Jaycees' sought to
communicate. 43 '"There is... no basis in the record," the Court wrote, "for
concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the
organization's ability to engage in... protected [expressive] activities or to
disseminate its preferred views."'144 The Minnesota statute "require[d] no
change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it
impose[d] no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members."' 45 Any assumption that the mere presence of women would alter
the Jaycees' expression was, in the Court's view, based on unwarranted
stereotyping: "[i]n claiming that women might have a different attitude about
such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign
relations, or that the organization's public positions would have a different
effect if the group were not a purely young men's association, the Jaycees
relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women.' 46 In sum, there was no evidence that
application of the anti-discrimination law would alter the Jaycees' voice, and
138. Id.
139. See id. ("Infringements on [the right to associate] may bejustified by regulations adopted toserve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
140. Id. at 623-25.





146. Id. at 627-28 (quotation and citation omitted).
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to conclude otherwise required reliance on impermissible assumptions about
the opinions of women.
4. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion in Roberts, Justice O'Connor chided the Court
majority for "adopt[ing] a test that... casts doubt on the power of the State
to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory
access to commercial opportunities .... [and] that accords insufficient
protection to expressive associations and places inappropriate burdens on
groups claiming the protection of the First Amendment."'147 Justice
O'Connor found misguided the inquiry into whether a state regulation alters
an association's message.141 In her view, "[w]hether an association is or is
not constitutionally protected in the selection of its membership should not
depend on what the association says or why its members say it.' 149 She
viewed this inquiry as "rais[ing] the possibility that certain commercial
associations, by engaging in... certain kinds of expressive activities, might
improperly gain protection for discrimination.'2
150
For Justice O'Connor, the appropriate analysis determines at the outset
whether "the Jaycees is an association whose activities or purposes should
engage the strong protections that the First Amendment extends to
expressive associations.' 15' In particular, the relevant distinction is between
"expressive" associations-that may choose their members however they
like-and "commercial" associations-that have no constitutional right to
discriminate in selecting their members.'52 Whereas regulation of an
expressive association's membership is subject to strict scrutiny, 5 3 the state
may freely regulate membership in commercial associations so long as such
regulation is rationally related to the state's legitimate ends. 54
147. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 633.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 632.
151. Id. at 633.
152. See id. at 633-34.
153. See id. at 634.
154. See id. at 635.
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Justice O'Connor saw the Jaycees as a "relatively easy case for
application of the expressive-commercial dichotomy,"'155 because although
"[a] good deal of what the [Jaycees] does indisputably comes within the right
of association... in pursuance of the specific ends of speech, writing, belief,
and assembly for redress of grievances,' ' 156 the association is "first and
foremost, an organization that... promotes and practices the art of
solicitation and management."' 57  The organization is, therefore,
predominantly commercial, and the First Amendment does not allow it to
discriminate against women in selecting members. 158
5. Rotary
In a subsequent case, Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte,'59 the Court applied the test it had developed in
Roberts to hold that Rotary had no First Amendment right to exclude women
in violation of the California Unruh Act. 6 The Rotary Court concluded that
the Act did not violate Rotary's First Amendment interests because there
was nothing about the inclusion of women that would affect the
organization's expression: "[T]he Unruh Act does not require the clubs
to... abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical
standards in all vocations, good will, and peace.' 6' The Court also denied
any claim to intimate association in light of Rotary's large size, open
membership policies, community involvement, and public activities.62
155. Id. at 638.
156. Id. at 639 (citation omitted, alterations in original).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 640.
159. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
160. See id.
161. Id. at 548-49 (citation and footnote omitted). City of Dallas v. Sanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989),
decided shortly after Roberts, makes clear that expressive association must be tied to an identifiable First
Amendment interest. Id at 24-25. In Sanglin, the plaintiff claimed that a local ordinance restricting
access to a dance hall to individuals aged 14-18 violated their rights to associate with others who were
older than 18. Id. at 22. The Court had little difficulty concluding that no right of expressive association
was at stake. See id. at 24-25.
162. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 546-47. Rotary's discussion of intimate association is, perhaps, most
remarkable for the case it does not mention: Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), upheld Georgia's
sodomy statute and rejected under the Griswold line of cases the notion that there is, as the Court put it, "a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy." Id. at 191. There is plainly something amiss when
the Court takes seriously (as it did in Rotary) the idea that a service club made up of a group of men might
have some claim to intimate association yet (as in Hardwick) the Court can also easily conclude that
consensual intimacy between two same-sex adults within a private home entails a "right... [with] no
support in the text of the Constitution." Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
Vol. 77:639, 2002
Freedom's Associations
6. New York State Club Association
Following Rotary, in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,163
the Court rejected a claim that New York City's ordinance prohibiting
discrimination by private clubs with more than four hundred members was
facially unconstitutional. 1' 4 The plaintiffs in the case-a consortium of 125
social clubs-challenged the ordinance on the ground that it violated their
freedoms of intimate and expressive association. 6 5 With respect to the claim
of intimate association, the Court denied the facial challenge because, under
Roberts and Rotary, some of the clubs were not sufficiently intimate to
warrant protection. 66 Similarly, because some of the clubs would not have a
valid claim to infringement of expressive association, the statute was not
facially unconstitutional on this basis. 67
The importance of the case lies in the Court's discussion of expressive
association. New York State Club Ass'n makes clear that for an association to
prevail on a claim that its right of expressive association has been violated,
the association must show that it was "organized for specific expressive
purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly
as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the
same sex, for example, or the same religion."' ' The Court explains that
unless the association can make this showing, so long as it remains free to
"exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club's members
wish to promote,',169 it is subject to anti-discrimination laws. 70
163. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
164. See id. at 10-14.
165. See id. at 11.
166. See id. at 11-12. The Court acknowledged in passing that some of the individual clubs might be
sufficiently intimate. See id. at 12 ("there may be clubs that would be entitled to constitutional
protection"); id. at 14 ("appellant has not identified those clubs for whom the antidiscrimination
provisions vail impair their ability to associate together"); id. at 15 ("[the] opportunities for individual
associations to contest the constitutionality of the [ordinance] as it may be applied against them are
adequate to assure that any overbreadth... will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific
facts"). See also id. at 19 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("in such a large city [as New York] a club with over
400 members may still be relatively intimate in nature, so that a constitutional right to control membership
takes precedence").
167. See id at 13-14.
168. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. See id. See also id. at 19 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that "there may well be
organizations whose expressive purposes would be substantially undermined if they were unable to
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The suggestion is plainly that few groups will succeed in claiming
exemption from anti-discrimination statutes on the basis of a right of
expressive association. If, as in Roberts, associations may not assume that
individuals hold a certain view because of their sex (or race or religion, for
instance), and if wholesale exclusion may only be justified because inclusion
will undermine the specific expressive purpose for which the association
exists, only groups organized for a discriminatory purpose appear to have a
supportable claim to expressive association. On this view, a group
advocating racial separatism, for example, would likely succeed in claiming
it must be free to discriminate on the basis of race in selecting its members,
or else its message will be undermined. However, other, less overfly hostile,
groups would seem to be out of luck. Against this background, the Court
took up the issue of gay Scouts.
F. Membership and Expression: The Boy Scouts
In 1990, James Dale, an Eagle Scout, was expelled as a member of the
Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and as Assistant Scoutmaster of Monmouth
Council, New Jersey, because he is gay.' Monmouth Council officials
learned of Dale's sexual orientation when they read in a newspaper about his
role as co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.12 Dale
sued in state court claiming, among other things, the BSA had violated New
Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), which prohibits in places of
public accommodation discrimination on the basis of "affectional or sexual
orientation.' 73
1. The State Court Decisions
At the trial level, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division,
granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts. 74 The court held that
the Scouts were not a "public accommodation" under the New Jersey
statute, 17 5 and that the organization was, in any event, exempt because it was
confine their membership to those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background .... The
associational rights of such organizations must be respected.").
171. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000).
172. See id. at 645-46.
173. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 and 10:5-5 (2000)
174. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645. The trial court's decision, Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-
330-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995), is unpublished.
175. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (2000).
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a "distinctly private" group. 176 The court also held that in view of the BSA's
opposition to homosexuality, it had a First Amendment right of expressive
association that prevented the state from requiring the organization to accept
Dale as a scoutmaster. 177
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division reversed,
holding that the BSA and its local councils are places of public
accommodation under New Jersey law because they are unselective in their
membership practices and have close relationships with public entities and
public service organizations. 17 The Appellate Division also rejected the
BSA's argument that freedom of association sheltered it from the application
of the anti-discrimination law. 179 Applying Roberts, the Appellate Division
held that the BSA was too large to claim freedom of intimate association.'
I D
As to freedom of expressive association, the Appellate Division held that
the BSA bore the "substantial burden of demonstrating a strong relationship
between its expressive activities and its discriminatory practice" because
"any lesser showing invites scuttling of the state's anti-discrimination laws
based on pretextual expressive claims.'' s8 The Appellate Division framed the
inquiry thus: "Will New Jersey's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination by enforcement of the LAD significantly impair the BSA's
ability to express its fundamental tenets and to carry out its social,
educational and civic activities?"'8 2 The Appellate Division determined that
admitting James Dale would not violate the BSA's freedom of expressive
association."' It explained that there was no dispute that "the BSA's
collective 'expressive purpose' is not to condemn homosexuality. Its reason
to be is not to provide a public forum for its members to espouse the benefits
of heterosexuality and the 'evils' of the homosexual lifestyle.' 1 4 Rather, the
BSA's purpose is "to promote ... the ability of boys to do things for
themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft, and to teach them
176. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
177. See id.
178. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,282-83 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
179. See id. at 28546.
180. See id. at 286.
181. Id. at287.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 288.
184. Id.
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patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues." 18 5 The Appellate
Division reasoned that the anti-discrimination law did not interfere with
these goals, 18 6 and that to conclude otherwise would be to engage in
impermissible stereotyping about gay members.8 7
The Appellate Division also rejected the BSA's argument that its rights
were comparable to those of the organizers of the St. Patrick's Day Parade in
Boston who, the United States Supreme Court held in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,' had a First
Amendment right to exclude a contingency of gay marchers.'8 9 The
Appellate Division reasoned that Hurley was not a freedom of association
case, but "a First Amendment speech case... involv[ing] the choice of a
speaker... not to propound a particular point of view."'"9 Finally, the
Appellate Division rejected "the proposition that... [Dale's] public
declaration that he is gay in and of itself constitutes 'expressive activity'
sufficient to forfeit his entitlement to membership in the BSA."' 9'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate
Division.192 Citing the BSA's extensive public solicitation activities and its
close relationships with public entities, the court agreed that the BSA was a
public accommodation under New Jersey law. 193 The court also held that the
First Amendment did not exempt the BSA from the anti-discrimination
statute. 94 With between fifteen and thirty participants in each troop, the
Scouts were too large to claim a right of intimate association. 195 Moreover,
the Court observed that the troops are unselective in their members and on
occasion allow non-members to attend their meetings.1
96
With respect to the BSA's rights of expressive association, the court
agreed with the Appellate Division that BSA members do not associate in
185. Id. (quotation omitted).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 289.
188. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
189. See id. at575.
190. Dale, 706 A.2d at 292 (quotations ommitted).
191. Id.
192. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1999).
193. See id. at 1210-13.
194. See id. at 1225.
195. See id. at 1220. The court considered the right of intimate association a First Amendment right.
See id.
196. See id. at 1222.
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order to promulgate the view that homosexuality is immoral. 197 Accordingly,
'Dale's expulsion constituted discrimination based solely on his status as an
openly gay man." 198 The court held that the First Amendment does not
protect this kind of discrimination.199
The court also rejected the BSA's argument that Dale's presence in the
BSA was akin to the forced inclusion in a parade found unconstitutional in
Hurley. "Unlike a marcher in a parade," the court explained, "Dale does not
participate in the Boy Scouts 'to make a point' about sexuality, but rather
because of his respect for and belief in the organization. And unlike a
parade, where the speech itself is the public accommodation, permitting Dale
to remain in a leadership position in no way prevents Boy Scouts from
invoking its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on
one subject while remaining silent on another."2 ' The court "reject[ed] the
notion that Dale's presence in the organization would be symbolic of the
Boy Scouts' endorsement of homosexuality." 20 1 The court therefore held that
the BSA could not expel Dale because he was gay.202
2. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, holding that the
application of the New Jersey public accommodation statute violated the
BSA's right of expressive association, reversed °203 The Dale Court described
expressive association as "crucial in preventing the majority from imposing
its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular,
ideas."2°4 In the Court's view, "[f]orcing a group to accept certain members
may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those
views, that it intends to express," and constitutes a violation of expressive
197. See id. at 1224-25.
198. Id. at 1225.
199. See id. (explaining that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold the
enforcement of a state's antidiscrimination statute against an expressive association claim based on
assumptions in respect of status that are not a part of the group members' shared expressive purpose.").
200. Id. at 1229 (quotations and alterations omitted).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1230. In a separate concurring opinion in Dale, Judge Handler emphasized the
interdependency of "status" and "expression" with respect to sexual orientation. See id. at 1236-45
(Handler, J., concurring).
203. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
204. Id. at 647-48. Freedom of intimate association was not before the Court.
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association "if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the
group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. 2 5
In order to determine whether a group is protected by the First
Amendment, the Court observed that the initial question is "whether the
group engages in 'expressive association.' 20 6 The Court explained that
while "[t]he First Amendment's protection of expressive association is not
reserved for advocacy groups[,] ... to come within its ambit, a group must
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private."' 207 The
Boy Scouts met the test: the organization engages in expressive activity by
instilling certain values in its members. a°
The Court then turned its attention to whether the inclusion of James Dale
would significantly affect the BSA's "ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints, '209 an inquiry that, the Court stated, "require[d it] first to
explore, to a limited extent, the nature of the Boy Scouts' view of
homosexuality." 210 That view, according to the BSA, was reflected in the
212 iScout Oath 211 and Law, particularly in their requirements that a Scout
remain "morally straight," and "clean. ' 213 Although the Court noted that
neither the Scout Oath nor the Scout Law expressly mention sexuality or
sexual orientation, it accepted the BSA's assertion that its organization
teaches that homosexual conduct is not "morally straight," and that it does
205. Id. at 648.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 649-50.
209. Id. at 650.
210. Id.
211. On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout law;
To help others at all times;
To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.
Id. at 649.








213. See id. at 650.
Vol. 77:639, 2002
Freedom's Associations
not want to promote the view that homosexuality is "legitimate behavior."1 4
The Court therefore saw no need to "inquire further to determine the nature
of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality." ' 5
The only remaining question, then, was "whether Dale's presence as an
assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts' desire to
not promote homosexuality as a legitimate form of behavior."2 6 In reaching
that issue, the Court also deferred to the BSA: "As we give deference to an
association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also
give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression." 1 7 The Court therefore concluded, "Dale's presence would at
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as
a legitimate form of behavior. 218 The Court compared Dale's presence in
the BSA to the unwanted marchers in the parade in Hurley: "As the presence
of [the gay and lesbian marchers] in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would
have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a
particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout's choice not to propound a
point of view contrary to its beliefs." ' 9
The Dale Court rejected the view of the New Jersey Supreme Court that,
because the BSA did not associate for the purpose of disseminating the
belief that homosexuality is wrong, Dale's presence would not affect the
BSA's expression.m Instead, the Dale Court held that "associations do not
have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in
order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired
214. Id. at 650-51.
215. Id. at 651. The Court did, however, also refer to other evidence in the record as to the BSA's
position on homosexuality "as instructive, if only on the question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs."
id. That evidence comprised a 1978 internal position statement that homosexuality is incompatible with
Scout leadership, a second position paper adopted in 1991 after Dale was expelled, and the BSA's
position asserted in litigation in California. See id. at 651-52. In view of this evidence, the Court found the
BSA's professed views on homosexuality to be sincere. See id.
216. id. at 653 (quotation omitted).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 653.
219. Id. at 654.
220. Id. at 654-55.
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in order to be entitled to protection., 22' The Court also found it irrelevant
that some members of the BSA do not share the BSA's official position on
homosexuality and that the BSA does not expel heterosexual leaders who
openly disagree with the organization's position on gay scouts. 222 In the
Court's view, the First Amendment does not require that "every member of a
group agree on every issue,,' 223 and "[t]he fact that the organization does not
trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its
ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection. 224
Concluding that New Jersey's interests in ending discrimination did not
justify "such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scout's rights to freedom of
association," 225 the Court held that the BSA could not be required to accept
Dale as a member.226
3. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens227 argued that the majority
"pretermits [the] entire analysis. '228 In his view,
[t]he relevant question is whether the mere inclusion of the person at
issue would impose any serious burden, affect in any significant way,
or be a substantial restraint upon the organization's shared goals, basic
goals, or collective effort to foster beliefs. Accordingly, it is necessary
to examine what, exactly, are [the] BSA's shared goals and the degree
to which its expressive activities would be burdened, affected, or
restrained by including homosexuals.229
Examining the record, Justice Stevens found it "exceptionally clear that
[the] BSA has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy
and has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality. '230 Therefore,
221. Id. at 655.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 656.
225. Id. at 659.
226. See id.
227. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Souter also wrote a
separate dissent. See id. at 700-02. (Souter, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 683-84 (quotations omitted).
230. Id. at 684.
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there was no infringement of the BSA's First Amendment rights."' Justice
Stevens viewed the majority's deference to the BSA as "astounding" in light
of the Court's duty to examine whether the BSA in fact held the professed
views. 32 "[U]nless one is prepared to turn the right to associate into a free
pass out of antidiscrimination laws," he wrote, "an independent inquiry is a
necessity."'233 Justice Stevens also viewed Dale's inclusion in the Boy Scouts
as nothing like Hurley. In contrast to marching in a parade, he reasoned,
membership in the Boy Scouts is simply not speech: "[Dale's] participation
sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world... Dale did not
carry a banner or a sign; he did not distribute any factsheet; and he expressed
no intent to send any message.' ' 34 Accordingly, in view of the Court's prior
decisions in Roberts and Rotary, Justice Stevens took the view that
[t]he only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their
presence alone-unlike any other individual-should be singled out
for special First Amendment treatment. Under the majority's
reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label
"homosexual." That label, even though unseen, communicates a
message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes.235
G. Summary
Associations have a right to be free from government regulation of their
membership if such regulation unduly infringes their First Amendment right
of expressive association. After Dale, to claim a right of expressive
association, an organization must engage in some form of public or private
expression. An organization does not have to associate for the purpose of
disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to First Amendment
protection. The organization must merely engage in expressive activity that
could be impaired. The First Amendment prohibits application of an anti-
discrimination statute to compel an association to admit an individual as a
member if the presence of that individual would significantly affect the
association's ability to advocate its public or private viewpoints. In making
231. Id. at 688.
232. Id. at 686.
233. Id. at 688.
234. Id. at 694-95.
235. Id. at 696.
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that determination, deference is given to the association as to the nature of its
expression and as to what would impair that expression. In addition to
government regulations compelling an association to admit members,
associational freedom may be infringed by government action imposing
burdens on associations or their members, or by enlisting an association to
serve the government's own ends. Even if an association is highly
expressive, its associational interests become irrelevant if the activities in
question-for example, the election of candidates in a party primary-are
sufficiently integral to the activities of the state to constitute state action.
II. THE TROUBLE WITH EXPRESSION
This section sets out the principle problems with the Supreme Court's
doctrine of freedom of expressive association. I argue that the right of
expressive association is not defined with sufficient precision and, in
analyzing an association's message, the Court focuses on the wrong
constitutional issue. The doctrine of expressive association is also isolated
from and in tension with other doctrines, notably public accommodation law,
and the doctrine is superfluous in view of other First Amendment doctrines.
Further, an association's expression is often indeterminate, and inquiry into
expression risks distorting an association's message. This inquiry also
unduly intrudes on associations. Finally, the expressive association doctrine
gives insufficient weight to the government's interests in regulating certain
associational practices.
A. The Vagueness Problem
To begin, the Court does not identify with sufficient clarity the precise
right at stake. In Dale, the Court describes the right of expressive association
as the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends,' ' 36 that belongs to
groups engaged in "public" or "private" expression,' and is "implicit in the
right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment."' 38
However, this definition tells us very little. Most citizen groups involve
association with others in pursuit of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, or cultural ends. Most groups engage in public or private
236. id. at 647.
237. See id. at 648.
238. Id. at 647 (quotation omnmitted).
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expression of some nature. Indeed, expression is often what makes a group a
group, as opposed to a set of unconnected individuals. Pursuing a particular
end (be it political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural) is
what distinguishes one group of citizens from another. If these are the
criteria for expressive association, it becomes difficult to see what kind of
groups would not qualify.
People lined up to purchase movie tickets, for instance, are pursuing a
collective cultural end (seeing the movie), and they often engage in private
expression with each other while they wait (about current events, movie
reviews, or the weather). A law firm is a collection of highly expressive
individuals pursuing shared economic (and sometimes political) ends. A
parade is a group seeking political and social ends through public
expression. A church involves private (and sometimes quite public)
expression for religious ends. Yet labeling all of these quite different entities
"expressive associations" does not seem very helpful for meaningful
constitutional analysis.
In sum, the Court's description of the right of expressive association is
more like a slogan than a workable definition with a supporting rationale. It
accomplishes very little in the way of describing the interests at stake, the
reasons for protecting freedom of association, or how to identify and analyze
a claim to constitutional protection.
B. The Problem of Focus
Even if it were to explain more precisely what it means by expressive
association, the Supreme Court focuses on the wrong issue. The Constitution
does not mention "expression" or "association," much less "expressive
association.' ' 39 It is reasonable to wonder, therefore, why "expressive
association" is the relevant right when dealing with constitutional protections
accorded to groups of citizens.
As the cases play out, the Court is concerned more with expression than
with association.2" Rather than develop, in light of the expressive value of
associations, an account of the nature and significance of individuals
239. The First Amendment does protect "the freedom of speech," U.S. CONST. amend I, but, as Frank
Morrow usefully reminds us, speech is not the same thing as expression, and in beginning with
expression, "the likelihood is increased that the discussion will mislead or go astray." Frank A. Morrow,
Speech, Expression, md the Constitution, 85 ETHICS 235, 237 (1975).
240. See supra Part Ml.E, F.
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associating, or of the differences among different kinds of associations, the
Court focuses instead on the particular messages of associations.24 The
trouble with this quite unusual inquiry (aside from the practical difficulties I
discuss below) is that it is far from clear why the association's message
should matter so much.
Let us accept for the moment that the importance of freedom of
association lies in the constitutional significance of expression. On this view,
the Constitution protects freedom of association because the ability to join
together with others is an important condition for realizing First Amendment
values like speech and the development and exchange of ideas. That is, if I
cannot associate with others, being able to speak out means very little. The
proper scope of freedom of association therefore must, on this account,
reflect its origins in expression. One could then develop a detailed account
of constitutional protections for association in light of the goal of expression.
Such an account would identify, for instance, which kinds of associations
most likely entail expressive values, what the conditions are for those
associations to engage in expression, what kinds of governmental regulations
are consistent with the underlying value of expression, and so on.
However, the Court does not do that. Instead, after linking association to
expression, the Court's next step is to conclude that the scope of the right of
expressive association therefore depends on the specific message an
association seeks to impart.242 Under the Court's approach, two otherwise
identical associations receive very different treatment depending on what
they have happened to say. The task of the judge becomes to sift through
meeting minutes, correspondence, public pronouncements and the like in
order to determine whether the association's expressed views fit with (or
would be unduly impaired by) a particular governmental regulation.
This seems fundamentally misguided. If the point of protecting
associations is to safeguard expression, it is difficult to see that the relevant
issue is whether an association's views are compatible with the
consequences of governmental regulations. As Justice O'Connor explains in
her concurring opinion in Roberts, this inquiry is likely to over-protect
associations with traditionally little First Amendment value, and under-
protect associations with traditionally strong First Amendment interests.243
241. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
242. The step is an example of what Frank Easterbrook terms the "constitutional rumor chain, in which
the conclusions bear no resemblance to the original rules." Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Explicit
Rights of Association, 10 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 91, 99 (1987).
243. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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At the same time, the Court's approach also seems destined to deny
protection to some associations that are very similar to protected
associations. Where there is insufficient proof of an association's expression
to demonstrate an incompatibility with a governmental regulation, the
association's claim will fail." Accordingly, even a group organized for
traditionally core First Amendment expressive activities-advocacy for
instance-risks losing protection under the Court's approach. The Court's
focus is therefore wrong because there needs to be some attention in the
analysis to the type of association claiming constitutional protection, and to
the type of activity the association undertakes.
Moreover, the expressive association doctrine is viewpoint based. The
Jaycees and Rotary were prohibited from denying admission to women
because those organizations were not-as a matter of their established
purposes and expressed beliefs--opposed to women.24 On the other hand,
the Boy Scouts had a First Amendment right to deny admission to James
Dale because the Court accepted that the organization is opposed to
homosexuality.246 It is not, then, sufficient under the Court's analysis for an
association merely to engage in expression to enjoy the protections of
expressive association. Nor is it sufficient for an association to express views
on subjects germane to a governmental regulation. Rather, the views the
association holds and has expressed must themselves be incompatible with,
contrary to, the governmental regulation at issue.
First Amendment analysis does not normally entail this kind of
particularistic scrutiny of a speaker's viewpoint. Indeed, in most contexts we
become alarmed when governmental officials condition rights or benefits on
what we say.247 Why should we be any less concerned when the particular
244. Consider, for example, two fraternal organizations: each has four-dozen members, a clubhouse, a
secret handshake, and weekly meetings. Neither organization admits Catholics. One of the two
organizations can produce records containing past anti-Catholic statements by its members. In the other,
although everybody knoows Catholics are not welcome, there are no such records. Following the Court's
approach, the first of these two organizations is likely to enjoy a right of expressive association that
prevents the state from requiring it to admit Catholic members. The second organization is likely to fail if
it raises a constitutional claim because the organization has been insufficiently expressive about its biases.
245. See supra Part IL.E.
246. See supra Part 3I.F.
247. Hence, according to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions:
even though a person has a "right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
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governmental officials making this determination are judges? If freedom of
association serves First Amendment ends of expression, it is odd to narrow
the right to mean the protection of certain views, and then ask whether an
association professes those views. We might properly inquire whether an
association entails the kinds of activities that serve the First Amendment
values we seek to protect and promote. But to go further and ask what the
association's opinions are before deciding whether the government can
regulate such matters as who joins the association, or even whether the
association can exist, seems a dubious and dangerous enterprise. The end
result of this problematic focus is to protect not association because of
expressive values, but rather associations with a particular message.
Put differently, the Court purports to be analyzing freedom of association
when it is really analyzing freedom of expression. The Court seems to
understand associations like the Jaycees or the Boy Scouts as just like any
other speaker with a message. The Court treats government regulation of
membership as raising a constitutional problem only when the regulation
interferes with the association's message, that is, where the presence of some
individual interrupts what would otherwise be said. Freedom of expressive
association is therefore reduced, in the Court's analysis, to the freedom of an
association to speak.
This is an exceedingly cramped vision of the value of association and its
protection under the Constitution. It does not take very much to see that there
may be something quite special about associations, distinguished from
individual speakers. For example, through associations individuals come
together, develop shared ideas and programs, and engage in collective
activities. All of these things might be quite different from what these
individuals do or are able to accomplish on their own. Of course, the fact
that an association has certain distinct features does not necessarily mean
that those features are constitutionally protected. But by moving instead to
the topic of expression, the Court short-circuits any analysis of what it is
about associations that may merit special protection.
Because the Court narrows freedom of association to mean simply the
expression of a message, the Court fails to appreciate exactly why
government regulation of membership might be problematic. The Court
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited. This would allow the government to produce a result that it could not command
directly.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quotation and alteration omitted).
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makes no serious effort to examine the problems regulation of membership
may raise, for example, by undermining bonds of solidarity within an
association, or altering the conditions for openness and candor among
members. Instead, the Court simply asks whether the regulation of
membership interferes with the association's actual message. In the Court's
approach, association is simply a noun: associations are entities that speak.
The possible values, in particular the possible First Amendment values, of
associating are all but ignored.248
A related difficulty is that the Court appears to have only a very
superficial and detached understanding of what an association is. In speaking
of associations, the Court fails to offer any coherent account of what it
understands the term to encompass, and the most basic features of
associations are missing from the Court's discussion. The Court offers no
recognition, for instance, of the number or types of associations in the United
States, or the extent of citizen involvement in associational life. There is no
apparent understanding of what associations do, why people join them, or
what participation means to their members. The Court makes little attempt to
consider the conditions associations require to exist and thrive or to
understand the contributions or difficulties associations may represent in a
constitutional democracy.
Under the Court's analysis, diverse groups-the NAACP, the Boy Scouts,
service organizations like Rotary and the Jaycees, and at times even
families-are all lumped together as "associations." Beyond drawing abroad
distinction between "intimate" and "expressive" association, the Court
undertakes no serious effort to consider variations in associations, and how
groups might differ in form or function, much less how such distinctions
may be relevant to a First Amendment analysis.
This perhaps explains why the Court's analysis is unusually context
dependent. Rather than providing a series of rules and standards that could
be applied to various kinds of associations, the cases are confined to
particular associations-the Jaycees and then Rotary and then the Boy
Scouts, for instance-and outcomes turn on the Court's understanding of
those particular organizations. This kind of ad hoc inquiry seems largely
248. Some academic commentators make a similar error. Jed Rubenfeld, for instance, argues thatjust
as under the First Amendment a driver cannot speed in order to make a point, an expressive association
should not be able to engage in unlawful discrimination. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's
Purpose, 53 STAN. L REV. 767, 808-09 (2001). This overlooks how choice is more significant to
associating than driving fast is to getting across an opinion. See infra Part VI.C.
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useless for guiding lower court judges, legislatures, or even associations
themselves seeking to understand appropriate standards and constitutional
requirements. It is one thing to illustrate a rule by example. As the doctrine
of freedom of association has developed the examples are all the rules we
have.
C. The Isolation Problem
A further difficulty with the Court's approach to expressive association is
that it is strangely disconnected from other seemingly relevant doctrines. In
particular, the Court offers no persuasive account of how the expressive
association doctrine relates to the long-standing rule that public
accommodations like hotels, schools, and restaurants do not have a First
Amendment exemption from anti-discrimination law, 2 9 regardless of their
views or the content of their expression."
Is it that an "expressive association" is categorically different from public
accommodations? If so, what is the difference? Or does the emerging
doctrine of freedom of expressive association portend new limitations on the
ability of government to regulate these traditionally public
accommodations? 251 If there are ways to reconcile expressive association
with public accommodation doctrine, the Court does not tell us what they
are.
D. The Superfluous Doctrine Problem
Because it focuses on expression, the Court's doctrine of freedom of
association is also largely superfluous. If the only relevant inquiry is whether
and how a governmental regulation impairs an association's expression, that
249. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,260-61 (1964) (holding that
a federal public accommodation statute is constitutional as applied to a motel). See generally Nan D.
Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L REV. 1591,1613-36
(2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Autonomy, 85 M[NN. L REV.
1639, 1665-68 (2001).
250. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) ("[P]arents have a First Amendment
right to send their children to [private] educational institutions that promote the belief that racial
segregation is desirable, and.., the children have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it does not
follow that thepractice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same
principle.") (citations omitted). See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L REV. 1, 34 (1959) (explaining that "integration forces an association
upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant").
251. See Hunter, supra note 249, at 1591.
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inquiry could be conducted using existing First Amendment rules and tools,
without the need for a special doctrine of expressive association and special
criteria for determining the legitimate reach of regulation.
For instance, governmental regulation aimed at the content of a group's
speech falls within the well-crafted First Amendment rules that Laurence
Tribe labels "track one" analysis 5.25 Unless a content-based regulation
pertains to expression that falls outside of First Amendment protections
(such as obscenity253 or defamation5 4 or fighting words255), the regulation is
subject to strict scrutiny and the government bears the burden of
demonstrating that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to that end.5 6 So, for example, if the
government prohibits a group from meeting or marching because of the
group's expression, we would ask whether the regulation satisfies strict
scrutiny. Many cases have involved exactly this inquiry-without the need
for a special doctrine of expressive association-when the government seeks
to regulate a group whose views it opposes. 257
On the other hand, many regulations of group activities are not
specifically (or obviously) directed at the content of a group's expression.
Again, though, there are well-worn constitutional tests we can employ. A
governmental regulation that is not aimed at the content of a group's
expression but nonetheless has an impact on its public speech-what
Professor Tribe calls "track two" cases' -rmust be content-neutral and
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and in the case
of prohibitions on speech, allow adequate alternative channels for
communication. 9 If expression is the relevant consideration in cases
involving associations, this very standard could usefully be applied to assess
the validity of many kinds of governmental regulations. Consider, for
instance, a law that reads: "Gatherings of more than four unrelated citizens
between the hours of 6 p.m. and 8 a.m. are hereby prohibited." In analyzing
252. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, MIERICAN CONSTIUTONAL LAW 791 (2d ed. 1988).
253. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957).
254. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339-48 (1974).
255. See, e.g., Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
256. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269-70 (1981).
257. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919).
258. See TRIBE, supra note 252, at 792.
259. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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this law, we would ask whether it is narrowly tailored to achieve a significant
governmental interest and whether there are adequate alternative channels
for groups that would otherwise meet during these hours to express whatever
it is they express. We do not need special rules about expressive association
to determine whether the law is constitutional.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School260 demonstrates the point. In that case, the Court held that a
public school's refusal to allow a Christian children's club from meeting
after hours, as part of the school's general program of opening its facilities to
various social, recreational, and educational groups, entailed viewpoint
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. 6' The Court reached
this result using traditional rules of freedom of speech.26 Freedom of
association is not even mentioned in the Court's decision.263
Of course, there is always an issue as to whether (and how much) a
particular regulation infringes upon a group's expression. But this alone does
not warrant a distinct set of rules of "expressive association." The Court
already accepts, without much analysis, that many types of governmental
regulations seemingly unconnected to speech-such as noise restrictions"6
or litter controls265 or limits on the use of parks, streets, and other public
places26 6 -have an impact on communication. To the extent that other
varieties of regulation may pertain specifically to groups, similar
presumptions about communicative impact could be made. Thus, for
instance, we could assume (as indeed the Court itself does) that regulating
membership criteria has an impact on expression. We would then ask
whether such a regulation is narrowly tailored to a significant governmental
interest, an inquiry that would look to such things as the reasons for the
membership regulation and the types of groups to which it applies. There
would be little need for a more particularized investigation of a group's
message.
260. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
261. See id. at 112.
262. See id. at 106-07.
263. But see id. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking freedom of association cases in discussing
establishment clause issue).
264. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1949).
265. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
266. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-93 (1989); Renton v. Playtime
Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49-51 (1986).
267. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
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E. The Distortion Problem
Framing the relevant inquiry as whether a government regulation
significantly impairs the association's private or public expression also
presupposes that an association's message or purpose can be reliably
investigated and understood. In practice, this will often prove unrealistic.
Associations with a clear, publicly stated message are likely to be relatively
rare. Many associations tend to have unstated or ambiguous views. Further,
associations are comprised of individuals who naturally have different
opinions on various issues; the association itself may lack a coherent stance
on any specific question, or it may not have expressed the views of the group
in any easily identifiable manner. Indeed, an association may have said
different things, or said one thing but done another. An association's
expression might also change over time, as new issues arise, the views of
members evolve, or different members arrive and assume different roles. The
apparent expression of an association might also be the result of historical
accident: today's members may not share the positions and policies
formulated when the association was founded, and yet there may not have
been an occasion or reason to amend those original views in any official or
public manner.
The Court's investigation into an association's message is also hard to
square with one obvious fact. That an association is engaged in litigation in
opposition to a government regulation suggests rather strongly that the
association opposes what the government is seeking to do. What could be a
more certain expression of the group's views than defending itself in court?
That the association may not have clearly announced this opposition in the
past, or that it may only recently have developed the opposition evidenced by
its litigation activities, are of uncertain relevance. The association bringing
or defending a lawsuit plainly opposes the regulation at that point: going
forward, at the very least, applying the regulation would be inconsistent with
the association's expression.
In this regard, the expressive association doctrine is especially
problematic with respect to anti-discrimination law. The Court's test in this
context-whether the admission of a certain individual would significantly
impair the group's expression-is, in a way, meaningless. Who, after all, can
really say whether and how an individual will alter or impair a group's
expression? People affect their social environments in varied and
unpredictable ways. A group opposing the admission of an individual has
plainly been affected in some manner-otherwise, there would be no
opposition. Inquiring further, to seek to ascertain what the presence of a
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certain person will actually mean for a group's expression, appears a dubious
exercise and an uncertain basis for determining the proper scope of a
constitutional right.
The problem is exemplified by the Court's analysis in the cases already
discussed. In Roberts and Rotary, the Court determined that women would
not alter the expression of the service organizations, and that to conclude
otherwise would be to engage in gender stereotyping. In Dale, the presence
of James Dale would, according to the Court, undermine the Boy Scouts'
expression because he would "force the organization to send a message, both
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior. '2 68 The outcomes are
hard to square. Indeed, trying to reconcile them suggests that the Court's
analysis in Roberts and Rotary amounts, at the end of the day, to a type of
judicial censorship. In holding that women will not alter the associations in
question because they are no different from men, the Court precluded the
possibility that in fact the members of the Jaycees and of Rotary quite
genuinely believe that women are different from men, at least different
enough for purposes of their membership policies. Somebody must have
held this view: the organizations defended their exclusionary policies all the
way to the Supreme Court. Such a view was of no moment because it was
simply impermissible stereotyping. On the other hand, that James Dale
would affect the expression of the Scouts was a permissible viewpoint.
The end result is that the Court's approach seems likely to distort a
group's message. Dale proves a striking example. In analyzing the impact of
the anti-discrimination law on the Scouts' expression, the Dale Court
essentially recasts the organization as a bunch of bigots. The most reasonable
conclusion is that the record in Dale was at best ambiguous: despite its
litigation postures, there was no very clear prior statement by the Boy Scouts
that it was in fact anti-gay, indeed opposition to homosexuality was not
clearly one of the central features of Scouting. 69 However, the Court, in
focusing on expression, was required to play up the documentation
containing the Scouts' most anti-homosexual statements.
As a result, the Court portrayed the Scouts as so hostile to homosexuality
that the mere presence of a gay Scout would force the group to send a
268. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
269. See David France, Scouts Divided, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6,2001, at 44 (discussing conflicts within
the BSA with respect to gay Scouts); Chuck Sudetic, The Struggle for the Soul of the Boy Scouts,




message it rejected. Hence, in a concluding statement, the Court (citing cases
involving the rights of groups like the Ku Klux Klan) emphasized that the
Scouts had a First Amendment right to their views, even if those views were
"unpopular" or "unwise.' 270
Many Scouts, used to camping and knot-tying and the like, would
probably be surprised to learn that they belong to the anti-gay organization
the Court portrayed the Scouts to be. The point is nicely made in a New
Yorker cartoon that appeared shortly after the Dale decision:
©Cartoonbank.com -
"And this one's for homophobia." 271
270. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 (citing inter alia Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
271. THE NEv YORKER, Jan. 22, 2001, at 77. © 2002 The New Yorker Collection from
cartonbank.com. All rights reserved. Used with permission.
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The difficulty is not that the Boy Scouts do not exclude gays. They
zealously defended their right to do so. Nor is it that individual Scouts
should not be aware of the organization's policy. They should know and
decide for themselves whether to participate, under all of the relevant
circumstances. The difficulty is that the Court's focus on message almost
inevitably leads to a distortion of a group's position. Thus, just as the Court
overlooked the possibility that the Jaycees and Rotary believe women are
sufficiently different to be excluded, the Court likely overstated the Scout's
views on gay members.
F. The Intrusiveness Problem
Investigating an organization's "private" expression 272 is particularly
problematic. Indeed, it is startling. Private expression depends in a very
substantial way on privacy. It does not take much to recognize that the
richness of associational life derives in significant part from the ability to
come together with other like-minded individuals, free from the scrutiny of
outsiders. Judicial prying appears inconsistent with this most basic feature of
associations.
Private expression is also very difficult to measure and evaluate. There is
not likely to be much evidence: private expression is not generally recorded.
It is also likely to be subtle, varied, and largely beyond the reach of external
monitoring. Asking whether an association's private values will be altered by
the application of a government regulation seems, therefore, both destructive
of associational life and poorly suited to protecting the First Amendment
interests at stake.
G. The Governmental Interest Problem
The Court's approach also seems insensitive to the interests of the
government in regulating certain associations or certain associational
activities. Dale exemplifies the problem. Framing the relevant issue as
whether the Boy Scouts' expression will be impaired by James Dale's
presence, the Court effectively presents the state's interest in prohibiting
discrimination as purely the personal (and possibly selfish) interest of James
Dale in being able to express his own views. Indeed, James Dale himself is
treated as the embodiment of a viewpoint, one that the Court finds
incompatible with the views of the Scouts. Thus, the Court invokes Hurley,
272. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
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and compares James Dale's efforts to remain a Scout to marchers excluded
from the St. Patrick's Day parade. 73
However, the Boy Scouts is not a parade, and James Dale was not seeking
a right to march with a sign. More generally, New Jersey's purpose in
prohibiting discrimination had little to do with facilitating one speaker over
another. Rather, the point of New Jersey's statute is to allow individuals
equal access, without regard to their race, religion, sexual orientation, or
other such characteristics, to a wide variety of services and entities, including
stores, theaters, motels, and swimming pools.274 It is certainly appropriate,
when evaluating a claim to freedom of association, to ask whether the state's
interests reasonably extend to the particular type of organization or entity
being regulated. It would, therefore, be appropriate to see how an
organization like the Boy Scouts compares to some of these other entities
being regulated. But treating, as the Court does in Dale, the relevant state
interest as akin to an individual's desire to march in a parade just misses the
point.
H. Implications
My purpose in setting out these problems in the Supreme Court's analysis
of freedom of expressive association is not simply to criticize what the Court
has done. These shortcomings point to how an alternative approach to
freedom of association, one more sensitive to the realities of associational
life and more faithful to the constitutional and governmental interests at
stake, should look. Such an approach would meet the following criteria:
First, there must be a clear understanding of the subject matter in question.
What, in other words, are associations? What do they look like? What do
they do? Second, the approach must carefully identify the constitutional
interests at stake in associational life. Why should associations be protected
under the Constitution? In particular, the approach must provide a
satisfactory theory of associational freedom that goes beyond simple
assertions and conclusions. Third, the approach must take seriously the
state's interests in regulating associations. What is the state trying to
accomplish and how it is going about that? Fourth (and perhaps most
difficult of all) the approach must offer a method for identifying, in a reliable
and coherent manner, when the Constitution protects an association from
273. ld. at 654.
274. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (2000).
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state regulation. In other words, it is not enough simply to wait for ajudge to
take a look at an association's minutes and other records to tell us if a
regulation goes too far. We need clear tools that can be usefully brought to a
variety of contexts.
With these criteria in mind, I turn in the next sections to developing and
applying an alternative account of freedom of association. I begin by seeking
to understand the subject matter: what are associations and why do they
matter?
IV. A SOCIOLOGY OF ASSOCIATIONS
Visiting the United States in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville remarked
on the propensity of Americans to join associations. He wrote:
Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition
are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and
industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand
different types-religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very
limited, immensely large and very minute .... Nothing, in my view,
more deserves attention than the intellectual and moral associations in
America.275
Commentators frequently invoke these words because Tocqueville's
observation that associations are a central feature of American life remains
pertinent today. The United States is a "nation of joiners.' 276 Summarizing
cross-national data, Sidney Verba and his colleagues report "associational
life in America is probably unparalleled in the number of organizations and
the diversity of their concerns. Americans are [also] more likely to be
members of voluntary associations... than are citizens of other nations."
277
Social scientists have researched numerous aspects of associations." If
we are to think meaningfully about constitutional protections for freedom of
275. ALEXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Perennial library 1988) (1835).
276. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 1 (1944).
277. SIDNEY VERBA Er AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERIcAN POLITICS 79
(1995). See also James E. Curtis et al., Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries: A
Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 139, 148 (1992) (reporting that worldwide Americans are the
most likely to join associations if religious organizations are included; excluding religious organizations
Americans join at the same rate as citizens of other nations).
278. See generally, David Horton Smith, Major Analytical Topics of Voluntary Action Theory and
Research: Version 2, 1 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION REs. 1 (1972) (identifying the following areas of research:
conceptual issues; rates of participation; the effect of the state on associational involvement; the effect of
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association, this research is a useful-perhaps necessary-place to begin. In
this section, I therefore draw on the research to provide an overview of the
associational terrain.
A. Definitions
Researchers have defined "association" in various ways. 79 In an early
formulation, G.D.H. Cole defines an association as "any group of persons
pursuing a common purpose or system or aggregation of purposes by a
course of cooperative action extending beyond a single act, and, for this
purpose, agreeing together upon certain methods of procedure, and laying
down, in however rudimentary a form, rules for common action."2 "o More
recently, Mark Warren describes associations as "those kinds of attachments
we choose for specific purposes-to further a cause, form a family, play a
sport, work through a problem of identity or meaning, get ahead in a career,
or resolve a neighborhood problem."2 1 Yael Tamir refers to an association
as "any kind of formalized, non-governmental, human interaction. ' 'as
Some commentators discuss voluntary associations, a formulation that
emphasizes organizations individuals enter by choice. 3 Other commentators
define associations as those social arrangements located between the family
and the state.' Still other commentators emphasize that associations
the development of institutional sectors of society on participation; the nature and determinants of the
incidence, grovth, change, and dissolution of associations; the nature and determinants of relationships
between associations and other groups and individual affiliates; the effectiveness of associations; the
internal functioning of associations; the nature of individual activity; role selection; the impact on
participants; and the development of theories of associations).
279. A useful overview (and critique) is provided by MARK E. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND
AssociATIoN 39-59 (2001).
280. G.D.H. CoLE, SOCIAL THEORY 37 (1920).
281. WARREN, supra note 279, at 39.
282. Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF AssOCIATiON 214,216 (Amy Gutnann
ed., 1998).
283. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNUIJELLE, RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE
INDtVtDUALS AND VOLUNTARY ASSOcIATIONS 7 (1993); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CvIVc LIFE 296-98 (1999); Theda Skocpol, How Americans Became Civic, in
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 27,34-37 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds.,
1999).
284. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, in
ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 1995).
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embody non-hierarchical social relationships. 25 Some researchers define
association using a tripartite scheme: primary associations comprising
intimate connections (particularly among family and friends); secondary
associations involving personal connections and face-to-face contact (such as
in religious groups, hobby clubs, and self-help groups); and tertiary
associations with many members who do not know each other personally
(such as the AARP or a state bar association). 286
While these approaches all provide some guidance in conceptualizing
associations, a definition may ultimately be of limited use. For instance,
broad distinctions and descriptions overlook more subtle characteristics of
particular associations. The Boy Scouts is a large, mass-membership
association. But it is also a collection of small, localized troops. Membership
in the local PTA or neighborhood group may be entirely voluntary. But
everybody might also expect you to join if your child attends school or you
live on the block. An association might comprise private citizens. But it
might also have extensive relationships with the government. And so on. In
view of complications of these kinds, Nancy Rosenblum is surely correct to
caution that "[g]ross references to 'voluntary' associations.. . and general
terms like 'secondary' . . . associations obscure the mixed makeup of most
groups.' 2
Further, any reliance on a single definition is likely unrealistic in view of
the huge variety of associations in the United States. The most recent edition
of the Encyclopedia ofAssociations includes organizations as diverse as the
American Belgian Hare Club, the Association of Food Journalists, the
Society of Dance History Scholars, the Friends of French Art, the North
American Truffling Society, the Renaissance Transgender Association, the
American Singles Golf Association, the Americans for Customary Weight
and Measure, the Hereditary Order of the First Families of Massachusetts,
the Cookie Cutter Collectors Club, and the Association for People with Dogs
Named Marty.2 8 As one commentator points out, "[tihe ingenuity of
285. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 173 (1993) (referring to "networks of civic engagement" that link citizens together in "horizontal"
relationships).
286. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 282,
at 3, 10. Gutmann describes the central function of "secondary" associations as "bringing members
together in local chapters for regular meetings and cooperative activities." Id.
287. NANCY L ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN
AMERICA 6 (1998).
288. See I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: AN ASSOCATIONS UNLIMTED REFERENCE 329, 528,




Americans in creating organizations knows no bounds."2 89 Seeking to unite
these sorts of diverse organizations under a single definition is likely to
produce either inaccuracy (some groups will not fit), or such vagueness in
terms that the definition is not practically helpful.
Moreover, for purposes of thinking about the proper scope of
constitutional protection for freedom of association, it may ultimately be less
important to describe "association" as a general matter, than to have tools to
recognize and speak meaningfully about particular kinds of associations, to
be able to identify and evaluate their relevant features, and to compare and
contrast them to other kinds of associations. It may, in other words, be less
useful to say that a gardening club and the Jaycees and the KKK are all
"associations," than to say what these entities have in common, and to be
able to recognize how they differ.
B. Numbers and Types
On that score, it is useful to have some understanding of the number and
the types of associations that exist in the United States. Precise figures are
hard to come by because many associations do not report their existence to
anybody. The Encyclopedia ofAssociations-which does not include local
organizations-lists nearly 23,000 non-profit membership organizations of
national scope.290 The Nonprofit Almanac reports that as of 1995, there were
576,133 tax-exempt organizations of 645 different types.29' But this figure is
also only the tip of the iceberg. It excludes the many thousands of religious
associations, 292 as well as perhaps several million smaller secular groups that
lack tax-exempt status.293
Perhaps more useful than the sheer number of associations is the
information researchers have gathered on participation in various types of
289. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVwAL OF AMERICAN
CoMMUNTY 48 (2000).
290. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS: AN ASSOCIATIONS UNLIMITED REFERENCE (Kimberly N.
Hunt ed., Gale Research, 38th ed. 2002).
291. See VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON ETAL.,NoNPROFiTALMANAC 1996-1997: DZIENSIONS OFTHE
INDEPENDENT SECTOR 234 (1996).
292. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 287, at 8 (reporting that "[r]oughly 75 million Americans
belong to small religious fellowship groups and secular recovery and support groups.").
293. Robert Wuthnow estimates from his recent survey evidence that there are possibly three million
small, informal groups (such as support groups, book clubs, neighborhood associations) in the United
States. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SHARING THE JOURNEY: SUPPORT GROUPS AND AMERICA'S NEW
QUESTFOR COMMUNITY 45 (1994).
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associations. Recent work by Sidney Verba and his colleagues is of
particular relevance.294 Verba and his colleagues report the results of a
national survey of citizen participation in a wide variety of associations."
According to the results of the survey, seventy-nine percent of respondents
were affiliated with one or more associations either as members or by
making financial contributions; forty-one percent of respondents had four or
more such affiliations. 296 Among respondents reporting affiliation with at
least one association, sixty-five percent had attended a meeting of the
association within the past year; forty-two percent reported active
membership, such as service on a committee; and twenty-eight percent
reported that they had served as a board member or officer.297
C. Nature of Participation
There are also important differences in the ways in which individuals
participate in different types of associations. Verba and his colleagues report
a broad range of involvement in the various organizations they examined.
The largest portion of respondents (forty-four percent) indicated affiliation
with a large charitable or social service organization.2 9' But seventy-nine
percent of the members in these organizations simply made a financial
294. See VERBA Er AL., supra note 277.
295. See id. The survey asked respondents about the extent and nature of their involvement in the
following categories of organizations: service clubs or fraternal organizations; veterans' organizations;
religious groups; ethnic organizations; senior citizens' groups; women's groups; labor unions; business or
professional organizations; issue-specific groups like gun control or environmental groups; general civic
organizations such as the League of Women Voters; organizations supporting liberal or conservative
causes, for instance the Conservative Caucus; candidate or party organizations; youth groups; literary, art
or study groups; hobby, sport or leisure groups; neighborhood or homeowners' groups; charitable or
service organizations; educational organizations like the PTA; and cultural organizations such as a
museum group. See id. at 60-61. The study also included a category for "other" groups not covered by
these categories. See id. That only one percent of respondents indicated they were affiliated with an
organization that did not fall within one of the specified types of organizations evidences the
comprehensiveness of the list. See id. at 63.
296. See id. at 62.
297. See id. See also DAVID HORTON SMITH, GRASSROOTS ASSOCIATIONS 41, 51 (2000) (reporting
that sixty-seven percent of adult Americans, or 124 million individuals, belong to one or more grassroots
organizations and that there are seven and a half million such associations); WUTHNOW,supra note 293, at
45 (reporting that forty percent of the adult population, or seventy-five million Americans, are members of
a "small group" that meets regularly and estimating that there are three million small groups in the United
States); Frank Baumgartner & Jack Walker, Survey Research andMembership in VoluntaryAssociations,
32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 908, 920 (1988) (reporting that 77.7 percent of respondents are members of one or
more association).
298. See VERBA ET AL., supra note 277, at 63-64.
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contribution and did not attend meetings.299 Participation in cultural
organizations (such as museum groups), veterans' groups, and liberal or
conservative groups was also mostly limited to giving money.300 However, of
the respondents involved in other kinds of groups-service or fraternal
groups; religious groups; educational groups; literary, art or discussion
groups; hobby, sports or leisure groups; business or professional groups;
unions; and neighborhood or homeowners' groups-at least half reported
regularly attending group meetings.3°'
D. Demographic Variations
Different people also participate in associations to different degrees.
Researchers have long examined how participation varies by race, gender,
age, and other demographic characteristics. 32 For present purposes, it is




302. See generally Morris Axelrod, Urban Structure and Social Participation, 21 AM. Soc. REv. 13
(1956) (reporting that education, income, and occupational status are positively related to participation in
associations); Wendell Bell & Maryann Force, Social Structure and Participation in Different Types of
Formal Associations, 34 SoC. FORCES 345 (1956) (reporting that low-income respondents are more likely
to be involved in unions but that for all other associations participation is higher among high-income
respondents); Floyd Dotson, Patterns of Voluntary Association Among Working Class Families, 16 AM.
Soc. REv. 687 (1951) (reporting that working class respondents are active primarily in athletic and church
groups); John Edwards & Randall White, Predictors of Social Participation: Apparent or Real, 9 J.
VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 60 (1980) (reporting that education, occupational prestige, income, and years
in a neighborhood all have a positive effect on association membership but the significance of these
factors diminishes when a larger number of variables are considered); Howard Freeman et al., Correlates
of Membership in Voluntary Associations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 528 (1957) (reporting that residential
mobility, job mobility, and a positive attitude toward the community are positively related to participation
in associations); T.B. Guterbbock & B. London, Race, Political Orientation, and Participation, 48 AM.
Soc. REv. 439 (1983) (reporting and analyzing higher participation of Whites than Blacks); Robert
Hagedom & Sanford Labovitz, Occupational Characteristics and Participation in Voluntary
Associations, 47 SOC. FORCES 16 (1968) (reporting that individuals in occupations that require leadership
skills and individuals in bureaucratic positions participate more than other types of workers); David Knoke
& Randall Thomson, Voluntary Association Membership Trends and the Family Life Cycle, 56 SOC.
FORCES 48 (1977) (reporting that for adults, association membership rises after marriage, drops with the
birth of children, rises when children enter school, and continues to rise through the departure of children
from the home, and then declines again towards the end of life); Charles Wright & Herbert H. Hyman,
Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Survey Samples, 23 AM. SOC.
REV. 284 (1958) (reporting that Whites are more likely to be members of associations than are Blacks and
that participation is directly related to socio-economic status); Basil G. Zimmer & Amos H. Hawley, The
Washington Law Review
Researchers report that associational membership increases with
education; indeed, education is often the most important predictor of
membership. 33 Accordingly, participation is positively and strongly
correlated with income.304 Membership is also positively correlated with age:
older Americans belong to more organizations than do younger
Americans.0 5 Racial differences in associational membership are not large.
If religious organizations are counted, Black Americans are slightly more
likely to belong to associations than are White Americans. 306 Rural residents
are more likely to participate in associations than are urban dwellers.3 7
Women belong to slightly fewer associations than do men (although this
gender gap is narrowing).30 8 Married men and women, and those with
children, join more religious, school and youth groups, but they participate
less often than do single Americans in other types of groups.
309
E. Effects
A large body of research examines the effects of associations on the lives
of their members and the roles associations play in the broader community.
1. Individual Benefits
Some associations confer obvious benefits on their members by allowing
them to pursue their interests with like-minded individuals. If I enjoy
gardening, for example, I may join a gardening association to share tips,
trade seedlings and cuttings, learn about new products and techniques, or
just to spend some time in the company of other green thumbs. Certain
Significance of Membership in Associations, 64 AM. J. Soc. 196 (1959) (reporting higher participation in
the central city than in the suburbs).
303. See Robert D. Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in
America, 28 PS 664,667 (1995).
304. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 193; VERBA ETlAL., supra note 277, at 191-
204.
305. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 247; Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra
note 303, at 673.
306. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 280; VERBA ET AL., supra note 277, at 231-
41; Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 303, at 672.
307. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 205; Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra
note 303, at 670.
308. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 194-203; VERBA ET AL., supra note 277, at
251-63; Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 303, at 670.
309. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 278; Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra
note 303, at 671.
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associations exist solely for the tangible benefits they provide to their
members: I join the AAA, for instance, not because I want to schmooze with
other drivers, but in order to get professional auto assistance, travel
discounts, and road maps.
A different individual benefit of associational membership may be the
realization of an important goal or furtherance of a personal belief. If, for
example, I believe that spotted owls should be protected, I may join an
environmental organization not simply because I want to associate with
others who share my ideas (although that might be nice), but because I
recognize that together we have a better chance of influencing legislation.
Beyond these obvious reasons forjoining, researchers have demonstrated
more subtle ways in which associations affect the lives of their members.
These include: providing emotional support, friendship, solidarity, and
stability;31° conferring economic benefits; nourishing social identity and
prestige;"' and providing a forum in which individuals can develop and live
their values.
Of course, some people are just "joiners" out of habit, and they may have
memberships in a variety of associations without expecting or receiving any
obvious personal benefits. 4 I may join an association for no other reason
than that somebody (a co-worker or a neighbor, for instance) asks me to sign
up. Alternatively, I might join because my parents were members and their
parents were members before them, and that is just how things are done.
2. Cooperation
Beyond these individual motivations and effects, there are also significant
social and political consequences of associational membership. The oft-
recited features of associations identified by Tocqueville in the 1830s are
especially important. Tocqueville observed that associations keep anonymity
in check by drawing individuals out of their world of private self-interest and
310. See Sffmi, supra note 297 at 195-212; WuTHNow, supra note 293, at 183, 344-45.
311. See James Kerri, Anthropological Studies of Voluntary Associations and Voluntary Action: A
Review, 3 J. VOLUNTARY ACION RES. 10, 15-16 (1974).
312. See id.
313. See SMITH, supra note 297 at 56, 195-212.
314. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 98.
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teaching them habits of cooperation, solidarity, and other civic skills.3' 5 Of
course, not all associations do this: simply joining a mass-membership
organization like the AARP or Greenpeace, for example, does not suddenly
give me a roster of close friends. But some associations can clearly serve this
kind of function. If, for example, for the past twenty years I have gathered
with the same six people every Wednesday evening to discuss French poetry,
it seems likely I will feel closely connected to those people, I will share and
cooperate with them, and, conversely, that they will notice if one Wednesday
I do not show up.
3. Power
According to Tocqueville, associations also generate power because in
associations collective agendas are set and refined, and organized individuals
are able to exercise greater influence together than if they each labor alone.
316
Therefore, the broader social impact of an association may lie in the goals it
pursues and the outcomes it achieves: influencing legislation, for instance-
but also, perhaps, raising funds for some purpose (the new hospital, an ill
child, victims of war); changing our physical environment (beautifying the
315. See DE TOCQUEVIJLL, supra note 275, at 515 ("Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart
enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another.").
Echoing these observations, John Stuart Mill writes that through association with others, a citizen is drawn
out of the sphere of self-interest and learns to pursue collective ends: "He is called upon ... to weigh
interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private
partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the
common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than
his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and
stimulation to his feeling for the general interest." John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative
Government, in THREE ESSAYS 143, 197-98 (Oxford U. Press ed. 1975) (1861).
316. See DE TOCQUEVLLE, supra note 275, at 190. A useful empirical investigation of the effects of
associations is Jason Kaufman, Three Views ofAssociationalism in 19th-CenturyAmerica:AnEmnpirical
Examination, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1296 (1999). Examining associations in fifty-three cities in 1880, Kaufman
finds that while these associations brought people together to perform collectively beneficial acts, there
was no evidence that an increased number of associations reduced governmental spending or promoted
greater political participation as measured by voter turnout. See id. at 1337. Kaufman reaches the
following conclusions about the effects of associations:
[C]ivic associations help people (particularly self-enfranchised groups of people) get what they
want from government, for better or worse. Indeed, [James] Madison may have been right in
suggesting that the best cure for factionalism is more factionalism. Given the wide range of
special interests represented by associations, past and present, associationalism may be
desirable if for no other reason than to counteract the nearly inevitable presence of other
factions .... On the other hand, excessive associationalism may simply lead a few
associations to wield political power disproportionate to their actual membership ....
Id. at 1339.
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park, building a statue); helping somebody get elected to public office; or
transmitting information to others.
Of course, not everything an association achieves is necessarily good for
everybody else, or even good for anybody else. An association might impact
its broader community by creating fear (as gangs do), limiting access to
certain places (the effect of some homeowner associations, or of a picket
line), destroying something other people happen to enjoy, preventing an
activity from taking place, or funding some nefarious cause.
In considering these social influences, it is important to recognize that
associations often work to empower otherwise politically weak individuals.
As Tocqueville recognized, associations can serve as a counterweight to the
interests of majority groups by giving minority interests a stronger political
voice, and serving a representative function. 317 There are numerous examples
of the phenomenon of strength in numbers, such as the impact of well-
organized gay rights groups.
318
4. Self-Governance
Associations also provide a forum for self-governance. 1 9 In associations,
individuals develop skills and undergo experiences that better equip them to
take care of themselves, and to solve problems without having to rely on the
intervention of the state.320 Verba and his colleagues report how the "civic
skills" acquired in associations are an important resource for various kinds of
social and political activity:
Civic skills, the communications and organizational abilities that allow
citizens to use time and money effectively in political life, constitute
a... resource for politics. Citizens who can speak or write well or who
are comfortable organizing and taking part in meetings are likely to be
more effective when they get involved in politics. Those who possess
civic skills should find political activity less daunting and costly and,
317. See VERBA ETAL, supra note 277, at 192-95.
318. See generally DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUTFOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO
BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1999); JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY:
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN N THE U.S.A. (1976); THE QUESTION OF EQUALITY: LESBIAN AND GAY
PoLrTcs IN AMERICA SINCE SToNEAL (David Deitcher ed., 1995).
319. See DE TOCQUEVHIA supra note 275, at 513-17. For a modem Tocqueviflian commentary on the
"democratic virtues of special interest groups," see Peter H. Schuck, Against (andfor) Madison: An Essay
in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L & POL'Y REV. 553 (1997).
320. See DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 275, at 515.
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therefore, should be more likely to take part. Furthermore, those
capacities allow participants to use inputs of time and money more
effectively, making them more productive when they are active.32'
Internally, then, associations teach individuals organizing skills that are
useful in advancing political agendas: how to write letters, run meetings, and
recruit associates.322 Externally, associations allow individuals to express
their interests and demands on government and to protect their interests.
Associations aggregate political power: they permit individuals who would
otherwise be politically weak to join together to express their views and
advance their interests. "Without access to an association that is willing and
able to speak up for our views and values, we have a very limited ability to
be heard by many other people or to influence the political process, unless
we happen to be rich or famous. 32"
5. By-Products
Importantly, membership in an association may have these kinds of social
and political implications even if the association is not itself socially activist
or politically engaged. 325 Associations stimulate social and political activity
by broadening the sphere of interest and concern of their members, bringing
members into contact with diverse people, and providing channels through
which to act.326 Participation in associations in adolescence, for example,
321. VERBAETAL, supra note 277, at 304.
322. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 338.
323. See id. See also Kerni, supra note 311, at 11-16 (explaining that externally associations act as
political pressure groups; perform deliberative functions; and serve as points of articulation with officials).
324. Gutmann, An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 282, at 3. See also
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 67,67-91 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1999).
325. See Bonnie H. Erickson & T.A. Nosanchuk, How an Apolitical Association Politicizes, 27
CANADIAN REv. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 206,206-219 (1990). Conversely, we should not assume that
the importance of overtly political organizations lies solely or even principally in their political
achievements. One commentator reports, for instance, that early suffrage picketing and pageants were less
significant for their effect on the public than for their effects on participants, who became unified and
energized around a common cause. See LINDA J. LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE
RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 98, 119, 153 (1997).
326. See David Knoke, Associations and Interest Groups, 12 ANN. REV. SOC. 1,1-21 (1986). See also
David KNOKE, ORGANIZING FOR COLLEcTvE ACTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF ASSOCIATION
201-12 (1990); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. Nm, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 5-20 (1972); Jane Leighley, Group Membership and the
Mobilization of Political Participation, 58 J. POL 447, 447-63 (1996); Phillip H. Pollock IL,
Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does Group Activity Affect Political Participation?, 26
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increases political activity in adulthood: adolescents who join associations
are more likely to discuss political issues, campaign, vote, and join political
organizations in early adulthood.327 Individuals involved in associations are
more likely to engage both in institutionalized politics (such as through party
mechanisms), as well as in spontaneous activities like protests.328
Similarly, civic skills develop in associations without overt political
purposes.329 Verba and his colleagues report that civic skills are often
acquired early in life, especially through education; hence, education is
positively correlated with political activity.330 In adult life, participation in
various kinds of associations provides additional opportunities for acquiring
and practicing these skills. 331 Non-political associations provide a forum for
members to discuss political issues and for political recruitment.332 In
addition, through non-political activities, individuals develop
communication and organizational skills that are useful in politics.
333
AMI. J. POL Sci. 485, 485-503 (1982); David L. Rogers et al., Voluntary Association Membership and
Political Participation: An Exploration of the Mobilization Hypothesis, 16 SOc. Q. 305,305-10 (1975).
327. See M. Hanks, Youth, Voluntary Associations, and Political Socialization, 60 Soc. FORCES 211,
211-23 (1981); Thomas Janoski et al., Being Volunteered? The Impact of Social Participation and Pro-
Social Attitudes on Volunteering, 13 Soc. F. 495,496-517 (1998).
328. See Rory McVeigh & Christian Smith, Who Protests in America: An Analysis of Three Political
Alternatives-Inaction, Institutionalized Politics, or Protest, 14 SOC. F. 685, 697-700 (1999).
329. There is an important similarity between this notion and Jtirgen Habermas' discussion of the
public sphere. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCrURALTRANSFORMATION OFTHE PUBiC SPHERE T.
Burger & F. Lawrence trans., 1989). According to Habermas, civilsocietyin seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Europe developed as "the genuine domain of private autonomy... opposed to the state." Id. at 12.
Since civil society stood in opposition to the state, a public sphere emerged in which citizens discussed
and debated state authority and action as it related to private interests. See id. at 24. In contrast to the
Greek polis, in the public sphere, individuals formed primarily in the realm ofprivate life came together to
debate public issues:
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come
together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public
authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The
medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public
use of their reason.
Id. at 27. Habermas illustrates the point by his account of the prevalence in London, at the beginning of
the eighteenth century, of coffee houses, where private individuals met publicly to discuss issues of
common concern. See id. at 36.
330. See VERBAETAL., supra note 277, at 305.
331. See id. at309.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 309-10.
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For Black citizens, associations are particularly important sites for
acquiring civic skills. In the workplace, educated White citizens
disproportionately occupy the high-level positions-such as teaching and the
legal profession-that impart civic skills. 334 However, in associations, Black
citizens have about the same opportunities, as do Whites, to develop and
practice civic skills. 335 In church groups, Black citizens (and members of
other minority groups) are on average able to practice civic skills more
frequently than are White citizens. 336 Accordingly, "[c]hurches... are one of
the few vital institutions left in which low-income, minority, and
disadvantaged citizens of all races can learn politically relevant skills and be
recruited into political action. 337
Historically, many groups formed for social purposes have prepared their
members for political activity. In the 1860s, women in the United States,
although excluded from voting, holding office, or serving on juries,
exercised political influence through leadership roles in religious
organizations. 38 In the 1870s, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union
immersed members in prison reform, youth advocacy, and labor issues.339 In
the 1890s, the members of women's reading groups became involved in
334. See id. at 314-20.
335. See id.
336. See id. There is also evidence that involvement in religious groups increases the propensity of
individuals to engage in protest activities relative to activities through institutionalized politics (e.g.
through parties). See McVeigh & Smith, supra note 328, at 696.
337. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 339 (citing Frederick C. Harris, Religious
Institutions and African American Political Mobilization, in CLASSIFYING By RACE 299 (Paul Peterson
ed., 1995)). See also Phillip L Miller, The Impact of Organizational Activity on Black Political
Participation, 63 SOC. SCI. Q. 83, 83-98 (1982). For a discussion of the historical role ofBlackchurches
in politics, see JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICA
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OFTHE CIVILRIGHTS MOVEMENT,
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). On the role of churches in modem interest
group politics, see ALLEN D. HERTzKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON: THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS
LOBBIES IN THE AMERICAN POLrY (1988).
Echoing the significance of associations to otherwise politically weak citizens, Theda Skocpol observes
that in the locally organized chapters of national associations that flourished in the United States during
the 1830s to 1850s, members enjoyed unique opportunities for advancement:
[T]he top posts were often held by white-collar, business, or professional men or women. But
lowly clerks and farmers and skilled workers, or their wives, also attained such posts. Civic
associations created status ladders that were not identical to the class hierarchies of the
economy. A person of lesser occupational status could work his or her way up an associational
ladder all the way to the top.
Theda Skocpol, How Americans Became Civic, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 283, at 67.
338. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREAMTON AND REcONSTRUCnTON 239-41 (1998).
339. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 389-90.
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various kinds of political reforms, including protections for women and
children.340 Non-political associations and church organizations have
historically been important sites of social and political activism for Black
citizens.3"' Indeed, it was precisely because associations of Blacks
represented a political threat that early Southern governments sought to
prohibit such organizations. 42
F. Social Capital
A further, and perhaps the most important, perspective on the impact of
associations comes from recent work in political science and related fields on
the significance of social capital.
1. Overview
Social capital refers to "features of social organization, such as trust,
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by
facilitating coordinated action." '343 The key idea of social capital theory is
that there is value in social networks and the norms these networks sustain.3"
Just as physical capital, like tools, and human capital, like education, can
increase the productivity of individuals and groups, so too can social capital
improve individual and collective productivity.345 Transactions between and
among individuals occur more readily when the individuals are embedded in
strong social networks and can draw upon the norms and trust that result
from social ties. It is, for instance, cheaper for me to lend money to
somebody I know and trust than to lend it to a stranger whose background I
have to investigate. It is easier if I can find a job through a friend than if I
have to use an employment agency. It is more efficient for both of us if we
can agree to car pool than if we each drive alone. These are simple examples
340. See supra Prologue.
341. See AMAR, supra note 338, at 241; PuTNAA, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 392; Allan D.
Hertzke, The Role of Churches in Political Mobilization: The Presidential Campaigns of Jesse Jackson
and PatRobertson, in InTERSGROUP POLmCS 177,177-98 (Allan J. Cigler & BurdettA. Loomis eds.,
3d ed. 1991).
342. See AMAR, supra note 338, at 241.
343. See PUtrmA, MAKING DENOCRACY WORK, supra note 285, at 167.
344. See id.
345. RobertD. Putnam, BowlingAlone, Revisited, THERESPONSiVECOMMUNrrY, Spring, 1995, at20.
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of the basic point: getting things accomplished takes less time and energy
when we know and we can depend on the people with whom we interact.
2. Collective Action Dilemmas
In particular, social capital can often solve prisoner's dilemmas and
similar collective action problems that impede cooperation for mutual
advantage. There are a variety of contexts in which cooperation between and
among individuals would make everyone better off, but not cooperating is
the dominant strategy pursued by self-interested actors. In the classic
formulation of this problem, the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume
explained the dilemma confronting two farmers who would each benefit by
jointly harvesting each other's crop:
Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so to-morrow. 'Tis profitable for
us both, that I shou'd labour with you to-day, and that you shou'd aid
me to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little
for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and
should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a
return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain
depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone:
You treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us
lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.'
46
Dilemmas of collective action mean that no individual will cooperate
unless there can be a reasonable expectation that others will follow in step.
Thus, you and I will both benefit if we get together to harvest our crops (or
to paint our apartments), but unless I can rely on you to come to my place
after I have helped you, I will refuse to cooperate. And you will not
cooperate first because you understand that I can then refuse to help you
later. Each of us will end up harvesting (or painting) alone, with lower
efficiency.
Game theorists have several labels for failures to cooperate for mutual
benefit. In the prisoner's dilemma, two prisoners would be better off if they
both refused to confess to a crime, but because each is individually better off
confessing no matter what the other does, and unable to coordinate their
actions, they fail to achieve the optimal outcome.347 In the tragedy of the
commons, each individual has an incentive to maximize her own use of a
346. DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE pt. 2, § 5 (1740).
347. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUrTON OF COOPERATION 7-24 (1984).
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common resource (e.g. grazing land), but the end result is that the resource
disappears to the detriment of everybody.34 Public goods (e.g. clean air) are
goods that can be used by any individual regardless of whether that
individual contributes to the provision of the good; as a result, nobody has an
incentive to contribute and everybody loses the benefit of the good.349 In the
logic of collective action, individuals do not contribute to collective ends
(e.g. labor strikes) because each individual receives only some of the benefit
of her contribution and because she can free ride on the contributions of
others. In all of these settings, without some guarantee that if I cooperate
you will reciprocate, and with the knowledge that once I cooperate you will
have an incentive to defect, neither of us cooperates even though cooperation
would produce a more desirable outcome for us both. In each instance, self-
interest works as an impediment to mutually beneficial outcomes.
One solution to these kinds of dilemmas is that offered by Thomas
Hobbes in Leviathan: enforcement by a third-party such as the state.35 '
Under this approach, a powerful sovereign prevents cheating and therefore
harmonizes civil life. Thus, we can agree to help each other to harvest (or to
paint our respective apartments) by first entering into a duly executed
contract. If you fail to live up to the bargain, I can sue you for breach. I will
therefore help you because I know you do not want to be sued, and you will
reciprocate for the same reason. The threat of sanction imposed by the state
works to ensure we both live up to the bargain.
Third-party mechanisms are costly. The expense involved in negotiating
and writing up the contract and going to court to have it enforced can easily
outweigh the benefit of cooperation. In addition, reliance on a third-party
itself presents a collective action problem: the third-party is likely to pursue
its own interests once we grant it power. Moreover, because a third-party
lacks familiarity with the specific circumstances of a collective action
setting, the third-party may not be very good at regulating for optimal results.
Elinor Ostrom provides striking evidence of the failure of governmental
policies to overcome dilemmas of collective action where the government
348. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLEcInE ACTION 2-3 (1991).
349. See John Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 111-12 (John Kagel & Alvin Roth eds., 1995).
350. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 27-28 (1965).
351. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 223-34 (C.B. Macphersoned., Penguin Classics 1986) (1651).
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lacks sufficient monitoring capacities and the skills for tailoring policies to
the specific circumstances of a particular setting.
35 2
Social capital-in the form of social networks and norms-is a resource
that can solve collective action problems, often more effectively than any
other mechanism. "Success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action and
the self-defeating opportunism that they spawn depends on the broader
social context within which any particular game is played. Voluntary
cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of
social capital .... Social capital facilitates cooperative interactions to
overcome collective action dilemmas because it provides information about
participants and it helps ensure the enforcement of their commitments. While
I may be too suspicious to cooperate with a stranger (because I suspect she
may not return the favor), I will cooperate with my friend: I have known her
for a long time and I know she is an honest and reliable person, we have
done things for each other in the past, and it seems unlikely that she will
sacrifice our friendship (or embarrass herself in front of our mutual
acquaintances) by cheating. Social capital facilitates the exchange.
These same mechanisms can extend beyond tight personal connections to
produce cooperation in broad social settings. It is not simply having lots of
trustworthy friends that counts. Indeed, personal ties might be too time-
consuming to allow for very broad cooperative endeavors. Rather, social
capital can exist in the form of more general interlocking networks that
provide information about individuals and incentives for compliance, and
that monitor and punish defection. Thus, I will be more inclined to cooperate
with a stranger who turns out to be a member of my gardening club, or my
neighbor's friend, or if others can vouch for her reputation. My fear that she
will defect decreases because of the social context in which the transaction
occurs.
Two specific forms of social capital are especially relevant to our
discussion: civic networks and norms of generalized reciprocity.
3. Civic Networks
Civic networks are various types of social groups in which individuals are
brought together, usually with some shared purpose or interest.
Neighborhood associations, choral societies, sports clubs, religious
352. See OSTROM, supra note 348 at 143-81.
353. See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 285, at 167.
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organizations, and interest groups are examples of civic networks. 3 4 Civic
networks link citizens horizontally: they bring together people of similar
status and power (as distinguished from vertical networks which are
hierarchical links of dependency). Thus, while cat clubs, Rotary, and
PTAs represent civic networks, most workplaces, hierarchically arranged, do
not.
We may summarize the ways in which civic networks produce
cooperation and overcome collective action dilemmas in the following
manner. First, civic networks increase the costs of defection. 56 An individual
who is embedded in a dense network of social relationships has more to lose
from defecting: defection puts at risk all of the other transactions in which
the individual is engaged, as well as the benefits from future transactions."
Second, civic networks can foster norms governing acceptable behavior.
3 58
These norms improve the efficiency of transactions because everyone can
reasonably anticipate how others will behave (and everyone can act with
confidence that nobody is going to cheat). Third, civic networks provide
information and allow for monitoring: cooperators (as well as cheaters)
develop reputations that are relayed to others who can figure them into future
transactions.35 9 Fourth, civic networks provide a template for future
cooperation: having collaborated in the past, it is easier for networked
individuals to do so again.3 60
Civic networks are able to connect broad segments of society, thereby
greatly expanding the scope of cooperative endeavors.36' In this manner,
civic networks can provide the background conditions for a wide range of
citizen activity. Evidence of this effect is reported in political scientist
Robert Putnam's study, Making Democracy Work. 62 In that study, Putnam
sought to explain the substantial variations he observed in the performance
of newly formed regional governments in Italy, and in particular differences
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361. See id. at 175.
362. See id. at 83-120.
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between the North and the South. 63 Some of these new regional
governments were inefficient and corrupt; others were highly successful in
pursuing programs and creating local prosperity.364 After eliminating other
explanatory factors, Putnam determined that regional differences could only
be accounted for by regional variations in civicness-the density of
voluntary associations and the degree of citizen participation in public
affairs.365 Northern regions of Italy were characterized by a long tradition of
associational life: from twelfth-century guilds and religious organizations to
nineteenth-century cooperatives and mutual aid societies to dense modem
networks of choral societies, hiking clubs, and the like.366 The South, by
contrast, embodied a tradition of small separate family units and passive
membership in the Catholic Church.367 During the several decades of
Putnam's study, the North prospered and local government was effective,
while the South was marred by corruption, suspicion, and poverty.68 Putnam
argues that civic culture made all the difference in the North, where
networks of associational ties and the norms and trust they sustained
overcame collective action problems and made individuals and groups more
productive and government more effective. 369 "[O]bjective measures of
effectiveness and subjective measures of citizen satisfaction concur,"
Putnam concludes, "in ranking some regional governments consistently more
successful than others. Virtually without exception, the more civic the
context, the better the government.
370
Importantly, civic networks are not necessarily (or even usually) formed
in order to reap the benefits of social capital. People join choral societies
because they enjoy music, not because they want to reduce crime and
unemployment. People bowl in leagues because they enjoy the game in the
company of others (and they like pizza), not to make government more
effective or to help the economy grow faster. The benefits of civic networks
are, therefore, often the unintended by-products of membership and
participation.
363. See id. at 63-82.
364. See id
365. See id. at 120.
366. See id. at 162.
367. See id. at 143-48, 175-76.
368. See id. at 115.





Reciprocity refers to the disposition of individuals to engage in
cooperation with other citizens. 371 We may usefully distinguish between two
types of reciprocity: specific reciprocity and generalized reciprocity.372
Specific reciprocity involves cooperation between two (or perhaps more)
identifiable individuals. It exists when one person does a favor for another-
who, either immediately or at some future date, returns the favor to that same
person.373 "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine," is an instance of
specific reciprocity. By its very nature, specific reciprocity requires trusting
that the person to whom the favor is granted will return the favor in the
future. Individuals who fail to reciprocate quickly enough or generously
enough may, therefore, be shut out of cooperation in the future. Specific
reciprocity often confers significant benefits on individuals. Individuals who
are able to exchange favors with others may hear about job opportunities,
have somebody available to mind their children or watch their house, more
easily borrow money, or get a ride to work. But the benefits of specific
reciprocity are mostly limited to the individuals granting and then receiving
favors, with few benefits to the general population. Indeed, this is true by
definition: favors are not valuable if they confer substantial benefits on other
people, because then the benefit is widely available, and there would be no
need for reciprocity.
Generalized reciprocity exists where a favor granted by one person does
not depend on any expectation that the recipient will repay it to that person.
Instead, the person grants the favor because he or she is part of a community
in which it is understood that people do favors for each other. The favor will
be returned only in the sense that the person giving it will in turn benefit,
somewhere down the road, from other favors from other members of the
community. Accordingly, generalized reciprocity exists where individuals
trust each other generally, and exhibit cooperative behavior with each other,
even though there is no specific guarantee in any particular instance of a
reciprocal exchange. 74
371. See id. at 172.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. See Ernst Fehr and Simon Gdcbter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics ofReciprocity, 14J.
ECON. PERSP. 159,159-61 (2000); Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher, A Theory ofReciprocity (Feb. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Generalized reciprocity is an important form of social capital, conferring
substantial benefits on groups or communities in which it exists. Generalized
reciprocity is a normative feature of the social context. As is true with other
norms, generalized reciprocity shapes behavior because failing to abide by
the norm results in public disapproval and exclusion from social groups.
375
Moreover, quite practical considerations prevent individuals from breaching
a code of reciprocity. Where social ostracism means the disappearance of
neighborly help (no loaned gardening tools, no baby-sitters, no advice or
warnings, no consultation), and where other individuals in a community do
cooperate for efficiency gains, violating norms of reciprocity can mean deep
and long-lasting personal costs. Norms of generalized reciprocity can thus
greatly reduce the risk of defection in collective action situations. I will
harvest your crop (or paint your apartment) because I am expected to do so
and because I can rely on somebody to help me later on; you will help me
because you prefer not to be shunned by your neighbors and because you
also need help from others in the future. As such, generalized reciprocity
makes possible cooperation for mutual benefit.376 On a larger scale,
reciprocity may overcome or reduce free-rider barriers to the provision of
public goods. Individuals acting reciprocally contribute to public goods even
without any specific guarantee that others will also contribute.3 7
Summarizing the evidence, Eric Uslaner reports that "[w]hile the effects of
social trust [i.e. generalized reciprocity] on collective action are not
always... large, they are consistent. No other variable affects as many types
of collective action.' 378
More generally, norms of reciprocity reduce a variety of transaction costs.
When individuals do not need to check constantly that they are not being
taken advantage of but instead may rely on shared cooperative norms, their
goals become easier to achieve. It is, for instance, cheaper and easier for me
if somebody on the street will lend me a quarter to make a phone call than if
I have to use a credit card or call collect. It is easier for me to leave my
briefcase at my table when I go to order coffee than to drag it along because I
worry it will be stolen. If I may be confident that a salesperson is not
cheating me, it is easier for me to buy a car. If I do not need to rely on
lengthy legal documents to borrow money, it is cheaper and easier to get a
375. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 311 (1990).
376. See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 285, at 172.
377. See Fehr and Gachter, supra note 374, at 164; R. Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public
Goods Through Voluntary Contributions, 94 ECON. J. 772, 774 (1984).




loan. In numerous ways such as these, "[a] society that relies on generalized
reciprocity is more efficient.., for the same reason that money is more
efficient than barter.' 3 79 Generalized reciprocity serves to "lubricate the
inevitable frictions of social life."380
5. Empirical Evidence
Empirical studies confirm that social capital in the form of civic networks
and norms of reciprocity leads to substantial individual and collective
benefits.81 In the first place, social capital confers important economic
advantages. Research in economic sociology demonstrates that economic
activity is highly dependent on social capital: the structure of social
relationships among economic actors, including shared understandings and
trust, plays a crucial role in economic outcomes.8s For instance, a large body
of evidence documents the benefits to individuals of social ties and
relationships of trust for obtaining employment, receiving higher
compensation, getting promoted, and finding a new job after being laid
off.38 3 Children also do much better, as measured by their risk of abuse, their
behavioral and emotional problems, their performance in school, and their
prospects for the future, when they grow up in families and neighborhoods
characterized by high levels of social capital in the form of civic networks
and reciprocal norms 4.3 " In addition, a striking body of empirical evidence
demonstrates that social capital has important health consequences: people
379. PUTNAM, BOWING ALONE, supra note 289, at 135.
380. ld.
381. See id. at 307-25,336-49.
382. See generally RONALD BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION
(1992); CHARLES SMITH, AUCTnONS: THE SOCIALCONSRUCTION OF VALUE (1989); SHARONZUKIN &
PAULDIMAGGIO, THE STRUCTURES OFCApirrAL THESoCIALORGANZATION OFTHEECONOMY (1990);
Neil Fligstein, A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656 (1996); Mark
Granovetter, EconomicAction and Social Structure: The Problem ofEmbeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481
(1985); Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social
Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. Soc. 1320 (1993).
383. See, e.g., MARK S. GRANOVErrER, GETTING A JOB (1974); PUTNAM, BOWVING ALONE, supra
note 289, at 319-25; Nan Lin, Social Networks and Status Attainment, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 467,467-87
(1999).
384. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 296-306; James S. Coleman, The Creation
and Destruction of Social Capital: Implicationsfor the Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
375,384 (1988); Jason Mazzone, Towards a Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessonsfrom Collaborative
Reproduction, 39 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1, 8-10 (1998); Toby L Parcel & Elizabeth G. Menaghan,
Family Social Capital and Children's Behavior Problems, 56 SOC. PSYCHOL Q. 120 (1993).
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embedded in strong civic networks with sturdy norms of generalized
reciprocity are less prone to a variety of physical and mental ailments,
including heart attacks, strokes, cancer, and depression, and these same
people recover faster when they do become ill.
385
Importantly, social capital often benefits bystanders. When people around
me are connected through civic networks and reciprocal norms, those people
do better. But the quality of my own life may also improve as a result of the
social capital of a group of people- of which I am not myself a part.
Communities characterized by high levels of social capital experience less
crime, poverty, unemployment, welfare dependency, drug use, teenage
pregnancy, and juvenile delinquency; these same communities have more
productive workers, more effective government, and they enjoy greater
economic prosperity than do communities with weaker social networks.38 6
These things obviously benefit the individuals whose civic connections and
commitment to reciprocal norms produce all of these effects. At the same
time, there are positive externalities: some of the benefits flow to the people
who are less connected or hardly connected at all. It is useful to be socially
connected. But a person who has few social ties is better off living among
people who are socially connected than among other loners.
6. Anti-Social Capital
To be sure, social capital, like other tools, can be used for malevolent
purposes. Social capital may, for instance, be employed to identify and weed
out government opponents. It may allow certain groups to pursue anti-
democratic goals, such as the oppression of minorities, violence, or
terrorism. Gangs, the Ku Klux Klan, Al Qaeda, and exclusionary
neighborhoods all put their social capital to bad uses. There is always an
issue as to the particular purposes social capital serves, just as we should
always ask whether knowledge (human capital), corporate resources
(financial capital), and other tools are being put to desirable ends.
Nonetheless, the general point remains: social capital serves as a kind of
capital that can solve collective action dilemmas by furnishing sufficient
guarantees of trust and by tempering self-interested behavior. Groups that
385. See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 326-35; IUsa F. Berkman, The Role of Social
Relations in Health Promotion, 57 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 245,245-54 (1995); Teresa S. Seeman, Social
Ties and Health: The Benefits of Social Integration, 6 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 442, 442-51 (1996).
386. See generally PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 289, at 307-25, 336-49.
387. See id. at 20.
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are able to draw upon civic networks and the norms of reciprocity such
networks sustain can therefore reap the benefits of cooperation in collective
action settings and enjoy increased productivity more readily than groups in
which social relationships are too weak to overcome suspicion and self-
dealing.
G. Summary
Americans are involved, to varying degrees, in a wide variety of
associations. These associations confer tangible benefits on their members
and they may have substantial effects on the broader community. Some
associations are directly involved in politics. Yet even non-political
associations may produce broader social and political effects by instilling
skills that their members take to political life and by producing social capital
for collective action.
V. ASSOCIATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
Having set out the principle features of associations and their effects, I
turn now to examine constitutional protections for freedom of association.
The goal is to provide an account of the reasons for protecting associations
under the Constitution and the proper scope of such protections, as well as to
generate tools for analyzing a claim to associational freedom.
This section takes a fresh look at the very idea of freedom of association. I
ask: why does the Constitution protect freedom of association? The question
is vital because without a satisfactory theory of the underlying purposes of
the constitutional right of association, it is difficult to determine the proper
scope of the right, or to assess whether governmental regulations (like anti-
discrimination laws) infringe that right.
I propose that rather than infuse association with notions of "expression'"
in order to tie freedom of association to freedom of speech, it makes more
sense to begin with a different constitutional protection: the First
Amendment's petition and assembly clause. Although assemblies and
petitions receive relatively little attention in modem legal analysis,388 in the
early Republic, the ability of citizens to assemble together and to petition
their government was an important political freedom. The right of assembly
388. For instance, a leading treatise on constitutional law discusses the right of petition in a footnote.
See TRIBE, supra note 252, at 866 n.31.
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and petition was a core provision of the Bill of Rights, and it was in terms of
this right, rather than free speech, that associations in the early Republic
were understood and their place and role debated.
My aim is to provide a conceptual account of freedom of association. I do
not, therefore, pretend to offer either a sustained historical description of
associations or a constitutional argument derived from historical practices.
Rather, I look to the past because people before us have also thought about
associations and the Constitution. Instead of working on a blank canvas, it is
useful to see what we can learn from those early efforts.
My bottom line is this: Freedom of association merits constitutional
protection because association is a critical means of popular sovereignty.
Associating is a way for citizens to exercise political influence, get things
done, and keep government in check. This idea, which underlies freedom of
petition and assembly, informed early historical perspectives on associations.
It also provides a useful basis for understanding the proper scope of freedom
of association today.
A. Assembly and Petition: Text
A good place to begin constitutional analysis is with the text. The First
Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."389 The
amendment has two main commands--evidenced by the use of the semi-
colon. The first is the limitation on Congress' authority with respect to
religion. The second, our present interest, is the limitation on Congress'
power with respect to speech, the press, assembly and petition.
Focusing on this second command, as a textual matter there are three
issues of concern: abridging the freedom of speech; abridging the freedom of
the press; and abridging the freedom of the people to assemble and petition
the government. There are two clues that we should understand assembly
and petition to belong together. The first clue is the use of "and to petition,"
which contrasts with the use of "or" in the remainder of the First
Amendment's language. 390 The second clue is the use of "right," in the
singular (as in "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition"), rather than the plural "rights" (as in "the rights of the people




peaceably to assemble, and to petition"). 39' The prohibitions on Congress'
power can therefore be understood as prohibitions with respect to speech,
press, and assembly in order to petition the government.
392
It is also useful to note the difference in syntax between the two principle
commands of the First Amendment. Beginning with the religion command,
the Amendment prohibits Congress from making a law that respects the
establishment of religion, or that prohibits free religious exercise.393 There is
no indication that there are no laws (i.e. laws made by individual states) that
respect an establishment of religion; similarly there is no indication that
individuals necessarily enjoy the free exercise of religion. It is just that
Congress may not legislate with respect to these matters. Contrast the syntax
of the speech, press, and assembly/petition command. Congress is prohibited
from making a law abridging the freedom of speech, the freedom of the
press, or the right of assembly and petition. Textually, the implication is that
these freedoms already exist-Congress is prohibited from interfering with
them.
Two additional textual observations about the assembly/petition clause
merit comment. First, unlike the other provisions of the First Amendment,
the assembly/petition clause specifically refers to a right of "the people."394
The phrase reflects a populist notion, a commitment to popular
sovereignty.395 It also suggests a relationship between assembly and petition
and the other provisions of the Constitution that also refer to "the people.
' 396
For instance, the phrase alerts us that the right of assembly and petition is not
just any old right, but rather a right belonging to the same "We the People"
that established the Constitution in the first place.
397
Second, the right of petition and assembly is qualified. It is the right
"peaceably to assemble."39 This suggests something about the scope of
Congress' power: while Congress may not abridge the right peaceably to
391. Id.
392. Note that the comma in "to assemble, and to petition" mirrors the comma in "establishment of
religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof." Id. It does not therefore signal a right of petition separate
from the right of assembly.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See AMAR, supra note 338, at28-30.
396. See U.S. CONSr. pmbl.; art. I, § 2; amend. II; amend. IV; and amend. IX. See generally Jason
Mazzone, We the Judges, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 647, 654-55 (2001).
397. See AMAR, supra note 338, at 26-32.
398. U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
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assemble, some limitations on un-peaceable assembly are permissible. The
qualification also suggests that the scope of the present right is already
limited: there is no general right of assembly, but only a right of peaceable
assembly that the people enjoy.
Further light is shed on the meaning of these textual provisions by
examining briefly their passage through the Congress that proposed them to
the States. James Madison's draft Bill of Rights, introduced on June 8, 1789,
contained separate amendments for religion, for freedom of speech and the
press, and for freedom of assembly and petition. 99 The select committee of
the First Congress rewrote and combined the speech and press proposal with
the assembly and petition proposal into a single amendment that read: "The
freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the
Government for the redress of grievances, shall not be infringed."40 When
this proposed amendment was debated in the House, Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts moved to eliminate the assembly clause on the ground that it
was "derogatory to the dignity of the House to descend to such minutiae.
' 4°1
In Sedgwick's view, the right to speak necessarily entailed the right to
assemble: "If people converse freely, they must assemble for that purpose: it
is a self-evident, unalienable right which people possess." Sedgwick's
motion was defeated.4 3 Also defeated was a proposal by Thomas Tucker of
South Carolina to add a clause protecting the right of the people not just to
petition, but to instruct their representatives.4
In the Senate, the language of the proposed amendment was changed to
apply specifically to Congress: "That Congress shall make no law, abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to petition the government
399. Madison's proposed speech and press clause read: "The people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 12 (Helen E. Veit et a].
eds., 1991). Madison's assembly and petition clause read: "The people shall not be restrained from
peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by
petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances." Id.
400. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 28 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
401. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Theodore Sedgwick).
402. Id.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 761. On the history of instruction, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 188-96 (2d. ed. 1998).
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for a redress of grievances.""°  The Senate thereafter combined this
amendment with Madison's separate amendment protecting religion, and
deleted from the result the phrase, "and consult for their common good."4 6
Following some additional minor changes, on September 25, 1789, the
Speaker and the Vice-President signed a resolution asking President George
Washington to send this amendment, as the third of twelve proposed
amendments, to the States for ratification. 7 The first two of these twelve
proposed amendments were not ratified and so this, the third, became our
First Amendment. 4" 8
We should not make too much of prior drafts of constitutional provisions.
But here is one understanding of how this short textual history is instructive.
First, it underscores that assembly and petition were not simply afterthoughts
to free speech and free press. Rather, they originated in a separate proposed
amendment. Second, Madison's original proposal combines assembly and
petition in the same amendment, underscoring that these rights are linked.4 9
Third, Madison' s draft includes some additional information about the right
of assembly: the right allows for the people to "consult for their common
good." This suggests that assembly is not just any old gathering, but it has an
important underlying purpose connected to the collective welfare.
Antecedent state constitutional provisions also shed light on the meaning
of the assembly and petition clause.41 At the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified, the constitutions of Delaware,411 Maryland,412 Massachusetts, 413 New
405. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 70-71 (J. Gales & W. Seaton printers, 1820)
(1789).
406. See id. at 77.
407. See id. at 96-97.
408. See AMAR, supra note 338, atS-9. The original second amendmentbecame our27thAmendment
when it was ratified on May 7, 1992.
409. On the other hand, in Madison's draft, assembly is separated from petitioning by a semi-colon,
perhaps indicating that while the right of assembly is related to the right of petition, assembly is not
necessarily limited to formulating petitions.
410. On the use of state constitutions to interpret the Bill of Rights, see AMAR, supra note 338, at 29;
Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 251,251-62 (1992).
411. See DELAWAREDECLARATION oFRIGHTS § 9 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 276,277 (1971) ("That every man hath a right to petition
the Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner.").
412. See CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, &c. § XI (1776), reprinted in 3
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OFTHE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1687 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. & compiler, 1909) ("That every man hath a right to petition
the Legislature, for the redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner.").
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Hampshire,414 North Carolina,415 Pennsylvania,1 6 and Vermont417 provided
for a right of assembly or petition or both. Four observations are especially
relevant. First, in these state constitutions, assembly and petitioning are
closely linked. While Maryland's Constitution provides for a right of petition
but no specific right of assembly,418 all of the other states protect the right of
assembly and petition in the very same constitutional provision. Second, in
every case, protections for assembly and petitioning are contained in
amendments separate from protections for free speech and free press.419
Third, in every instance except one, the right of assembly is specifically
limited to "peaceable" activities. 420 Fourth, assembly is plainly related to
413. See CONSTITUTION ORFORMOFGOVERNMENTFORTHECOMMONWEALTHOFMASSACHUSErIS,
pt. 1, art. XIX (1780), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 412, at 1892 ("The
people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good;
give instructions to their representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses,
petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.").
414. See CONSTruTIlON OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, pt. I, art. I, § XXXII (1784), reprinted in 4 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTIITIONS, supra note 412, at 2453, 2457 ("The people have a right, in an orderly and
peaceable manner, to assemble and consult upon the common good; give instructions to their
representatives; and to request of the legislative body, by way of petitions or remonstrance, redress of the
wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.").
415. See CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, &C. § XVIIJ, reprinted in
5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITIJTIONS, supra note 412, at 2787, 2788 ("That the people have a right to
assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the
Legislature, for redress of grievances.").
416. See PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776 at § XVI reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 411, at 266 ("That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to
instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition,
or remonstrance.").
417. See VERMONT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1777, at § XVIII, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note
411, at 324 ("That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good to
instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition
or remonstrance."); CONSTITUTION OF VERMONT, 1786, ch. I, A Declaration of the Rights of the
Inhabitants of the State of Vermont § XXII ("That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult
for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the Legislature for redress of
grievances, by address, petition or remonstrance."), reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTIUTIONs 503 (William Finley Swindler ed., 1973-79).
418. It may have been taken for granted that a right of petition included a right to assemble: the clue is
that the Maryland Constitution protects a right to petition "in a peaceable and orderly manner," a similar
qualification as in the other states on the right to assemble.
419. See DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 411, at § 23; CONSTrruTION OF
MARYLAND, supra note 412, at § VII; CONSTITION OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 375, at § XVI;
Constitution of New Hampshire, supra note 414, at § XXII; CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra
note 415, at § XV; CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 416, at § XI; Vermont Declaration of
Rights (1777), supra note 417, at § XIV; Vermont Declaration of Rights (1786), supra note 417, at § XV.
420. The exception is North Carolina. See CONSTITUON OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 415, at §
XVIII.
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popular sovereignty: in all of the state constitutions protecting a right of
assembly, the right belongs to "the People," to allow them to consult upon
their common good, redress grievances, and instruct their representatives.
B. Judicial Decisions
How has the modem Supreme Court construed the assembly and petition
clause? Four developments are notable. First, the Court has made clear that
the right of assembly and petition is not limited to the preparation and
discussion of petitions in their traditional sense. Rather a variety of activities
are protected, including political meetings,
421 marches,422 sit in protests a23
rallies before government buildings,424 gatherings in a public park,423 group
boycotts,426 labor pickets,427 the filing of lawsuits, 42 8 and lobbying
government.429 The Court has also refused to limit the right of assembly and
petition to the pursuit of political goals.43°
Second, the Court has come to view assembly and petition as largely a
right of free expression, rather than as the opportunity to influence
government.431
421. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
264(1937).
422. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969).
423. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966).
424. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,237 (1963).
425. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939).
426. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,907-12 (1982).
427. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614-16 (1971).
428. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
429. See, e.g., E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38
(1961).
430. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,531 (1945).
431. The change is evidenced by the difference in the way the Court describes the right of assembly in
two cases. In the first, in 1875, the Court writes:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
national government, is an attribute of national citizenship .... The very idea of a
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meetpeaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.
United States v. Cmikshank, 92 U.S. 542,552 (1875). Here, assembly is protected specifically to allow
the petitioning of government for the redress of grievances. By 1937, however, the Court describes the
right as involving a more general interest of free speech:
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Third, the Court has treated the rights of speech and petitioning as equally
important.4 32 Accordingly, the Court understands limitations on free speech
to apply with the same force to petitioning.
4 33
Fourth, the Court has emphasized that the right at issue is a right only of
peaceable assembly; the Court has, therefore, upheld regulations designed to
prevent disturbances, and to protect public safety.434
Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental ights .... The right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental.... The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements
to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to
preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order
to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 354-55 (1937).
Commentators criticize the Court for conflating assembly and petition with speech. See, e.g., Stephen
A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Governmentfor the Redress of Grievances,
96 YALE LJ. 142, 143 n.2 (1986) ("The short line of Supreme Court cases that raise the petition
clause... consistently err in their interpretation of the petition clause as merely a free expression
guarantee. These cases reveal an unstudied treatment of colonial legal history by ignoring the original
meaning of the right, and especially its remedial, legislative character.") (citation omitted); Eric
Schnapper, "Libelous" Petitionsfor Redress of Grievances-Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74
IOWA L REV. 303,346 (1989) ("The phrasing of the amendment undoubtedly reflects an intent to prohibit
measures ... severely limiting the number of individuals who could join in or present a petition, and to
place within the protections of the petition clause... any peaceable concerted speech or action taken to
influence the course of government conduct.") (emphasis added).
432. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) ("The Petition Clause... was inspired
by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble.
These First Amendment rights are inseparable.") (citation omitted); id. at 482 ("The right to petition is cut
from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular
freedom of expression.").
433. See id. Some commentators argue that because, historically, petitions received greater protection
than speech, the modem Court errs in according speech and petitions the same degree of protection. See,
e.g., Schnapper, supra note 43 1, at 343-47. Schnapper disputes the claim that the grouping of speech with
petition and assembly in the First Amendment signals that these rights are meant to receive the same
degree of protection:
This syntactical argument is far too weak to support the extraordinary conclusion that the
framers actually wanted to reduce the scope of the then existing right to petition. It is virtually
inconceivable that the framers intended to afford American citizens a lesser degree of
protection if they complained to the President or Congress than the Colonists had enjoyed
when, as British subjects, they complained to the King or Parliament... Indeed, there is
absolutely no contemporaneous history suggesting that anyone connected with the framing and
approval of the petition clause harbored any objection to or intended any limitation on the right






C. Madison on Factions
As commentators who discuss the constitutional status of associations
frequently remind us,435 Madison and other delegates to the Philadelphia
convention were opposed to "factions." The oft-cited text is Federalist 10,
where Madison promises that an advantage of the constitutional design, in
particular the large size of the union and the broad electoral basis, will be to
"break and control the violence of faction." 43 6 A faction, according to
Madison, is "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." '437 The trouble
with these factions is their influence in political processes: self-interested
collectivities, allowed to pursue their own agendas, destabilize government,
undermine the public good, and weaken protections for minorities.438
Madison sees factions as a natural "propensity of mankind."439 However,
factions cannot simply be abolished, because the liberty that allows factions
to exist is a cornerstone political freedom.' Accordingly, all that can be
done is to minimize the effects of factions by setting in place a polity large
enough to prevent the dominance of any single interest."
434. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,478 (1988) (upholding ban on picketing in front of a
single residence); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-17 (1982) (explaining that the
government may limit boycotts designed to suppress competition for economic advantage and the
government may also limit violent gatherings); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972)
(upholding anti-noise ordinance); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611,616-17 (1968) (upholding statute
which prohibited picketing "in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or
egress to and from" any courthouse); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,43 (1966) (upholding prohibition
of demonstrations onjailhouse grounds); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,564 (1965) (upholding ban on
picketing near courthouse); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding city ordinance
prohibiting noise trucks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-78 (1941) (upholding ordinance
requiring a permit for all parades and public meetings in light of municipality's need to ensure no
overlapping events and advance notice to ensure policing). See generally M. GLENN ABERNATHY, THE
RIGHTOFASSEmLY AND ASSOCIATION 19-49 (2d ed. 1981).
435. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 64-66; Schuck, supra note 319, at 553-56; Kaufman,
supra note 316, at 1302.
436. THE FEDEtALtST NO. 10, at56 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
437. Id. at 57.
438. See id.
439. Id. at 59.
440. See id. at58.
441. See id. at 63-65.
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Many kinds of modem associations fall within Madison's definition of a
faction. A political advocacy group, for example, contains individuals united
by a "common impulse of passion, or of interest" that is often adverse to the
interests of their opponents. Some commentators therefore see Madison's
complaints about factions as evidence of the weak constitutional status for
associations." 2 That is surely too drastic. Not all associations can easily be
characterized as Madisonian factions: reading groups, church groups and
hobby clubs, for instance, do not pursue interests adverse to the rights of
other citizens or to the interests of the community. Further, as Federalist 10
itself demonstrates, concern with the effects of associations does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that there should be no right of
association, that citizens should be legally prevented from gathering
together. Moreover, as it quickly became evident in the new Republic,
opposition to factions is hard to square with protections for assemblies and
petitions.4 43 Before exploring that problem, we must first understand the
right of assembly and petition in its historical context.
D. Assembly and Petition: History
1. English Origins
A petition is a formal request or prayer by an individual or a group to a
governing official for the exercise of the official's authority to redress a
wrong or to grant a privilege.444 The custom of petitioning originated in
England as early as the thirteenth century," 5 and a right of petition was
recognized in the 1689 English Bill of Rights." 6 Petitioning therefore has a
longer pedigree than freedom of speech. "In the late seventeenth century,
although the existence of a right to petition was widely accepted and
442. See supra note 435.
443. See infra Part V.D.vj.
444. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1145-46 (6th ed. 1990).
445. On the history of petitioning, see Higginson, supra note 431, at 153-55; Don L. Smith, The Right
to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and Interpretations (1971)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University, on file with author).
446. The 1689 clause provided for "the right of the subjects to petition the King" and stated that "all
commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." An Act declaring theRightsandLiberties
of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown (The Bill of Rights), I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2





understood, there was no comparable recognition of any general right of
freedom of speech." 447
In medieval England, petitions were submitted to parliament, which met
as high courts to receive and try them." 8 These medieval petitions dealt with
mostly private matters: complaints of miscarriages of justice and requests for
relief from taxes and other regulations.449 By the fourteenth century,
parliament acted also in a legislative capacity to consider petitions
expressing collective interests.45 In the seventeenth century, petitioning
firmly took root.45' Petitions involving a wide variety of private and public
concerns were received by virtually all governing authorities, including
parliament, the King, the courts, and local officials.452
Especially significant was the populist nature of petitioning. Individuals,
such as the poor, who could not otherwise exercise influence, relied on
petitions to obtain favors or relief.453 Accordingly, "[t]he word 'petition' was
a common figure of speech, used literally and metaphorically to signify a
deferential request for favor or for redress of a problem."'45 Petitions to
government officials typically contained a "prayer" for relief. The use of the
term underscored the universality of petitioning. Just as God heard all
prayers, everyone could petition the government.455
Under the English Bill of Rights, petitions enjoyed greater protection, in
particular from prosecution for criminal libel, than did other forms of speech
and writing.45 6 "Petitions afford[ed] subjects... immunity to norms that
otherwise restrict[ed] public commentary on political matters."4 7 Eric
447. Schnapper, supra note 431, at 318. Schnapper observes, for instance, that the 1689 Bill of Rights
contained no reference to freedom of speech, indeed that the Licensing Act (requiring government
approval for printing a book) was still in effect. Id. See generally LARRY D. ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT
HERITAGE: THE GROW'TH OF FREE SPEECH IN EARLY AMERICA (1994); LanyD. Eldridge, Before Zenger:
Truth and Seditious Speech in Colonial America, 1607-1700,39 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 337,337-38 (1995).
448. See David Zaret, Petitions and the "Invention" of Public Opinion in the English Revolution, 101






454. Id. at 1510 (footnote omitted).
455. See id. at 1513 n.9.
456. Id. at 1512; Schnapper, supra note 431, at 328.
457. Zaret, supra note 448, at 1512.
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Schnapper explains that the protections accorded petitioning arose as an
institutional response to what we would today call a separation of powers
problem: immunizing petitions prevented the House of Lords, in its judicial
capacity, from interfering with the legislative functions of the House of
Commons. 458
Safeguards for petitioning did not reflect a commitment to notions of free
speech per se because petitions were more akin to lawsuits than to instances
of popular expression. "[T]he common-law prohibition against libel actions
founded on petitions was not a particular application of a more general free
speech principle .... [P]etitions and lawsuits were regarded as simply two
different ways in which an aggrieved subject might request redress from the
government."
459
Further, despite its considerable reach, petitioning was not an absolute
right. David Zaret explains that the protections accorded petitions involved
several important restrictions. A petition was understood not to assert a claim
of popular sovereignty: the petitioner was asking-praying-for relief, rather
than demanding an entitlement in the name of popular will.4" Petitions were,
therefore, expressed in highly deferential language that gave an appearance
of conveying information, instead of criticizing an official or making a
demand.46' Petitions were also locally grown: they were based on the
personal experiences of the petitioners, and requested particular relief on
their behalf, rather than expressing general discontent.462 Finally, petitions
were not made public: a petition was a way to communicate directly with an
authority, not an opportunity to share opinions with other people.463
In England, the organizing of petitions on matters of collective
importance-known as "common" petitions-initially occurred within the
existing structures of civil society.4" Churches, wards, guilds, common
councils, and quarter and assize sessions were the units in which collective
petitions were prepared and the necessary signatures gathered.46 5 Although a
petition is a written document, collective petitioning did not depend on
literacy. In churches, taverns, and other local settings, the common petitions
458. Schnapper, supra note 431, at 334.
459. Id. at 343.
460. See Zaret, supra note 448, at 1513-14.
461. See id. at 1514-16.
462. Id. at 1516.
463. Id. at 1516-17.




were read aloud and discussed.466 Churches were particularly significant to
common petitions. Ministers often made themselves available to give advice
on proposed petitions, 467 and Sunday service was an opportunity to gather
4681signatures.
By the seventeenth century, new entities emerged to organize common
petitions. "[P]rivate associations of individuals met in homes, taverns, and
sectarian congregations to debate and sign petitions.,,469 Here we see the first
hints of the relationship between petitions and associations. In the
seventeenth century, "petitioning cut across traditional residential affiliations
by ward and parish, uniting like-minded individuals in voluntary
associations." 470 In this context, petitioners asserted not just their right to
petition but also the right to "meet together to frame and promote
petitions.""
Around the same time, an important link between petitioning and
publishing also emerged. By the mid-seventeenth century, printing and the
press played a substantial role in petitioning.472 Printed petitions could be
more widely circulated, expanding the potential for gathering a large number
of signatures.473 Printing also allowed the circulation of commentary in favor
of a petition or in opposition to a competing petitioning campaign.' 7
Petitions to parliament were reported in newspapers even though, in light of
the restrictions on petitioning discussed, news reports on petitions were often
brief or vague.475 As a result of publication, petitions slowly began to take
the form of an appeal to a broader public based on reason and argument,
rather than merely an outright request for an official favor.
47 6
466. Id. at 1519. Note the similarity to newspapers: in colonial America, "[i]t maybe that more people
read newspapers at taverns or coffeehouses than at home, and many others could hear them read aloud or
discussed." SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 39 (citing DAVID W. CONROY, IN PUBLIC HousES 179-80,
236-40 (1995)).
467. See Zaret, supra note 448, at 1524.
468. ld. at 1519.
469. Id. at 1525.
470. Id. See generally R.J. Morris, Clubs, Societies, Associations, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF BRITAIN, 1750-1950: SOCIAL AGENCIES AND INSTiTTONS 395 (F.M.L Thompson ed.,
1990).
471. Zaret, supra note 448, at 1525 (quotation omitted).
472. See id. at 1528.
473. See id.
474. See id. at 1530-32.
475. See id. at 1528.
476. See id. at 1536-38.
Washington Law Review
2. Colonial Petitions
While in the American colonies there was no general right to free
speech,477 individuals and groups of individuals had a right to petition their
assemblies-the "chief symbol of colonial rights," '478 and "the Repository of
the People's Priviliges ' 479-and a right to receive a response to their
petitions.480 Colonial petitions dealt either with private grievances that could
not be resolved through other legal mechanisms, or with issues of public
concern.48 As such, petitions were an important mechanism to transmit
information to the colonial assemblies about the needs of individuals and
482local communities. Petitions were therefore an important form of popular
politics-what Alan Tully, in his study of colonial New York and
Pennsylvania, calls "the most noticeable feature of the[ir] political
cultures. 483 Petitions also served to expose mistreatment, corruption, or
waste by public officials.41 "Petitions were not the only vehicle for political
messages in this era. In sermons, newspapers, pamphlets, and official
ordinances and declarations, messages went from the political center to the
periphery. But for messages in the opposite direction.., petitions were a
principal device."
485
In particular, groups who were not enfranchised-such as women, felons,
Indians, aliens, and slaves-were nonetheless able to express their
477. See LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY, at v (1964) (noting that notions of free speech only emerged around the time the
First Amendment was adopted). See also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA
L REV. 455,487 (1983). Anderson argues that "'[flreedom of expression,' the notion of an interrelated
complex of protections for thought, belief, and expression, is a modem concept. To impose it
retrospectively on the framers is anachronistic. Although they gradually recognized a relationship between
the freedoms of press, speech, petition, assembly, and religion, the process was inductive, rather than
deductive. The Framers began not with a general theory of intellectual freedom, but with specific solutions
to concrete grievances." Id. at 488.
478. ALAN TULLY, FORMING AMERICAN POLITICS: IDEALS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITIMONS IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA 118 (1994).
479. Id. (quoting N.Y. WKLY. J., May 17, 1735).
480. Higginson, supra note 431, at 142.
481. See id. at 153-54.
482. See id. at 153.
483. TULLY, supra note 478, at 416.
484. See Higginson, supra note 431, at 154. See also Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law
Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CINN. L
REV. 1153, 1178 (1986).
485. Zaret, supra note 448, at 1498.
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grievances, and seek benefits, through petitions.4" 6 Petitions thereby provided
a broad means for representation and influence. Reporting on this
characteristic, one commentator concludes,
the historical record appears to be devoid of colonial authority denying
that a person had a right to petition based on any of the factors
associated with disenfranchisement. Put another way, petitions might
have been rejected on the merits; they might have been ignored for
failure of sufficient supplication; they might have been dismissed as
absurd; but, they were not rejected on any ground akin to standing.
Indeed, their reception and reading was largely automatic.4 7
As a result of its widespread practice, petitioning "originated more bills in
pre-constitutional America than any other source of legislation. 488
The practice of petitioning in colonial Virginia is illustrative. There,
petitions consisted of a "body" containing a claim or grievance, and the
signature of the individual or group seeking relief.4 89 Petitions addressing
issues of public concern were posted in public places, such as churches and
courthouses, so that people who agreed with the petition could add their
signatures to it.490 In the early seventeenth century, the entire body of the
Virginia Assembly met to consider the petitions it received.491 Later petitions
were referred to select committees for initial review. 492 The Virginia
Committee of Propositions and Grievances, established in 1666, came to
handle most petitions, making recommendations to the assembly on
appropriate action.493 In eighteenth-century Virginia, more than half of all
statutes enacted originated in petitions. 494 These statutes were far from
trivial. Edmund Morgan observes, for example, that the Virginia Statute of
486. See Higginson, supra note 431, at 153; Smith, supra note 484, at 1178, n.159. See also LUMsDEN,
supra note 325, at 54.
487. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L REv. 2153, 2190 (1998) (footnote omitted).
488. Higginson, supra note 431, at 144.
489. See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFlUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY VIRGINIA 26 (1979).
490. See id. at 26-28.
491. See id. at 28.
492. See id.
493. See id.
494. See id. at 64. A similar study of petitioning in Pennsylvania reveals that fifty-two percent of the
acts passed between 1717 and 1775 originated in petitions. See Alan Tully, Constituent-Representative
Relationships in Early America, 11 CANADIAN J. HIST. 139, 140-42 (1976).
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Religious Liberty, drafted by Thomas Jefferson in 1779 and enacted in 1786,
"would probably not have been passed if it had not been supported by a large
number of petitions. 495
3. Petitions to Congress
In the early American Republic, petitioning was also an important means
of resolving grievances and an influential source of congressional
legislation.496 According to one study, petitioning in the early years of the
Republic "provide[d] the most widespread means for popular participation in
the political process. 497 In the early Congresses, petitions were read on the
floor of the House and then referred to a committee or to the executive for a
report and recommendation-which sometimes resulted in the passage of an
appropriate bill. 498 A careful study of the fate of petitions presented to the
early Congresses shows that "most petitioners were assured of at least a
detailed examination and consideration of their prayer ....
Among the petitions presented to the first Congress are the following: an
April 28, 1789 petition from "the Citizens of New Jersey," "[c]omplaining
of illegality in the late election of Representatives for that State to the House
of Representatives; '"500 an April 15, 1789 petition from one John Churchman,
"[p]raying an exclusive right of vending of spheres, hemispheres, maps,
charts, and tables on petitioner's principles of magnetism throughout the
United States;" '' January 5, 1791 petitions from the Baptist Associations of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont, "[p]raying that
Congress will adopt measures to prevent the publication of any inaccurate
editions of the Holy Bible;' 502 an August 5, 1790 petition from Alexander
Macomb and William Edgar, "[p]raying release from a contract entered into
with the United States for the purchase of a quantity of western lands;"503
495. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 229 (1988)
496. See JOSEPH COOPER, THE ORIGINS OF STANDING COMMITTEES AND THE DEVELOPMENTOFTHE
MODERN HOUSE 3 (1970).
497. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., PETITIONS,
MEMORIALS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4,
1789 TO DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 6 (Comm. Print 99-AA).
498. See id. at 7-8.
499. Id. at 11.
500. Id. at 16.
501. Id. at 119.
502. Id. at 127.
503. Id. at 43.
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and numerous war-related petitions, seeking compensation for military
services and for lost or damaged property.5°
Over the years, some issues have generated very large numbers of
petitions to Congress, including the Alien, Sedition, and Naturalization Act
in the late eighteenth century;05 the Sunday mails debate in the early
nineteenth century;5 6 and prohibition50 7 and women's suffrage in the early
twentieth century.50'
4. Abolitionist Petitions
The issue that most tested the right of petition was slavery. Abolitionist
petitions began with a petition by the New York and Pennsylvania Quakers
to the first Congress on February 11, 1790,509 and another petition, the very
next day, by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.510 By the early 1830s,
Congress was inundated with abolitionist petitions." John Quincy Adams
famously presented fifteen such petitions on December 12, 1831.512 In the
mid-1830s, the pace quickened. On February 2, 1835, for instance, eight
hundred New York women presented Congress with their anti-slavery
petitions. 13 Many abolitionist petitions were from groups and organizations
opposed to slavery, but some were also from former slaves threatened with
return to slavery under the operation of state laws s5 4
Congress' practice, even on petitions dealing with contentious issues, was
to review all submitted petitions, issue a report, and either pass a bill or
reject the petition.15 However, on February 8, 1836, the House appointed a
special committee to determine new ways to deal with petitions on issues
504. See id. at45-102.
505. See Smith, supra note 445, at 112-18.
506. See id. at 118-22.
507. See id. at 111-12.
508. See id. at 143-44.
509. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 497, at 126.
510. See id.
511. See Smith, supra note 445, at 85.
512. See id.
513. See id. at 85-86.
514. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTrUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALISTPERIOD, 1789-1801,
at 229-32 (1997).
515. See Smith, supra note 445, at 87.
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related to slavery. 16 That committee recommended, and the House quickly
adopted, a resolution prohibiting any action on abolitionist petitions."' This
was the first of a series of abolition "gag-rules" that would bitterly divide the
House for a decade.518 John Quincy Adams strenuously opposed these gag-
rules. 519 In his view, the rules violated the very right of petition, and he
spearheaded their repeal. 20
As a result of the efforts of Adams and others, the gag-rules were finally
repealed in 1844,521 but petitioning never regained its full force.
52
Increasingly, petitions were automatically referred to committees, where
many simply died a silent death.523 One commentator concludes that the gag-
rules "effectively abolished the right of petition" as originally conceived.524
516. See id at 88.
517. See id. The resolution read:
And whereas it is extremely important and desirable that the agitation of this subject should be
finally arrested, for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to the public mind, your committee
respectfully recommend the adoption of the following additional resolution, viz: Resolved,
That all petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers, relating in any way, or to
any extent whatever, to the subject of slavery, or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being
either printed or referred, be laid upon the table and that no further action whatever shall be
had thereon.
12 CONG. DEB. 4051 (1836). The resolution was re-adopted in nearly identical language at the beginning
of each Congress until it was made a standing rule in 1840. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 150
(1840).
518. See Higginson, supra note 43 1, at 158-65. A detailed discussion of the gag-rules and their effects
is beyond the scope of this Article. In addition to the sources cited in this brief summary, see WilLIAM W.
FREEHLING, 1 THE ROADTO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS ATBAY, 1776-1854, at 308-52 (1990); WILLIAM
LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATrLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 305-
09 (1996); PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: A PUBLIc LIFE, A PRIVATE LIFE 355-56, 364-65,
402-03 (1997); Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech,
Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L REv. 785, 846-49 (1995). Older accounts of interest are
GILBERT HOBBS BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE 1830-1844, at 109-20 (1933); Robert P. Ludium,
The Antislavery "Gag-Rule": History and Argument, 26 J. NEGRO HIST. 203 (1941); James M.
McPherson, The Fight Against the Gag Rule: Joshua Leavitt and Antislavery Insurgency in the Whig
Party, 1839-1842, 3 J. NEGRO HIST. 177 (1963).
519. See supra note 518.
520. See Higginson, supra note 431, at 162-64.
521. See Smith, supra note 445, at 103.
522. See id at 103-04.
523. See id.
524. Higginson, supra note 431, at 144. We should be careful about causality here. At least one
commentator suggests that the experience with abolitionist petitions did not cause the demise of
petitioning, but rather the gag-rules simply demonstrated that the right of petition had already lost its
significance in American political culture. See Mark, supra note 487, at 2216. We should also not
overstate the decline of petitioning in light of the petitioning campaigns of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. See id. at 2226-28.
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Today, petitions are filed with the House Parliamentarian, who refers
them to the appropriate House committee and compiles a list for publication
in the Congressional Record.52 There is no mechanism for presenting
petitions on the floor of the House, or for securing a response.
526
5. Popular Sovereignty
Underlying the assembly and petition clause is a commitment to popular
527sovereignty. "Popular sovereignty means that the government derives its
powers from the People,who are therefore ultimately in charge.5 28 While
today we may not reflect too much on the notion of popular sovereignty, in
the decade after the Revolution, "[t]he problem of sovereignty was.., the
most important theoretical question of politics.., the ultimate abstract
principle to which nearly all arguments were sooner or later reduced."529 An
important complaint in the Declaration of Independence was, of course, that
the King had ignored the colonists' petitions,530 and that this amounted to
tyranny. 531 In the early Republic, therefore, "many Americans believed their
representatives to be... mere agents or tools of the people who could give
525. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 497, at 9.
526. See id.
527. See AmAR, supra note 338, at 26-32. On notions of popular sovereignty, see generally MORGAN,
supra note 495; WOOD, supra note 404, at 344-89.
528. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.
The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("[T[he people
are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which
the several branches of government hold their power, is derived."); Noah Webster, An Examination into
the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia
(1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNrED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BYTHE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 57 (Paul L Ford ed., 1888) ("The powers vested in Congress
are little more than nominal; nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but in the people.
The source of power is in the people of this country.").
529. WOOD, supra note 404, at 354.
530. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE par. 30 (U.S. 1776). After a list of specific
grievances, the Declaration reads: "In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in
the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince,
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free
people." Id.
531. The Stamp Act of 1765 in particular resulted in a flurry of colonial petitions, to no avail. See
generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (1995 ed.).
Washington Law Review
[them] binding directions. 532 In line with this belief, early petitions to
Congress were understood as the directions "of a free people [to] their
servants. 533
The First Amendment's assembly and petition clause promotes popular
sovereignty by protecting a right akin to the colonial practice of individuals
and groups petitioning their local assemblies.534 Elected officials can be
voted out of office come election day. In the meantime, petitions allow
people to inform their representatives of their needs and opinions.
At the same time-because now the People are in charge-something
more than colonial style petitions is contemplated. The First Amendment
safeguards the ability of all citizens to assemble together, in a constitutional
convention, to alter or abolish their government.535 On a small scale,
therefore, local assemblies and petitions allow specific groups to formulate
programs and demands, and to influence the course of government.
536
Assembly in a constitutional convention permits the political collectivity-
the People-to change their government entirely.537
6. Early Associations
In colonial America, popular gatherings were common and they often
entailed violence. 38 Mobs and riots disrupted economic activity, blocked
thoroughfares, destroyed property, and closed government offices.539 "These
were not the anarchic uprisings of the poor and destitute; rather they
represented a common form of political protest... by groups who could find
532. WOOD, supra note 404, at 371.
533. Philadelphiensis, No. 5, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 117 (Herbert Storing
ed., 1981).
534. See AMAR, supra note 338, at 26-32.
535. See id. at 26.
536. See id. at 26-32.
537. See id.
538. See WOOD, supra note 404, at 319-20.
539. See generally PAULA. GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA (1996); PAULINE MAIER, FROMRESISTANCE
TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSrON TO BRIrIAN,
1765-1776 (1972); Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and CivilAuthority inEighteenth-CenturynAmerica,
27 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1970); John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the
Justifications in Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L REV. 1043 (1979); Lloyd
I. Rudolph, The Eighteenth Century Mob in America and Europe, 11 AM. Q. 447 (1959).
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no alternative institutional expression for their demands and grievances.'"'
Accordingly, these gatherings were referred to as "conventions," or as
"popular assemblies," terms denoting a variety of meetings for public
purposes organized outside of the regularly constituted authority. l4' In the
colonies, such extra-legislative conventions and assemblies received
measured support from the Whigs, who saw them as a form of legitimate
political activity rather than as illegal disruptions. 42
By 1775, transient mobs and riots were less common, displaced by the
better-organized revolutionary associations. 43 These associations were the
institutional embodiment of the political functions served earlierby the mobs
and riots, representing the same notion of popular assembly.544 In the years
leading up to independence, the revolutionary associations took on
governmental responsibilities, implementing policies where the government
was slow to act.545 Numerous commentators have discussed the substantial
role these associations played during the course of the Revolution.546
With independence, Americans continued to assemble in regional and
interstate committees to voice grievances, as well as to pursue and
540. WOOD, supra note 404, at 320. See also Rudolph, supra note 539, at 447 ('Mob action provided
the first concrete indication of the common man's claim to participate in the decision-making process
which is government, of his demand for a share of political power.").
541. See WOOD, supra note 404, at 312, 320-21. The term "assembly" continued to be used in the
early Republic to refer to various public and private gatherings. A few examples illustrate the point. In a
proclamation in 1794, Massachusetts Governor Samuel Adams condemned the "certain persons ... [who]
did riotously and tumultuously assemble in the town of Boston in disguise, and with force and violence
illegally enter the houses of certain persons, break their furniture, and in several instances pull down parts
and in others the whole of their dwelling-houses, in violation of the laws, and of the rights of security and
of property therein guaranteed to every citizen." PA. GAZETE, July 9, 1794 (emphasis added). A public
notice in the same year advised that a forthcoming Harrisburg, Pennsylvania "meeting of the country
gentlemen, and others, is expected, to assemble at the Court-house in this town" PA. GAZETIE, Sept. 17,
1794 (emphasis added). A letter to the Pennsylvania Gazette in 1787 stated that a "great concourse of
people assemble every evening at the house of a certain major Boyd ... to circulate pamphlets and pieces
against the new constitution." PA. GAzEInE, Oct. 31, 1787 (emphasis added). Religious gatherings were
also referred to as assemblies, as evidenced by a report on a Philadelphia meeting of the Quakers in 1790.
See PA. GAZEtTE, Dec. 29, 1790 ("Through the continued favor of Divine Providence, being once more
permitted to assemble for the purpose of preserving circumspection of life, and decent order throughout
our religious society, and as far as infinite Wisdom may be pleased to qualiy us to promote an encrease of
Gospel Righteousness and Peace in the earth.") (emphasis added).
542. See WOOD, supra note 404, at 320-21.
543. See id. at 322.
544. See id.
545. See MORGAN, supra note 495, at 257-58.
546. See, e.g., id.; WOOD, supra note 404, at 320-24.
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implement political goals, and to regulate the economy. 47 "The emergence
of a distinctive pattern of voluntary association was inextricably bound in
with the history of liberty in America for it created a significant range of
alternatives to the use of coercive power through the state."548 Gordon Wood
reports that more associations serving quasi-public purposes arose in the
dozen years after independence than in the entire colonial period.549
Historians offer different accounts of associations in the new Republic,55
and it is clear that more research is needed to set the story straight.55 1 For
present purposes, it is sufficient to identify some of the main developments
from independence up to the Civil War. Theda Skocpol traces the growth of
associations in the new Republic as a function of politics, religious freedom,
and republican government.5 52 According to Skocpol's account, the
547. See WOOD, supra note 404, at 323-24.
548. OSCAR &MARY HANDLN, THE DIMENSIONS OFLIBERTY 89-90 (1961).
549. WOOD, supra note 404, at 325.
550. There is a growing literature on the history of associations. See generally, RICHARD FRANKLIN
BENSEL, SECTIONALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1880-1980 (1984); STUART M.
BLUMIN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IN THE AMERICAN CrrY, 1760-
1900 (1989); PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 (1978);
ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE'S LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1925 (1997); PETER DOBKIN HALL, THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1700-1900: PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, ELITES, ANDTHE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (1982); ALVIN J. SCHMIDT, FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS (1980); ROBERT
H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967); Benjamin R. BarberAn American Civic Forum:
Civil Society between Market Individuals and the Political Community, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 269
(1996); Elisabeth S. Clemens, Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups
and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920,98 AM. J. SOC. 755 (1993). Perhaps the most useful
overview is HANDLIN, supra note 548, at 89-112.
551. In particular, many studies focus on the rise of associations beginning in the 1830s, but very little
work has ever been done on associations in the late eighteenth century. An important exception is
Albrecht Koschnik, Voluntary Associations, Political Culture, and the Public Sphere in Philadelphia,
1780-1830 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia). My understanding of early
associations has been greatly enhanced by Koschnik's research. See generally STEVEN C. BULLOCK,
REVOLUTIONARY BROTHERHOOD: FREEMASONRY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIAL ORDER 1730-1840 (1996); MARY ANN CLAWSON, CONSTRUCTING BROTHERHOOD: CLASS,
GENDER, AND FRATERNALISM (1989); LORI D. GINZBERG, WOMEN AND THE WORK OF BENEVOLENCE:
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND CLASS IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1990); John L
Brooke, Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies: Voluntary Association and the Public Sphere in the
Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE "EXTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALISTERA 273 (Ronald Hoffman
& Peter J. Albert eds., 1996); Don H. Doyle, The Social Functions of Voluntary Associations in a
Nineteenth-Century American Town, I SOC. SCI. HIST. 333 (1977); Marc L Harris, The Process of
Voluntary Association: Organizing the Ravenna Temperance Society, 94 OHIO HiST. 158 (1985).
552. Skocpol, How Americans Became Civic, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, supra note 283, at 42. See also
Theda Skocpol et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic Voluntarism in the
United States, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 527-46 (2000). While I rely on Skocpol's account here, it is
important to recognize that her research is skewed towards large associations, particularly beginning in the
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American Revolution marked the first period of active association
membership. 3 The Revolution expanded the group of people engaged in
thinking about issues of equality and freedom, and the experience of
rebellion brought together dispersed individuals in circles of loyalty, thereby
giving them tools for collective action. 4 Skocpol argues that during the
1820s to 1850s, association was closely tied to politics: representative
politics institutionalized both political parties and civic associations, and
both types of groups sought to maximize membership in order to exert
political influence.555 In this period, the very nature of associational
organization at times mirrored the design of the nation itself: many
associations implemented internal constitutional rules and procedures,
provided for the election of leaders and representatives, and arranged
themselves as local units of a national body. 6 During the Civil War,
according to Skocpol, trans-local associations flourished, often with political
purposes. 57 In particular, fraternal organizations were actively engaged in
aiding members away from home.558 Skocpol further reports that at the end
of the Civil War, associations played an important unifying role.55 9 The
number of associations surged as a result of deliberate efforts to link
Northern and Southern citizens in common groups with a shared purpose.
560
How were these associations perceived and understood? In the new
Republic, the proper role and proper limits of associations were hot issues. 6'
Although associations and other forms of popular assembly had played
1830s, and so it may understate the importance of fledgling associations in the eighteenth century. See
generally Koschnik, supra note 551, at 3-7.
553. See Skoepol, How Americans Became Civic, in Civic ENGAGEmiENT, supra note 283, at 43.
554. Id.
555. See id.
556. See id. at 47.
557. See id. at 55.
558. Id.
559. See id. at 55-57.
560. See id. We can continue Skocpol's story by adding that during the Progressive Era, when
Americans created and joined an unprecedented number of associations, association-building was
specifically directed at curing various social ills which were thought to result from decreased solidarity
among citizens because of dramatic changes in the economy and society. See PUTNAMsupra note 289, at
367-401.
561. in understanding this debate, it is important to keep in mind that the definition of "association" in
the late eighteenth century was very broad and it included corporations. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at
18. Note also that in the early years of the Republic, newspapers were often organized as an "association"
of their readers. See SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 122-26. The point was to unite "members" through
the exchange of views; readers were therefore encouraged to submit opinion pieces. See id.
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celebrated roles in colonial America and in the Revolution, after
independence associations came to be viewed in a quite different light.
Associations continued to represent a form of political activity outside the
existing structure. But this was now a dangerous thing. Associations of like-
minded citizens were viewed as aspiring to a governmental role. 62 Since
associations drew their strength from the allegiance of their members, these
political aspirations were perceived as based on a claim to popular
sovereignty.5 63 Such a claim could only be illegitimate, because associations
were not subject to election and other popular constraints on representative
government. 564 A rival claim to popular sovereignty therefore threatened to
destabilize and undermine the authority of the new constitutional
government.5 65 "There were legitimate channels for public expression in the
town meetings, warned Governor John Sullivan of New Hampshire;
assemblies of private orders of men 'under the cover of convention
authority' would only undermine the constitution of the state.
',166
These fears were raised in the widespread opposition to the forty-odd
Democratic-Republican Societies that formed in the years 1793 and 1794:67
The members of these societies, a mix of professional men, merchants,
printers, farmers, and manual laborers,568 united in the belief that the new
government was insufficiently responsive to popular will, and that some
additional mechanism was needed to keep elected officials in check.5 69 The
societies therefore aimed to debate public questions-to conduct, in the
words of one proponent, "a jealous examination of all the proceedings of
administration" --and the societies regularly published resolutions critical
of Federalist policies.57' The societies also engaged in practical activities,
like poll watching, philanthropy, tracking the voting of representatives, and
562. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 33.
563. See id.
564. See id.
565. See id. at 36.
566. WOOD, supra note 404, at 326-27.
567. See RICHARD BUEL JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLrrICS, 1789-
1815, at 97-105, 127-34 (1972). See generally THE DEMOCATIC-REPUIBuCAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A
DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF CONSIT'UTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLUTIONS, AND
TOASTS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1976); EUGENE P. LINK, DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800
(1942).
568. See JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN
CRISIS 86 (1993).
569. See id. at 85.
570. GEN. ADVERTISER, May 16, 1794, quoted in SHARP, supra note 568, at 85.
571. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 79.
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even monitoring English ships in local harbors.5 72 'The Democratic-
Republican societies were organized, then, at least in the minds of their
founders ... to preserve the legacy of the American Revolution."573
The Democratic-Republican societies were widely condemned as aspiring
to a quasi-governmental role, and seeking to represent popular
sovereignty. 7 These societies were not by today's standards large: many had
only a few dozen members, and the biggest counted a few hundred
individuals in their ranks.575 The societies also insisted their role was, like a
town meeting, simply to promote the public good.576 But influenced by
accounts of the political role of the Jacobin clubs in France, the critics of the
societies feared that they challenged the power of the state.' r This fear was
especially strong when the societies were linked-with some justification-
to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.578
One historian reports that the societies' "claims to represent the
community at large... violated the governing principle of associational life
in the republican polity, that is, with the exception of charity, every
organization ought to manage only its internal affairs and touch only the
lives of its members."579 Of particular concern, the secrecy and membership
restrictions of the Democratic-Republican societies were inconsistent with a
claim of popular representation. 5  Writing in the Gazette of the United
States in 1794, for instance, "A Friend to Representative Government"
complained, "Undoubtedly the people is sovereign, but this sovereignty is in
the whole people, and not in any separate part, and cannot be exercised, but
by the Representatives of the whole nation.' 58 1 In other words, "[b]ecause it
was the legislature that was supposed to discuss, decide, and speak for the
572. See SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 56.
573. SHARP, supra note 568, at 89.
574. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 79.
575. See SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 55-56.
576. See SHARP, supra note 568, at 87.
577. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 52, 66-71.
578. See SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 58-60. See generally THE WHISKEY REBELION: PAST AND
PRESENT PERSPECIVmES (Steven R. Boyd ed., 1985). Assessing the evidence, one historian concludes,
"[a]lthough virtually all the clubs... denounced the violence... and there is no evidence the societies as
institutions fomented the outbreak, it is true that some members ... did actively participate in the
insurrection:' SHARP, supra note 568, at 98 (footnote omitted).
579. Koschnik, supra note 551, at 51.
580. See id. at 68-69.
581. GAZIE Op THE UNrrED STATES, April 4,1794, quoted in Koschnik, supra note 551, at 70n.51.
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people, when organizations did this, [the Federalists] saw only the
individuals involved, not the 'people.' 582 George Cabot expressed this
concern, when he asked in 1895: "[W]here is the boasted advantage of a
representation system.., if the resort to popular meetings is necessary?"
583
Fisher Ames was especially critical of the Democratic-Republican societies.
During House debates in November 1794, he warned: "If the clubs prevail,
they will be the Government, and the more secure for having become so by a
victory over the existing authorities.
' 584
Importantly, this indictment was not limited to the Democratic-
Republican societies, or even to overtly political associations. The historian
Albrecht Koschnik shows that the same fear of a "government within a
government" characterized opposition to a range of entities.5 8 Business
corporations were viewed with a similar skepticism in the early Republic
because they entailed the granting of special legal privileges that, like the
Democratic-Republican Societies, threatened to undermine the cohesiveness
of the polity.5 86 The incorporation of cities, with privileged status granted to
city officials, also raised the threat of a competing sovereign.5 87 ' The
Revolutionary heritage had sharpened certain public values that included an
abhorrence of special privileges and monopolies; at the same time, it was
found less and less easy to detennine for any given purpose what the public
good was. This meant a corresponding difficulty in deciding that the
advantages of incorporation should be extended to some groups and denied
to others." '588
582. James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of
Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L REV. 117, 132 (1999).
583. SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 61.
584. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 929 (1794), quoted in Koschnik, supra note 551, at 81.
585. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 46-51.
586. See id. at 27-30, 46-49 (discussing opposition in the 1780s to the charter of the Bank of North
America). On early corporations, see generally PETER D. HALL, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
CULTURE, 1700-1900: PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS, ELITES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY
(1982); RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATON, 1784-1855:
BROADENING THE CONCEPr OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION (1982); Simeon E.
Baldwin, American Business Corporations before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449 (1903); Peter D. Hall,
Organizational Values and the Origins of the Corporation in Connecticut 1760-1860,29 CONN. HIsr. 63
(1988); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Business Corporation, 50 WM. &
MARY Q. 51 (1993).
587. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 49-51 (discussing opposition to the 1789 Philadelphia charter).
On the other hand, churches, colleges, and charitable organizations largely avoided this criticism. See id.
at 28, 36.




Early criticism of the Democratic-Republican societies and other entities
had an uneasy relationship with support of, and constitutional protection for,
assembly and petitioning. "Petitioners were in a sense rivals of
representatives, claiming to speak the voice of the people but unrestricted by
the qualifications placed on voting and uninhibited by the responsibilities of
being part of the government. ' 589 It was, therefore, hard to explain why
individuals could assemble together and submit petitions to influence
government, but not form associations for the same purpose. While some of
the petitions to the first Congress came from temporary assemblies of local
folk gathered together to address a specific problem,5 1 many petitions were
from established associations pursuing particular interests.5 91
Some observers, in favor of assembly and petition, but against
associations, drew a distinction between temporary assemblies for the
purposes of consulting for the common good and submitting a petition, on
the one hand, and free-standing associations, representing an ongoing claim
to political influence, on the other.592 This strategy was evident in the
Republican-sponsored public meetings in opposition to the Jay Treaty in
1795: "[b]y styling their opposition to the treaty as an ad-hoc gathering,
meant only to collect 'the public sense,' the steering committee of the
meetings tried to shun activities that could be construed as perpetual
assemblies with unlimited goals."593
589. MORGAN, supra note 495, at 226.
590. There are numerous examples. On March 26, 1790, "[m]erchants and traders ofPortsmouth, New
Hampshire" petitioned for Congress to enact regulations governing foreign shippers and for the district
and circuit courts to be located in Portsmouth. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, supra note 497, at 41. On January 20,1790, "[s]undry inhabitants of Westchester County,
New York' petitioned for "[c]ompensation for wheat, rye, corn, oats and hay, cattle, sheep and hogs,
which were taken for (Army] use during the late war." Id. at 89. On May 13, 1789, "[m]erchants and
traders of Portland, Massachusetts" submitted a petition in opposition to a molasses tax. See id. at 103. On
April 16, 1790, "[t]radesmen, manufacturers and others of Baltimore, Maryland" petitioned for a tax on
imports of all products that could be made domestically. Id.
591. Forinstance, onJanuary 27, 1791, the Boston Marine Societypetitioned for the establishment of
hospitals for disabled seamen. See id. at 117. On December 20, 1790, the College of Physicians in
Philadelphia petitioned for a tax to discourage the use of distilled spirits. See id. at 127. On January 5,
1791, the Baptist Associations of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermontpetitioned
for "measures to prevent the publication of any inaccurate editions of the Holy Bible." Id.
592. See Koschnik, supra note 551, at 70.
593. Albrecht Koschnik, The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and the Limits of the American
Public Sphere, circa 1793-1795, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 33 (2001)
(http:lwww.historycooperative.orgljoumalslwml58.3/koschnik.html) (last visited, June 21, 2002).
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Of course, such a distinction was not in practice very clear.594 As the
experience in seventeenth century England had already showed, once the
right to petition was understood to allow for something more than merely
individual petitions, to protect also petitioning by groups of like-minded
citizens, associations are inevitable. If individuals may assemble together to
discuss issues of mutual concern for the purpose of drafting and signing a
collective petition, then it is hard to prevent people from forming more
permanent associational ties for the purpose of dealing with problems as they
emerge, or for anticipating them in advance. Accordingly, some early
commentators went further, asserting that while associations in colonial and
revolutionary America legitimately pursued political goals, the legislatures
were the sole elected representatives of the People; therefore extra-legislative
assemblies were unnecessary and improper in the new republic.595
A different approach was to distinguish illegitimate "self-created
societies" from legitimate "associations." '596 "[T]he latter existed as
collections of individuals organized for civic purposes (such as charity or
education), the former denoted organizations not chosen by the people but
born out of individual ambition, which violated the principles of popular
sovereignty by giving its members disproportionate public influence."5' For
instance, Noah Webster, the editor of American Minerva celebrated civic
associations even while he condemned political societies.598 This distinction
often seemed to turn on spin: organizations that were careful in the press,
and in their other public announcements, to present themselves as engaging
in private or civic activities, managed to avoid the condemnation directed at
entities with a more blatant public or reformist agenda.599
Although modern commentators dwell on Madison and his fear of
factions, George Washington was the more zealous critic of the early
594. Indeed, this tension underlay the gag-rules of the 1840s (at the very time associations were on the
upswing). Much of the opposition to the abolitionist petitions reflected an inability to contain the right of
assembly to episodic gatherings for the purposes of formulating a specific petition. The abolitionist
petitions were so disruptive precisely because, aside from their difficult subject matter, they entailed not a
request to elected representatives for redress of an individual or collective grievance, but rather a
continuous criticism of the activities of Congress by well-organized standing associations of citizens. See
Ludlumn, supra note 518, at 236-38; McPherson, supra note 518, at 177-79.
595. See WOOD, supra note 404, at 375.
596. See Kosehnik, The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia, supra note 593, at 21.
597. Id.
598. See id.




associations. 600 Writing privately on the role of the Democratic-Republican
societies in the Whiskey Rebellion, Washington asked if anything was
more absurd, more arrogant, or more pernicious to the peace of Society
than for self created bodies, forming themselves into permanent
Censors, and under the shade of Night in a conclave resolving that acts
of Congress which have undergone the most deliberate, and solemn
discussion by the Representatives of the people, chosen for their
express purpose, and bringing with them from different parts of the
Union the sense of their Constituents, endeavoring as far as the nature
of the thing will admit, to form that will into Laws for the government
of the whole; I say, under these circumstances, for a selfcreated
permanent body, (for no one denies the right of the people to meet
occasionally, to petition for, or remonstrate against, any Act of the
Legislature etc.) to declare that this act is unconstitutional, and that act
is pregnant of mischief; and that all who vote contrary to their dogmas
are actuated by selfish motives, or under foreign influence; nay, in
plain terms are traiters to their Country, is such a stretch of arrogant
presumption to be reconciled with laudable motives: especially when
we see the same set of men endeavouring to destroy all confidence in
the Administration, by arraigning all its acts, without knowing on what
ground, or what information it proceeds and this without regard to
decency or truth.601
This paragraph says it all. The trouble with associations is that they are
self-constituted, rather than popularly elected. They are permanent
assemblies, ready to criticize everything Congress does, rather than
occasional gatherings in response to specific legislation. They challenge
Congress, even though they themselves do not properly represent the People.
They also have an unfair advantage: whereas Congress must deliberate and
act in accordance with popular will, associations are responsible only to
narrow interests.
These were not mere private musings. In an address to Congress in the
fall of 1794, Washington publicly denounced the Democratic-Republican
600. See SCHUDSON, supra note 283, at 61-64. Citing the importance of some public scrutiny of
government, Madison encouraged Washington to temper his comments on extra-governmental
associations of citizens. See id. See also SHARP, supra note 568, at 103.
601. Letter from George Washington to Burgess Ball (Sept 25, 1794), in GEORGE WASHINGTON:
WRfnGS 885 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997).
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societies,602 and Washington's supporters sponsored resolutions condemning
them.6 3 In his farewell address, published in 1796, Washington emphasized
the danger associations presented:
[AIII combinations and Associations, under whatever plausible
character, with the real design to direct, controul counteract, or awe the
regular deliberation and action of the Constituted authorities, are... of
fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial
and extraordinary force; to put in the place of the delegated will of the
Nation, the will of a party; often a small but artful and enterprizing
minority of the Community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of
different parties, to make the public administration the Mirror of the ill
concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of
consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils and
modified by mutual interests. 4
Less than two years later, Congress enacted the 1798 Sedition Act.05
While the Act notoriously penalized speech critical of the government, 606 it
also made it a crime for any persons to "unlawfully combine or conspire
together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of the government
of the United States. 60 7
To be sure, not everybody shared the view that associations were
dangerous. Some commentators celebrated the Democratic-Republican
societies precisely because they represented a form of popular sovereignty.
"To the participants such associations of the people outside of the regularly
constituted government seemed as necessary under their new republican
governments as they did under the British government., 608 In addition,
essayists expressed support for the societies as mediating institutions,
602. See George Washington, Sixth Annual Address to Congress (Nov. 19,1794), in 347I EWRrrINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 29 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-44).
603. See SHARP, supra note 568, at 103.
604. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in WRITINGS, supra note 601, at 968.
605. See "An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," 1 Stat. 596-97 (July
14, 1798).
606. See id. at § 2.
607. Id. at § 1. Modem commentators often overlook the assembly portion ofthe Sedition Act, focusing
instead on the Act's restrictions on speech. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 338, at 23. But even when it was
passed, there was apparently little concern with Section I of the Act, while Section H (the speech
provision) met with vigorous criticism. See Martin, supra note 582, at 122 n.7. See also CURRIE, supra
note 514, at 260-62; Andrew Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republican Constitutionalism in the Federalist
Era, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 272-76 (1997). The Supreme Court recognized that the Act was
unconstitutional in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,276 (1964).
608. WOOD, supra note 404, at 326.
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providing-like town meetings-a pipeline for transmitting information
between citizens and elected representatives.0 9 When Tocqueville arrived in
the 1830s, he, too, saw the vast network of associations in the United States
as a form of popular sovereignty, and he celebrated them for that very
reason.
610
Thomas Jefferson thought Washington's hostility towards the
Democratic-Republican societies misplaced. He wrote privately: "The
denunciation of the democratic societies is one of the extraordinary acts of
boldness of which we have seen so many from the faction of monocrats. It is
wonderful indeed, that the President should have permitted himself to be the
organ of such an attack on the freedom of discussion, the freedom of writing,
printing and publishing."61' Sharing a similar view, Madison privately
described Washington's denunciation of the societies as "the greatest error
of... his political life."612 Nonetheless, the two Virginians made little public
comment on the societies because of the political risk of being publicly
linked to them, and thereby to insurrection.1 3
Further, even the critics of the Democratic-Republican societies were
often generous towards other associations that did not appear to threaten the
government's singular claim to popular sovereignty. The Masons, for
example, enjoyed strong popularity in the early years of the Republic.
614
George Washington was a Mason, as were other eminent individuals,
including Benjamin Franklin and Andrew Jackson.1 5 The Masons played a
substantial role in politics, such as by facilitating the election of their
members and sympathizers to public office. 616 Yet Masonry was celebrated,
as embodying virtue and patriotism, and thereby contributing to the
Republic's success. 617 In contrast to the Democratic-Republican societies, the
609. See SHARP, supra note 568, at 104.
610. See supra Part IV.E.
611. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dee. 28, 1794), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 426-29 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1985) (hereinafter MADISON PAPERS), quoted in SCHUDSON,
supra note 283, at 62. (By "wonderful," Jefferson means surprising.); see SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785) (entry for "wonderful").
612. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 30, 1794), in MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 611.
613. See SHARP, supra note 568, at 103.
614. See BULLOCK, supra note551 at 137-38. The anti-Masonic movementbeganinthe 1820s. See id.
at 277-307.
615. See id. at 1.
616. See id. at 220-38.
617. See id. at 139.
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Masons were understood to have the interests of the whole society at hearL 618
"Masonry's national and worldwide membership, its lack of explicit
exclusions, its voluntary nature, and its ancient origins all seemed to refute
any suspicion of a desire for power of selfish advantage.', 619 The acclaim the
Masons enjoyed in the early Republic, in contrast to the Democratic-
Republican societies, is evidenced by an extraordinary act on September 18,
1793.620 Dedicating the United States Capitol, President Washington,
dressed in Masonic garb, placed a silver plate on the corner stone and
covered it with corn, oil, and wine (the Masonic symbols). 621 The plate
identified the date as "the thirteenth year of American
independence... and... the year of Masonry, 5793."622
E. Summary
In the early Republic, associations were understood not in terms of free
speech, but in terms of assemblies, petitions, and popular sovereignty. Like
mobs, riots, conventions, and the revolutionary committees, associations
embodied extra-legislative political activity. Because today we focus on
expression, and we see associations as just another kind of speaker, we have
largely overlooked this political aspect of associations that lay at the core of
their treatment in the early Republic.6's To be sure, historically this link
between associations and popular sovereignty was highly problematic,
revealing early fears about political forces that threatened to destabilize the
new union. As we saw, for many critics, it was one thing for citizens to
gather in temporary assemblies to exert occasional political influence, but
quite another for permanent associations to assume a post-Revolutionary
political role. Moreover, it may be that in safeguarding, in the Bill of Rights,
a right to assemble and petition, it was not widely expected that the First
Amendment would extend to freestanding associations like the Democratic-
618. See id. at 152.
619. Id.
620. See id. at 137.
621. See id.
622. id.
623. Other aspects of the First Amendment may also be usefully understood in terms of a commitment
to popular sovereignty. See AMAR, supra note 338, at 20-26; ALEXANDER MEIKIFJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 154-55 (1960); Anderson, supra note 477, at
487; Potter Stewart, Or the Press, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 631, 634 (1975). See generally Jason Mazzone,
Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First Amendment, 34 CONN. I REV. 405 (2002).
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Republican societies. Nonetheless, it was in terms of popular sovereignty
that associations in the early Republic were understood.
Accordingly, instead of forging a new doctrine of expressive association,
we might have more success in thinking about associational freedom if we
also understand associations in popular sovereignty terms. In so doing, we
need not agree with the views of Washington and other early critics on
whether this sort of popular sovereignty is a good thing. Indeed, we will
probably disagree. Today, the notion that there might be too much, or the
wrong kind, of popular sovereignty seems strange. Knowing, as we do, that
the Republic succeeded, it is more difficult to understand that groups of
citizens exercising political influence interfere with the "real" site of popular
sovereignty, the elected government. From a modem perspective, the early
criticisms directed at the Democratic-Republican societies are inconsistent
with understandings of self-rule. We should, therefore, be inclined to protect
the popular sovereignty associations represent, rather than worry about its
destabilizing effects.
In sum, rather than think of associations as speakers, we should see their
significance-their constitutional significance-to lie in enabling people to
influence government. Associations matter not because of what they say but
because of their political role. The task, therefore, becomes to understand
what, in practice, freedom of association means once it is understood in
terms of citizens exercising political influence-and protected for that
reason. What, in other words, is the proper scope of constitutional protection
for associations if their value lies in popular sovereignty? I take up that issue
in the next section.
VI. THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Understanding the significance of freedom of association to lie in popular
sovereignty does not alone provide an adequate basis for determining the
proper scope of associational freedom or for evaluating claims to
constitutional protection. We need also to be able to draw distinctions among
associations, and associational activities, in ways that allow us to see what
popular sovereignty means in practice. Rather than begin from scratch,
however, it is sensible to make use of the tools social scientists have already
developed for classifying associations. I first provide an overview of these
tools and then use them to identify the proper scope of constitutional
protections for freedom of association.
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A. An Associational Typology
1. Operative Organization
The sociologist Talcott Parsons distinguishes three "types of operative
organization" in modem society: markets, bureaucracies, and associational
relations. 64 The three represent differentiated methods for organizing
collective action, and for making collective decisions. 625 Markets organize
through economic exchanges based on price.626 Bureaucratic organization is
based on rules enforced by coercive power, that is the power of the state.62
Associational relations are a form of social organization based on social ties,
communication, and shared norms.628 Associations are therefore those
entities in which associational relations are dominant.629 According to
Parsons, "the prototype of an association is the societal collectivity itself,
considered as a corporate body of citizens holding primarily consensual
relations to its normative order and to the authority of its leadership. 630
Modem associational relations, in Parsons' account, are characterized by
egalitarianism among members; voluntary ties (i.e. the possibility of exit);
and adherence to procedures and deliberation in decision-making. 63'
Accordingly, when entities are organized through associational relations,
outcomes are determined through influence based on persuasion rather than
through the mechanisms of money or governmental power.632 As one
commentator on Parsons puts it, "[m]odem associations rely on attachments
that are held and justified in terms of the intrinsic criteria of the norms-and
herein lies their distinctive means of influence, their ethical vitality, as well
as their dynamism.
' 633




628. See id. The theory of social norms as a means of organization has, of course, a long history in
sociology, beginning with Durkheim. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE (Karen E. Fields trans., The Free Press 1995) (1912); EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (John
A. Spalding & George Simpson trans., The Free Press 1951) (1897).
629. See PARSONS, supra note 624, at 24.
630. Id.
631. See id. at24-25.
632. Id. at 25.
633. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 50.
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While most entities are organized principally according to one of the three
forms of organization Parsons identifies, a single entity may exhibit features
of more than one organizational form. 634 Thus, the PTA is organized
principally through associational relations; a corporation is typically
organized under market structures; government entities are normally
organized as bureaucracies. But a firm may also include structures organized
as associational relations, such as an internal committee of minority workers.
An association, such as a gardening club or sports league, may have features
organized along market lines, for instance an office that sells merchandise. A
predominantly bureaucratic government office may incorporate associational
and market-oriented structures.
2. Ease of Exit, Medium, and Goods
Building on Parsons' approach, as well as on the related work of Niklas
Luhmann635 and Jirgen Habermas,636 political scientist Mark Warren
provides a helpful discussion of differences in associational forms. 637 Warren
invokes three broad criteria for distinguishing among associations: the
degree to which an association is voluntary; the constitutive medium of the
association; and the association's goods or purposes.638
"Voluntary," in this context, means "the associational bond is held
together by chosen normative allegiance rather than by other kinds of
force."639 In other words, the members of a voluntary association join, and
remain members, because they are persuaded by the principles of the
association and the social influence of others, rather than because of
motivations of money or the threat of state sanctions. An association is non-
voluntary where costs coerce membership, or prevent an individual from
634. See PARSONS, supra note 624, at 25-26.
635. See generally NILKAS LUMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (Stephen Holmes trans.,
1982).
636. See 2 JORGEN HABERmAS, THETHEORY oFCoMMUNICATIVEACTION: LIPVEORLD AND SYSTEM:
A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 137 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). See also JORGEN
HABERMAS, BETvEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 25-27, 37 (William Rehg trans., 1998); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 12 (T. Burger & F. Lawrence trans., 1989); 1 JORGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF
SOCIETY 285-86 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
637. See WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 94-133.
638. See id. at 94.
639. Id. at 98.
Washington Law Review
leaving. 640 Thus, a workplace is often non-voluntary because most people
need income. On the other hand, a workplace might be voluntary if, for
instance, there are multiple alternative employment opportunities. 61 A
church is voluntary for an individual who joins at age thirty after coming to
believe in the tenets of a particular faith. A church is less voluntary for an
individual who has grown up with deep ties to a particular religious tradition
and cannot imagine any alternative.647
The constitutive medium refers to the location of an association within the
three Parsonian media of state power, markets, or social resources. 643 Here,
the distinction between an association and associational relations becomes
important. "While associational relations are defined by the social resources,
associations are differentially embedded in these three media."6" Thus a bar
association might be organized principally through associational relations,
but it is embedded in the medium of power.
In considering the medium of an association, Warren draws a further
distinction between associations that are vested in their medium and
associations that are merely oriented towards their medium.645 Vested
associations are situated firmly within the medium and they seek to
reproduce it.646 Non-vested associations, on the other hand, aim to alter the
medium and its flow of resources.647 For example, a regulatory group that
monitors compliance with rules and recommends or imposes sanctions is
vested within the medium of state power because its authority depends upon
the power of the state, and its activities serve to reproduce that power.
Professional organizations, like state bar associations, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, are vested in state power because they regulate admission to
professions and enforce standards of professional conduct. By contrast, a
special interest group engaged in lobbying or litigation, such as the NAACP,
is oriented towards the medium of state power, but it is not vested in that
medium. The NAACP aims to alter state-sponsored rules and outcomes, and
to redirect the flow of the resources and benefits state power sustains.
640. See id. at 98-99.
641. See id. at 99.
642. See id.
643. See id. at 109.
644. Id.





Warren identifies the following different types of associational goods:
individual material goods (such as food and clothing); public material goods
(such as public radio); interpersonal identity goods (such as the identities
that emerge from friendship ties); status goods (such as degrees and titles or
prestigious memberships); exclusive group identity goods (such as goods
based on group distinctions like religion, language, race, gender, or a
common interest); and inclusive social goods (such as voting rights and other
goods related to membership in a broad social body). 48
3. Social Capital
We can also draw distinctions among associations based on their capacity
for equipping their members with civic skills and other resources that enable
members to exercise political influence. In other words, we can distinguish
between associations that represent high levels of social capital and impart
these skills and associations where social capital is low and members do not
have the same opportunities for gaining politically relevant skills. 9
4. Summary
Associations can be divided up according to whether they are located in
the medium of politics, markets, or social resources, and whether they are
vested in their medium or merely oriented towards it. Further distinctions
can be made based on the degree to which the associational ties are
voluntary, and based on the goods the association produces. Finally, we can
distinguish among associations high in social capital and associations with
low social capital.
These criteria provide multiple axes along which to organize particular
associations. Of course, no set of criteria is perfect. In practice, it may not be
easy to classify all associations according to the criteria I have identified, and
there may be disagreement as to where any particular association falls. Some
associations might have mixed or ambiguous features that do not easily place
them within a single classification. I also recognize that there are other
648. See id. at 123-33.
649. See supra Parts IV.E & F.
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methods for distinguishing among associations. 650 Nonetheless, these criteria
provide one way to draw, in a systematic manner, distinctions among various
kinds of associations.
B. Constitutional Implications
In order to identify the associations that merit constitutional protection
and the proper scope of that protection, we need to examine the implications
of each of these criteria for the underlying value of popular sovereignty.
1. Medium and Popular Sovereignty
An association's medium is an especially important factor in evaluating
the association's claim to constitutional protection. Other things being equal,
we should expect associations located in the medium of political power to be
more closely related to popular sovereignty than associations located in
either the medium of money and markets or in the medium of social
resources. The medium of political power is where public policies are
debated and determined, and where the opportunity to influence political
outcomes exists. In the medium of political power, associations act as a link
between the interests of individuals and the exercise of the state's power
over them. Associations located within this medium represent popular
sovereignty by communicating the preferences of citizens, articulating
differences and disagreements, and influencing the operation of state power.
More simply, associations that influence politics play a more significant role
in popular sovereignty than do associations that are engaged in buying and
selling in markets or associations limited to social life.
The distinction between associations vested in the political medium and
associations oriented towards the political medium is also important.
Politically vested associations are less likely to represent popular sovereignty
than are non-vested associations. Vested associations are those that depend
upon and deal in public power. Associations vested in the political medium
do not, therefore, represent popular sovereignty because they do not aim,
through contributions to deliberation, representation of interests, and the
like, to alter power structures and mechanisms, and to change political
outcomes. A bar association, for example, is vested in the medium of
650. See, e.g., DAVID KNOKE, ORGANIZING FOR CoLLEcnVEACTION: THEPOLITICAL EcoNoMiEs OF
ASSOCIATIONS 47-66 (1990); C. Wayne Gordon & Nicholas Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary




political power. It is responsible for licensing lawyers and for regulating the
practice of law, and it discharges its responsibilities by promulgating rules
and imposing state-sponsored sanctions against lawyers who violate those
rules. A bar association does not criticize its exercise of these functions, or
advocate assigning them to somebody else, or contend that lawyers should
not be regulated at all. In performing these kinds of regulatory functions, a
bar association does not, therefore, represent popular sovereignty because
while it depends upon state power, it is not involved in altering it.
Associations in the medium of markets or in the medium of social
resources also do not represent popular sovereignty. In markets, decision-
making occurs anonymously through price mechanisms rather than through
deliberation and debate about appropriate outcomes.65' A firm sells widgets
if there is demand for widgets at the price and quality the firm offers. The
firm does not sell widgets by relying on the police or the mayor to direct
customers to buy them.
Associations located in the social medium deal in social resources such as
shared norms. Accordingly, "they thrive on background consensus, which
they will tend to maintain through self-selection and exit rather than by
going public with their conflicts. ' ' 65 2 While they may play a significant role
in the lives of their members, these associations do not influence public
outcomes through the representation of interests, and contributions to public
debates and decision-making. The Catholic Church, for example, may
strongly influence the lives of its congregation. But such influence occurs
through reliance upon religious commands and priestly persuasion, rather
than through state force.
We can distinguish associations oriented towards the political medium
from associations vested in the political medium, and from associations
located in the market or in the social medium. Associations oriented toward,
but not vested in, the political medium have a high capacity to represent
popular sovereignty. Associations vested in politics, or located in the market,
or in social media, have a low capacity for representing popular sovereignty.
We should be inclined to grant greater constitutional protection to non-
vested political associations, than to these other kinds of associations. Table
1 summarizes these distinctions.
651. See MIcHAEL HECUTER, PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLiDARrrY 169-74 (1987).












Table 1. Associational Medium and Popular Sovereignty.
Which associations merit constitutional protection on this basis? Non-
vested political associations include political parties, business lobbies, social
movements, racial advocacy groups like the NAACP, environmental lobbies,
the NRA, religious advocacy groups, civil rights organizations like the
ACLU, child welfare lobbies, animal rights lobbies like PETA, unions
engaged in political lobbying, human rights organizations, as well as parades
and marches. All of these associations seek to influence state power, but they
do not themselves exercise it. We should, therefore, be inclined to grant
constitutional protection to these kinds of associations. We should be less
inclined to protect firms, cooperatives, and unions engaged in wage
negotiations (all located in the medium of the market); fraternal orders,
cultural entities, churches, sports clubs, social clubs, and hobby groups (all
located in the social medium); and regulatory organizations like bar
associations (vested in politics). These associations are less closely related to
popular sovereignty because they do not principally seek to Oter the exercise
of state power.653
653. I, of course, recognize that since many organizations have mixed features, non-political entities
may, at times, be oriented towards the political medium. This does not, however, alter the basic analysis:
the more an organization is politically oriented, the more inclined we should be to grant it protection.
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2. Social Capital and Popular Sovereignty
In addition to influencing political outcomes directly, a second way in
which associations may be relevant to popular sovereignty is by providing
their members with politically relevant skills and opportunities. Associations
with high levels of social capital are more closely related to popular
sovereignty than are associations in which social capital is low. High social
capital means that individuals have more frequent and more significant
contact with each other, greater experience in getting along with other
people, more opportunities to hear about political issues and to be recruited
into political action, and more experience in organizing activities, running
meetings, making speeches, and developing other civic skills from the day-
to-day operations of the group. Associations with high social capital are
important to popular sovereignty, not because they necessarily engage in
political activities themselves, but because they equip their members with
political skills. Accordingly, we should be inclined to grant constitutional
protection to high social capital associations.
Associations high in social capital may exist in any of the three media
discussed. Hence, associations that do not themselves influence political life
may merit constitutional protection because they provide their members with
political skills. For example, consumer cooperatives or ethnic self-help
networks, although located in the market, may be significant to popular
sovereignty to the extent these organizations entail high social capital. The
early women's study clubs discussed at the outset of this Article provide a
vivid example of organizations located in the social medium that are
nonetheless significant to popular sovereignty. While these study clubs were
not formed for political purposes, by teaching politically relevant skills, they
enabled their members to exercise political influence.654
Groups low in social capital do not have the same significance to popular
sovereignty. In low social capital groups, citizens lack opportunities to
develop skills useful for political activity. Low social capital groups include
large, mass-membership organizations, where citizen activity is limited,
often not extending beyond making a financial contribution. Instead of
citizens overseeing activities, the operation of these associations tends to be
guided by a cadre of professional managers. Members are relatively
anonymous to the leadership and to each other. Associations low in social
capital include organizations like the Sierra Club and the NRA; political
654. See supra Prologue.
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parties; many unions; rallies and parades; university alumni organizations;
many corporations; professional organizations like state or city bar
associations; large museum groups; and many charitable organizations. Low
social capital groups merit less constitutional protection than do groups
whose high social capital makes them important to popular sovereignty.655







Table 2. Social Capital and Popular Sovereignty.
How do we recognize whether an association is high in social capital?
Size is obviously a clue. Groups with a small number of active members
likely embody high levels of social capital. In considering size, however, the
level of analysis is also significant. A large organization with many members
may entail high social capital if the organization consists of smaller affiliated
units. Thus, for instance, the total membership of Mensa may be a poor
indicator of the organization's social capital if members are arranged in
small active local clubs affiliated with the national body. High member
turnover disrupts social networks, so stability also suggests an organization
embodies high social capital. Organizations with high social capital are also
likely to involve relatively egalitarian structures, with a commitment to
deliberation in decision-making. Low social capital organizations often have
centralized decision-making, and little member influence. High social capital
organizations involve the election of officials by members, unpaid
leadership, and rotation of members through administrative roles. Low social
capital organizations have paid organizers and a professional staff arranged
in a hierarchical manner. High social capital organizations show frequent
personal interactions among members in meetings and other events. In low
655. To be sure, low social capital organizations may nonetheless be significant to popular sovereignty
because they exercise political influence on their members' behalf, that is, because they are oriented




social capital organizations, members are less directly connected, perhaps
with their principle contact an organizational newsletter. Low social capital
organizations are likely to place few constraints on the growth of their
organization and provide for easy joining (such as by the payment of a
membership fee). High social capital organizations less readily admit
newcomers, and more carefully screen prospective members (such as by
requiring personal recommendations or attendance at a certain number of
meetings before admission).
3. Voluntariness and Popular Sovereignty
Whether an association involves voluntary or involuntary ties also bears
on its significance to popular sovereignty. Voluntary associations are more
effective at formulating a position that represents the interests of the
association's members and promoting that position through political
influence. By definition, a voluntary association is one in which individuals
who disagree with what the association does or says can leave the association
and join a more compatible organization.656 Voluntary associations are
comprised of more similar members than are found in non-voluntary
associations.Y As a result, "[v]oluntary associations may be able to attain a
relative 'purity' of purpose when compared to compulsory associations,
656. See WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 96. The classic work on the
subject is ALBERT 0. HiRSCHMAN, EXIT, VoIcE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
657. See Pamela A. Poppielarz & J. Miller McPherson, On the Edge or ln Between: Niche Position,
Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships, 101 AM. J. SOC. 698,698 -99
(1995) ("W]oluntary associations are overwhelmingly homogeneous, promoting relations between similar
people but inhibiting contact between dissimilar ones. Since the relations that people form can only be as
heterogeneous as the structures within which they meet other people, voluntary group homogeneity acts as
a barrier to societal integration.") (citations omitted). See also J. Miller McPherson & Lynn Smith-Lovin,
Homophily in Voluntary Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups,
52 AM. Soc. REV. 370,370-79 (1987).
For instance, many voluntary associations are sex-segregated. See J. Miller McPherson & Lynn Smith-
Lovin, SexSegregation in Voluntary Associations, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 61 (1986). The authors find that, in
a study of 815 voluntary associations, almost one-half were exclusively female and one-fifth exclusively
male, and gender-integrated associations were dominated by one gender. See id. at 65. Work-related
organizations tended to be sex-heterogeneous, while veterans groups, lodges, and hobby groups were
single-sex. See id. at 67. Church-related, social, and recreational groups were somewhat heterogeneous.
See id. Groups with some kind of community representation role (such as an advisory board or chamber of
commerce) were especially likely to be sex-heterogeneous. See id. at 75. All-female groups tended to have
more internal differentiation through committees. See id. at 70.
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which in turn may enable them to... develop a distinctive voice in the
public sphere.
658
Voluntary associations are, therefore, more closely related to popular
sovereignty than are non-voluntary associations. Voluntary associations
include organizations devoted to a hobby, recreation, or some other common
interest. Sporting associations, wine-tasting clubs, book groups, and choral
societies are all voluntary. Some voluntary associations are distinctly
political: a political party, for instance, involves individuals united because
they share common beliefs.
Non-voluntary associations include integrated bar associations,
neighborhoods, and many corporations. In each, the ability of individuals to
leave the group, while not impossible, is more constrained. Non-voluntary
associations often lack a distinctive voice and are less effective in exercising
political influence because the members are unable to overcome divisions
among themselves and formulate a distinctive agenda. Alternatively, the
contributions of non-voluntary associations to politics may reflect the
interests of the association's leaders or its most outspoken members, rather
than those of the entire group. Thus, non-voluntary associations are less
significant to popular sovereignty.
However, the mere fact that an association is voluntary should not alone
entitle the association to constitutional protection. Some voluntary
associations have little bearing on popular sovereignty, because they neither
engage in politics themselves nor provide their members with politically
relevant skills. A church, for example, is not significant to popular
sovereignty just because its members attend services voluntarily. A
university alumni association is a voluntary organization, but it has little
relevance to popular sovereignty unless it is politically influential or it
politicizes its members. In order to merit constitutional protection, a
voluntary association should still be required to engage directly in political
activity or entail sufficient levels of social capital to facilitate the political
activities of its members.
Nonetheless, the presence of voluntary ties allows us to evaluate the
contributions politically relevant associations make to popular sovereignty.
While associations oriented towards the political medium merit
constitutional protection, we should be more inclined to protect politically
oriented associations that are also voluntary. Such associations provide a
stronger and more distinct contribution to political life. Thus, for example,
658. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 107.
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we should be more inclined to protect the political activities of a highly
voluntary organization like the NAACP than those of a less voluntary
organization like a professional society.
Whether an association is voluntary may also indicate its level of social
capital. Individuals choose to join voluntary associations. They are therefore
likely to be higher in social capital than compelled associations, in which
individuals happen to find themselves." 9 On the other hand, ease of exit may
work to disrupt or undermine social capital. Individuals free to leave an
association, who do not need to work at resolving their differences and
overcoming conflicts, may find it difficult to develop high levels of social
capital. As Warren observes, because non-voluntary associations "must deal
with internal conflict, members may be more likely to have the politically
developmental experiences important for democracy, especially if the
association's response to conflict is democratic in nature. ' 660 In other words,
non-voluntary associations may be better at producing social capital if they
force individuals to harmonize their differences and develop working
relationships.
In addition, the extent to which membership is voluntary may allow us to
determine which kinds of high social capital associations merit the strongest
constitutional protections. Social capital theorists distinguish between two
overall varieties of social capital: "bonding" social capital, which is "inward
looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous
groups," and "bridging" social capital, which is "outward looking and
encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages. 66' Or, to put the
distinction more vividly, "[b]onding social capital constitutes a kind of
sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a
sociological VD-40.' ,662 Bridging social capital is often more significant to
popular sovereignty than bonding social capital, because bridging social
capital represents the union of a greater cross-section of the population. Non-
voluntary associations may be better at producing bridging social capital, by
bringing together diverse individuals without allowing them the possibility
of exit. Voluntary associations, on the other hand, are likely more adept at
producing bonding social capital, because dissenters will leave to form their
own associations with other likeminded individuals. Therefore, while both
659. On the importance of choice to social capital formation, see Mazzone, supra note 384, at 35-38.
660. WARREN, DEiOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 108.
661. PuTmNA BOVUNG ALONE, supra note 289, at 22.
662. Id. at23.
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voluntary and non-voluntary associations may embody social capital, to the
extent that non-voluntary associations can develop social capital, they
represent a particularly important form of popular sovereignty. For example,
community development corporations with appointed representatives from
diverse sectors of the community (representing poor neighborhoods, wealthy
neighborhoods, the city, and corporate interests) may be especially
significant to popular sovereignty-to the extent the representatives develop
a working relationship and agree upon a program. High social capital
associations with non-voluntary ties are relatively rare. While we may be
inclined to protect all associations with high social capital, we should
especially protect non-voluntary associations with high levels of social
capital because of their unique contributions to popular sovereignty.
In sum, voluntary associations high in social capital have a high capacity
for popular sovereignty. Non-voluntary associations high in social capital
have a very high popular sovereignty capacity and merit particularly strong
protection. Table 3 summarizes the distinctions.







Non-voluntary High Very High
Table 3. Associational Ties, Social Capital, and Popular Sovereignty.
4. Associational Goods and Popular Sovereignty
The goods an association produces also bears on its significance to
popular sovereignty. Associations that produce public material goods, like
parks, public radio, or neighborhood security, are likely to promote popular
sovereignty. The production of public goods requires agreement by
contributors that these goods are beneficial, as well as a commitment to
preventing (or sufficiently reducing) the effects of free-riding. "[P]ublic
goods must be achieved by collective action against the background potential
for conflict. Thus, associations that pursue public goods must attend to
common interests, and must persuade individuals they in fact have common
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,,663interests. We should, therefore, be inclined to grant constitutional
protection to these kinds of associations.
Associations that pursue inclusive social goods are also important for
popular sovereignty. Inclusive social goods are goods that exist by virtue of
membership in democratic society, including voting fights, access to
information about the operation of government and politics, and shared
culture and traditions. In general, these goods are available to everyone.
Associations that pursue inclusive social goods include debating societies,
educational organizations, voting rights groups, and providers of information
about political processes. These kinds of associations are closely related to
popular sovereignty, because they seek to improve conditions for democratic
participation. "Associations devoted to social goods are essential to
underwriting public spheres and political processes." 664 Associations that
promote inclusive social goods therefore merit constitutional protection.
Exclusive group identity goods are goods distributed on the basis of some
kind of distinction among people, such as-gender, age, religion, race, or a
common interest or hobby. 65 Associations that produce these goods may
contribute to popular sovereignty, to the extent that such goods provide a
basis for solidarity, cooperation, and other forms of social capital. However,
the mere production of exclusive group identity goods is unlikely to promote
popular sovereignty, because these goods, by definition, are enjoyed by a
select few. Similarly, status goods (such as membership in a country club or
a prestigious degree or title) may also provide a basis for social capital
among those who receive the goods, but the goods themselves contribute
little to popular sovereignty. Interpersonal identity goods produced through
friendships and other intimate ties may also produce social capital, but
otherwise are weakly related to popular sovereignty. Individual material
goods have little relationship to popular sovereignty. Table 4 summarizes the
distinctions.
663. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 128.
664. Id. at 132.
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Table 4. Associational Goods and Popular Sovereignty.
5. Summary
The criteria I have identified for distinguishing among associations
provide a basis for determining which kinds of associations are more
significant to popular sovereignty. We should be inclined to grant
constitutional protection to associations that are oriented towards (but not
vested in) the political medium and to associations that are high in social
capital. Political orientation and social capital are two important ways in
which associations contribute to self-government. We may draw further
distinctions among these protected associations. Voluntary politically
oriented associations merit greater protection than do non-voluntary
politically oriented associations. Of the associations protected because they
are high in social capital, non-voluntary associations, while rare, merit
particularly strong protection. In addition to these kinds of associations, we
should also be inclined to protect associations that produce public goods or
inclusive social goods because these goods are also closely related to popular
sovereignty.
C. Burdens on Free Association
Having determined, in light of the criteria relevant to popular sovereignty,
the associations that merit constitutional protection, we can also identify





The most obvious way in which the government infringes associational
freedom is by preventing citizens from forming associations that serve
popular sovereignty. The government can do this by outlawing the
association and by criminalizing membership. Prohibitions on politically
oriented, or high social capital, associations, or on associations pursuing
public or inclusive social goods, should, therefore, be impermissible. That is
to say, assuming that freedom of association, like other constitutional rights,
is not absolute, such prohibitions should be subject to strict scrutiny.666
2. Burdens on Associations and Individuals
Short of an outright ban, the government may undermine popular
sovereignty by burdening an association or its members. The government
might, for example, disrupt an association's meetings or harass participants.
The government might subject members to a tax penalty or deny them rights
and privileges like public employment, as in Elrod and Branti,667 or the use
of public facilities, as in Healey.668 The government might also burden
associations by publicizing their activities. This may be achieved by
photographing participants or printing their names in a newspaper when
members prefer to remain anonymous, or, as in Shelton,669 requiring
members to disclose their affiliations. Governmental action of this nature
should be strictly scrutinized.
3. Burdens on Popular Sovereignty Criteria
Governmental regulation not directed specifically at associations that
burdens the associational criteria conducive to popular sovereignty may also
be constitutionally suspect. We should carefully examine state regulations
that interfere with the opportunities for associations to exercise political
influence such as prohibitions on fundraising, lobbying, recruitment, or
dissemination of information. Similarly, we should examine, for their effects
on popular sovereignty, governmental interference with social capital such as
666. See Boy Scouts of Amn. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).




general limitations on small-scale gatherings. We should also be attentive to
more subtle mechanisms that impede the formation of high social capital
groups such as shifts in the distribution of governmental power between the
national government and the states.670 In addition, we should carefully
scrutinize governmental efforts that may prevent associations from pursuing
public goods or inclusive social goods in light of the implications for popular
sovereignty.
4. Regulation of Other Associations
On the other hand, governmental regulation of associations that do not
meet the criteria for popular sovereignty is less likely to raise a problem of
constitutional dimension.67 For instance, governmental regulation of low
social capital associations located in the market or in the social medium does
not present a freedom of association issue. Most business entities are neither
high in social capital, nor politically oriented, and they do not have a valid
claim to freedom of association.672 Similarly, most large-scale social
organizations, like sporting leagues, do not merit constitutional protection.
Likewise, organizations such as bar associations that perform quasi-state
regulatory functions are only weakly related to popular sovereignty. The
government should have greater latitude to regulate these kinds of groups.
5. Membership
As we have seen, the issue that has given the Supreme Court the most
trouble is governmental interference-particularly through anti-
discrimination law-with an association's selection of its members. Here,
too, the popular sovereignty account of freedom of association proves useful.
The account makes clear why some associations should not be entitled to a
constitutional defense against the application of anti-discrimination law.
Associations that do not contribute to popular sovereignty may properly be
prevented from discriminating in their membership. Many corporations, for
example, are neither politically oriented, nor high in social capital, nor do
670. See generally Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. LJ. 27 (2001).
671. That is to say, a freedom of association problem. A regulation may, of course, raise some other
constitutional problem.
672. Some associations located in the market medium may be high in social capital and merit




they produce public or inclusive social goods. Thus, corporations are
properly subject to anti-discrimination law,673 as has long been the case.674
With respect to associations entitled to constitutional protection because
of their relationship to popular sovereignty, interference with the selection of
members will not always infringe associational freedom. Let us return to the
associational criteria we have identified as related to popular sovereignty.
The application of anti-discrimination law does not alter an association's
medium. Anti-discrimination law does not impact whether an association is
oriented towards the political medium rather than towards the market or the
social medium. It is also unlikely that anti-discrimination laws alter the type
of goods an association produces. Accordingly, if an association is protected
because it is politically oriented, or protected because of the types of goods
the association produces, the association should not, on these grounds, be
exempt from anti-discrimination law.
Despite the protests of some commentators,675 anti-discrimination law also
does not affect whether an association is voluntary or non-voluntary. IfA, B,
and C are members of an association and they are, by operation of state law,
required to admit D, the association does not, thereby, become any less
voluntary. A, B, and C retain exactly the same option to leave the association
as they did before D arrived. A, B, and C are not required to associate with
anybody, not even with D, to any greater degree than they were before the
application of the law. As Warren puts it, "as long as exit options remain, the
compulsion exercise against the association does not translate into
compulsion against members."676 Accordingly, there should be no exemption
from anti-discrimination law just because an association is voluntary.
Associations that are protected because they entail high social capital are
in a different position. Governmental regulation that prohibits an association
from selecting its own members on whatever basis it chooses is likely to
673. See generally Hunter, supra note 249, at 1613-16.
674. In a comprehensive study of public accommodations laws, Joseph Singer argues that as early as
the eighteenth century, owners of commercial properties had a duty (under laws of implied contract) to
serve all patrons. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L REv. 1283, 1303-31 (1996).
675. See, e.g., Nancy L Rosenblum, Public-Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 282, at 75, 75-108.
676. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION, supra note 279, at 103. For this reason, it is more
appropriate to analyze anti-discrimination laws as burdens on associational freedom rather than as
compelled association. An anti-discrimination law does not compel A, B, and C to associate with D.
Rather, the law mandates that ifA, B, and C wish to associate together, they must also associate with D.
The law therefore imposes a burden on the ability of A, B, and C to get together.
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undermine the association's social capital and the association's contribution
to popular sovereignty. Thus, the application of anti-discrimination law to
high social capital organizations should be subject to strict scrutiny.
We need not speculate, as the Dale Court did, about the impact of certain
kinds of people on group settings to see why this is true. A large body of
research in the social sciences demonstrates that the ability of high social
capital groups to choose their own members, free from any compulsion, is
often a vital condition for the cohesiveness, 677 and effectiveness,678 of the
groups, as well as for the commitment of members to a group679 and their
trust in each other.68° In other words, it is not that the presence of certain
individuals undermines the group, or even that anti-discrimination law per se
affects an association. Rather the problem anti-discrimination law represents
677. See RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES 30-34,44-52 (1988); A. PAUL HARE, HANDBOOK OF
SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 126-66,206-23 (1962); MICHAEL. A. HOGG, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
GROUP COHESIVENESS: FROM ATTRACTION TO SOCIAL IDENTITY 22-30, 35-37, 80-83, 99-100 (1992);
Holly Arrow & Jopseh E. McGrath, Membership Matters: How Member Change and Continuity Affect
Small Group Structure, Process, and Performance, 24 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 334, 355 (1993); Albert
V. Can'on & Lawrence R. Brawley, Cohesion: Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 31 SMALL GROUP
RESEARCH 89, 90 (2000); Nancy J. Evans & Paul A. Jarvis, Group Cohesion: A Review and
Reevaluation, 11 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 359, 361-67 (1980). Cohesion is generally defined as a
commitment of group members to each other and to the work performed by the group. See Barbara A.
Wech et al., Does Work Group Cohesiveness Affect Individuals' Performance and Organizational
Commitment?: A Cross-Level Examination, 29 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 472,473 (1998); Brian Mullen
et al., Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision Making, 25 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 189, 190
(1994).
678. See Albert V. Carron & Kevin S. Spink, The Group-Size Cohesion Relationship in Minimal
Groups, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 86, 86-105 (1995); Stanley M. Gully et al., A Meta-Analysis ofCohesion
and Performance: Effects of Level of Analysis and Task Interdependence, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 497,
512-14 (1995); Claus W. Langfred, Is Group Cohesiveness a Double-Edged Sword?: An Investigation of
the Effects of Cohesiveness on Performance, 29 SMALL GROUP RES. 124, 124-43(1998); Wech et al.
supra note 677, at 473. But see Clint A. Bowers et al., When Member Homogeneity is Needed in Work
Teams: A Meta-Analysis, 31 SMALL GROUP RES. 305,305-27 (2000) (arguing that such effects are small
and limited to certain tasks).
679. See generally G.H. Dobbins & S.J. Zaccaro, The Effects of Group Cohesion and Leader Behavior
on Subordinate Satisfaction, 11 GROUP & ORGANIZATION STUD. 203 (1986); David Knoke, Commitment
and Detachment in Voluntary Associations, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 141 (1981); Harry Prapavessis & Albert V.
Caron, Cohesion and Work Output, 28 SMALL GROUP RES. 294 (1997); Clagett G. Smith & Michael E.
Brown, Communication Structure and Control in a Voluntary Association, 27 SOCIOMETRY 449 (1964);
Wech et al., supra note 677, at 473.
680. See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 67 (1972); Gary Alan Fime &Lori Holyfield, Secrecy, Trust, andDangerous
Leisure: Generating Group Cohesion in VoluntaryAssociations, 59 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 1, 26 (1996); Joseph
Paul Stokes, Components of Group Cohesion: Intermember Attraction, Instrumental Value, and Risk
Taking, 14 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 163, 163-73 (1983). Interfering with membership selection may also
undermine the secrecy upon which some groups depend. See Fine & Holyfield, supra, at 26.
Freedom's Associations
is that, when the government interferes with the selection of an association's
members, the group's social capital often diminishes as a result.
Accordingly, anti-discrimination law only infringes freedom of
association with respect to groups that are protected because they represent
high levels of social capital. For example, it should be unconstitutional for
the government to require women's study groups to admit men: interfering
with the power of the group to select its members undermines social capital
conducive to popular sovereignty. On the other hand, associations that do not
depend on social capital for their constitutional protection lack a valid claim
to exemption from anti-discrimination law. Political parties, for instance, are
constitutionally protected because they operate in the political medium,
rather than on the basis of their social capital (which is often quite low).
Even though political parties have a valid claim to freedom of association,
and the government should be prevented from interfering in other ways with
this freedom, parties should not be exempt from laws that prohibit racial or
other kinds of discrimination. Low social capital organizations do not
depend on unrestrained control over their membership in order to contribute
to popular sovereignty.
6. Popular Sovereignty as Inclusion
Indeed, anti-discrimination law may often enhance the contributions of
politically-oriented groups to popular sovereignty. By increasing popular
participation, anti-discrimination law gives these associations a broader basis
of public support and a stronger mandate. The relevant analogy is the town
hall meeting. At least in idealized form, a town hall meeting involves the
assembly of a cross-section of the community.6"' Inclusion is what gives the
town hall meeting its claim to popular sovereignty.682 Associations that are
inclusive-that look more like town hall meetings-better serve popular
sovereignty than do associations with narrow membership criteria.683 This is
a principle reason the socially inclusive Masons fared better in the early
Republic than did the more selective Democratic-Republican societies.6"
681. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLrICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTIrUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 24-25 (1960).
682. See id.
683. See generally Carl F. Taeusch, Freedom ofAssembly, 63 ETHICS 33, 40-42 (1952).
684. See supra Part V.D.6.
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Both types of organizations influenced government.685 However, by drawing
from a broader social base, the Masons-at least in popular imagination-
enhanced, rather than undermined, popular sovereignty.
686
D. Applications to Previous Cases
Having identified the proper scope of freedom of association, we can now
reevaluate the claims to constitutional protection raised in some of the cases
the Supreme Court has considered. Beginning with Patterson, it is clear that
the NAACP is oriented towards politics and, on this basis, has a strong
relationship to popular sovereignty. The Patterson Court therefore properly
invalidated governmental interference with the ability of NAACP members
to associate together. 87
Political parties are also closely related to popular sovereignty because
their principle function is political influence. The government should be
prevented from interfering with the ability of people to join parties, and with
the ability of parties to influence politics through such things as organizing
rallies, criticizing government policies, disseminating information, and
fielding candidates for public office. However, because their importance lies
in direct influence rather than in the political effects of high social capital,
political parties should not be entitled to discriminate in membership on the
basis of race or similar characteristics. While the Court in the White Primary
Cases invalidated such discrimination as unlawful state action,688 the popular
sovereignty approach presented in this Article suggests that discriminatory
membership is not an aspect of the associational freedom political parties
enjoy.
Unions may have some significance to popular sovereignty, by either
engaging in political influence directly, or, if they are small and intensive
enough, equipping their members with politically relevant skills. On the
other hand, many unions are principally market oriented: they seek, through
collective bargaining, to increase the market position of their members with
respect to wages and conditions of employment. Many unions are also too
large to involve high levels of social capital. Accordingly, unions do not
685. See id.
686. See id.
687. See supra Part II.A.
688. See supra Part l.D.
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always merit constitutional protection. Union activities may, therefore, be
better protected (as they currently are) under statutory law.
689
The Jaycees operates in multiple media. The organization is, in many
respects, a social organization.90 It also exerts political influence.69' Further,
it performs significant market-related functions, for example, by providing
its members with unparalleled access to business opportunities.692 However,
as we have seen, an association's medium is not relevant to the question of
gender discrimination at issue in Roberts. The Jaycees should only be
exempt from anti-discrimination law if an exemption is necessary to
maintain the organization's contributions to popular sovereignty based on
social capital.
Nationally, the Jaycees is an enormous organization, with thousands of
members.6' The national organization has only a very weak claim to
protection based on social capital. Accordingly, the national Jaycees should
not be permitted to exclude women in violation of anti-discrimination law. In
contrast, local chapters of the organization may fare better in claiming that
interference with their selection of members undermines their social capital.
In Roberts, the Minnesota chapter included more than four hundred
members with a high admission rate.694 The level of social capital was likely
quite low. Some local chapters may be sufficiently small and cohesive to
claim that interfering with membership undermines their social capital and
their contributions to popular sovereignty. Such a claim may only be
theoretical. A national organization like the Jaycees might not permit its
local chapters to determine their own membership policies. (In Roberts, the
lawsuit came about after the Minnesota Jaycees sought to admit women in
defiance of the national organization's policy.)695 At the end of the day, the
limitations on associational freedom and the practicalities of associational
life may, therefore, work to prevent discrimination by even local affiliates of
a national organization.
689. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). In addition, because union membership is often non-voluntary, where
a union engages in political influence, individual workers should not be required to finance the union's
political activities. The Court's approach in cases like Abood, therefore, makes sense under a popular
sovereignty approach. See supra Part II.C.
690. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984).
691. See id. at 626.
692. See WARREN. DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCATION, supra note 279, at 243 n.9.
693. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
694. See id. at 621.
695. See id. at 614.
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Even more clearly, freedom of association does not exempt the Boy
Scouts from anti-discrimination laws. Although the BSA is federally
chartered 69 6 and receives various governmental benefits, 697 the organization
operates in the social medium. It is involved in producing and transmitting
norms and values. 698 Accordingly, on the basis of its medium, the BSA has
only a very weak claim to associational freedom. In contrast to politically
oriented associations like political parties or lobbying organizations, the
BSA makes little contribution to popular sovereignty. 699 Nevertheless the
BSA is entitled to associational freedom if it embodies high social capital
and governmental regulations like anti-discrimination law that undermine the
BSA's social capital should be strictly scrutinized. Nationally, the BSA has
more than three million members and more than one million adult leaders.7 0
On a national scale, therefore, the organization's social capital is very low.
Local Scout troops, which contain between eighteen and thirty Scouts,
701
embody higher social capital and have a stronger claim to associational
freedom. Yet the members of a scout troop do not select each other. After
joining the organization, Scouts simply participate in a troop that meets in
their neighborhood. A boy who wants to be a Scout pays the fee, puts on the
uniform, and shows up at a meeting.7 2 Even if a troop embodies high social
capital its social capital plainly does not depend on the ability of individual
troop members to choose who may participate. In other words, even if a
troop is constitutionally significant because it embodies high social capital
and thereby provides its members with politically relevant skills, the troop
696. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 30901 et seq. (2002).
697. See Larry A. Taylor, How Your Tax Dollars Support the Boy Scouts of America, THE HUMANIST,
Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 6-13.
698. Both sides in Dale understood the BSA to be a social organization. See Brief for Petitioners at 2,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) ("It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of
America to serve others by helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to
make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential."); Brief for Respondent at 1, Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699) ("Boy Scouts of America ... is a national
recreational organization").
699. The Dale Court intimates that the BSA operates to some degree in the political medium. See Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653 (2000) ("the organization... send[s] a message ... to ... the
world"); id. at 654. ("the Boy Scouts... propound a... point of view"). Even accepting that some of the
organization's activities may be sufficiently politically oriented to entitle it to some associational freedom,
for the reasons discussed, such freedom would not entitle the BSA to an exemption from anti-
discrimination law.
700. See Boy Scouts of America Annual Report, available athttp www.scouting.org (last visited June
12,2002).
701. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1220 (N.J. 1999).
702. This statement draws on the program information from the Scouts' website. See
http://www.scouting.org. (last visited June 12, 2002).
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can perform that function whether or not the BSA's policy prevents a gay
Scout from joining the troop. Individual troop members do not determine
whether a gay boy, or any other boy, can be a Scout. On a popular
sovereignty account to freedom of association, the result in Dale70 3 is,
therefore, incorrect. Even if the BSA contributes to political life in a manner
contemplated by the assembly and petition clause, those contributions do not
depend on the Scouts' ability to discriminate against gay members.
The analysis highlights how associational freedom protects-and limits-
the activities of organizations that take the form of local units governed by a
national body that sets membership criteria. Such organizations may make
powerful contributions to political life, in large measure, because they can
draw upon a network of members and supporters across the nation. The
organizations' political activities-in the form of lobbying, supporting
candidates, contributing to causes, and disseminating information-deserve
constitutional protection. Local chapters of these organizations may also be
constitutionally significant if the chapters embody high social capital and
impart politically relevant skills to their members. However, if membership
policy is controlled at the national level, the organization will not generally
have a supportable claim that it must be exempt from anti-discrimination
laws. The organization's significance to popular sovereignty does not depend
on the ability of the national organization, or of its local chapters, to select
members free from all governmental interference.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a new approach to freedom of association under
the Constitution. The significance of associations, I have argued, lies in their
contributions to popular sovereignty, rather than to free speech. Some
associations directly engage in political activities. Other associations
promote popular sovereignty by equipping their members with politically
relevant skills. Self-government requires citizens to contribute to public life.
Recognizing how associations enable citizens to exercise political influence
allows us to align freedom of association with a core principle of our
constitutional democracy.
703. See supra Part 1I.F.
768
